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‘The writer must not conceal that his activity is one of arranging.’ 
– Walter Benjamin 
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ABSTRACT 
For many critics, Hamlet’s famous dictum that ‘The time is out of joint’ is to be read as a 
social comment on Shakespeare’s own historical moment (Hamlet, 1.5.189). Generally 
thought to have been written around the same period as Hamlet, Julius Caesar contains a 
similar statement—‘it is a strange-disposèd time,’ Cicero remarks early on in the play 
(1.3.33). In 1599: A Year in the Life of William Shakespeare, James Shapiro suggests that, 
far from being coincidental, this recurring untimeliness in fact pervades the plays 
Shakespeare wrote at the turn of the seventeenth century—and most notably Henry V, 
Julius Caesar and Hamlet. For Shapiro, the many anachronisms that can be found in those 
plays point to a shared, objective core of historical reality (‘Shakespeare came of age when 
time itself was out of joint,’ the critic argues). The idea that the ultimate meaning of 
Shakespeare’s dramas is inextricably bound up with the late Elizabethan (or early Jacobean) 
moment of their production is a central tenet of historicist criticism. Largely due to the 
hegemonic status of new historicism in the field of Shakespeare studies in the last thirty 
years or so, this mode of criticism has become, to a great extent, normative. 
The present work takes issue with the systematic approach that consists in viewing 
Shakespeare’s plays as mere reflections of an overarching, ‘objective’ historical reality. 
Specifically, the thesis challenges the default historicist framework in which many of 
Shakespeare’s plays have been embedded. Thus, Julius Caesar, Hamlet and Henry V are 
here looked at with a large emphasis on the present of interpretation (as opposed to the 
authorial moment). A key thread of the thesis is the sense that the meaning of these plays is 
directly determined by the criticism. In other words, their meaning is essentially 
constructed in the present—a fundamentally unfixed and ever-moving category. 
Accordingly, alleged anachronisms are here viewed as by-products of this subjective 
present. Rather than expressing the objective historical ‘real’ of the dramas, such 
anachronisms are considered to testify to the intrusion of the viewer within the literary 
scene. This implies that the dramas are always already infected not so much by their 
author’s historical moment but by the eye of the critic itself. 
At the heart of the thesis is the sense that Shakespearean drama can be viewed 
through the grid of an aesthetics of untimeliness, which manifests itself in various ways. 
The coexistence of multiple presents of interpretation within the hermeneutic field of the 
plays is one of the ways in which such an aesthetics can be experienced. For instance, the 
colossal criticism of Hamlet guarantees that no one historical elucidation of the play can 
prevail. Alternatively, the diegetic content of the plays can also be used to support the idea 
of an untimely aesthetics. On many occasions, Shakespeare’s dramas comment on the 
inherent disjunction that alienates them from the historical past which they (supposedly) 
purport to stage—this is generally done through the medium of key metadramatic 
characters like the Chorus in Henry V. In either case, complete historical presence is 
negated. Thus, the thesis posits the impossibility of presence—or untimeliness—as a valid 
aesthetic category in view of Shakespeare’s dramas. Each individual chapter illustrates how 
the dramas can be said to aestheticise the intrinsically differential quality of literature. 
Ultimately, the thesis also emphasises how différance, to use Jacques Derrida’s celebrated 
coinage, lies at the heart not only of literature but of all forms of staged entertainment.  
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Unless specified otherwise, all quotations from Shakespeare’s works are from The Norton 
Shakespeare, edited by Stephen Greenblatt, Walter Cohen, Jean Elizabeth Howard and 
Katharine Eisaman Maus (New York and London: Norton, 1997). 
 
 
 
 
 
The Walter Benjamin quotation that appears after the title-page is taken from The Origin of German Tragic 
Drama, translated from the German by John Osborne (London and New York: Verso, 2009), p. 179. 
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INTRODUCTION – SHAKESPEARE OR THE THEATRE OF THE IMPOSSIBLE 
 
 
 
Literature has no definitive meaning or resting place, even if it allows one to explore notions of 
‘definitive meaning’ and ‘resting place’ in especially critical and productive ways. The literary 
work never rests. It does not belong. Literature does not come home: it is strangely homeless, 
strangely free. 
– Nicholas Royle, Jacques Derrida1 
 
 
 
‘SOMETHING REPRESSED WHICH RECURS’: THE MOTIF OF CAESAR’S ROME IN 
SHAKESPEARE’S LATE ELIZABETHAN DRAMAS 
Whether ‘out of joint’ or ‘strange-disposèd,’ time never appears to be quite at one with 
itself in the plays Shakespeare wrote in or around 1599 (Hamlet, 1.5.189; Julius Caesar, 
1.3.33). This, at least, is what critics have recently suggested. In 1599: A Year in the 
Life of William Shakespeare (2005), James Shapiro argues that the dramatist’s ‘writing 
this year rose to a new and extraordinary level’—for ‘in the course of 1599 Shakespeare 
completed Henry the Fifth, wrote Julius Caesar and As You Like It in quick succession, 
then drafted Hamlet.’2 Shapiro is particularly interested in the ways these dramas 
‘tended to spill into each other’ and how ‘the technical innovations in one led to 
advances in the next.’ This ‘cross-pollination of the plays,’ as he calls it, manifests itself 
through recurring motifs.3 Overflowing the borders of Julius Caesar (generally viewed 
as Shakespeare’s arch-Roman play), the theme of Caesar’s Rome—as well as the 
historical figure of Caesar himself—echoes in the series of plays singled out by Shapiro 
in his study.4 Quoting from Sigmund Freud’s influential essay on the uncanny, Marjorie 
                                                
1 Nicholas Royle, Jacques Derrida (London and New York: Routledge, 2003), p. 45. 
2 James Shapiro, 1599: A Year in the Life of William Shakespeare (London: Faber and Faber, 2005), p. xv. 
3 Ibid., pp. 366 and 367. 
4 ‘Julius Caesar was not the first text in which Shakespeare dealt with the life and reputation of the 
Roman dictator,’ Richard Wilson remarks. In fact, ‘the very first scene of the play thought to be his 
earliest work for the stage, Henry VI, Part 1, opens with the Duke of Bedford predicting in Westminster 
Abbey that the soul of Henry V will make a far more glorious star […] Than Julius Caesar or bright—.’ 
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Garber remarks that the theme of ‘Rome, Caesar’s Rome, is the “something repressed 
which recurs”’ in Shakespeare’s dramas.5 As Shapiro observes, the recurrence of this 
specific theme in the plays written in or around 1599 is indeed uncanny. Towards the 
end of Henry V, the Chorus invokes ‘the senators of th’antique Rome’; and in As You 
Like It Rosalind knowingly alludes to ‘Caesar’s thrasonical brag of “I came, I saw, I 
overcame”’ (5.0.26; 5.2.27-28). Even uncannier are the repeated references to Caesar in 
Hamlet. ‘Of all Shakespeare’s plays, it is perhaps in Hamlet that we feel most the 
ghostly, dislocated presence and pressure of Julius Caesar,’ Garber observes.6 In the 
first scene of the play, Horatio provides a detailed account of the supernatural events 
that allegedly took place ‘A little ere the mightiest Julius fell’ (1.1.106.7); and later on 
in the play, Polonius remembers: ‘I did enact Julius Caesar. I was killed i’th’capitol; 
Brutus killed me’ (3.2.93-94).7 Drawing on the literary sources, critics have pointed out 
that ‘the legend of Hamlet comes down to us from prehistoric Denmark’, which means 
that it predates Caesar’s Rome by at least several hundred (if not several thousand) 
years.8 If the repeated invocation in Hamlet of the legendary Roman statesman is 
uncanny, it is because, from a strictly chronological point of view at least, it is an 
anachronism. 
 
                                                                                                                                          
Thus, ‘right from the beginning, it seems, Shakespeare found the example of Julius Caesar ominous, and 
the story of the general who conquered Gaul to build an empire a dangerous precedent for the English’ 
(Richard Wilson, Penguin Critical Studies: Julius Caesar (London: Penguin, 1992), p. 4). 
5 Marjorie Garber, ‘A Rome of One’s Own’, Shakespeare’s Ghost Writers: Literature as Uncanny 
Causality [1987] (New York and London: Routledge, 2010), p. 82. 
6 Ibid., p. 95. 
7 It is perhaps worth noting, as a token of the uncanny circularity of the concept of Caesar’s Rome in the 
Western unconscious, that Freud himself admitted to having played the part of Brutus—‘strange to say,’ 
he recalls, ‘I really once did play the part of Brutus. I once acted in the scene between Brutus and Caesar 
from Schiller [Die Räuber] before an audience of children’ (The Interpretation of Dreams [1899], 
translated from the German by James Strachey (New York: Avon Books, 1965), p. 460). 
8 David Bevington, Murder Most Foul: Hamlet Through the Ages (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2011), p. 7. 
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A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF ‘SHAKESPEARE’S ANACHRONISMS’ IN THE CRITICISM 
It would be difficult to investigate the question of untimeliness in Shakespeare without 
considering to some extent the topic of anachronism. Critics have long noted that 
Shakespeare’s works contain ‘anachronisms’—generally defined as temporal 
inconsistencies in view of official recorded history.9 There is a long tradition, starting in 
the eighteenth century, of scanning the plays for such instances.10 Literary anachronisms 
in the period were often treated with haughty disapproval: they were considered as 
authorial blunders that needed to be acknowledged and, in most cases, corrected. 
Shakespeare’s works were particularly exposed to such editorial ‘corrections’—
eighteenth-century editions of the plays are known for their textual revisionism.11 The 
widespread stereotype according to which Shakespeare had lacked a formal education, 
amongst other factors, reinforced editors’ self-righteousness and often justified the 
systematic amendment of what were viewed as regrettable chronological ‘errors’ within 
the dramas. But the tide turned in the nineteenth century: the overarching influence of 
Romantic ideas on literary criticism meant that such ‘mistakes’ did not matter so much 
to critics anymore (although, it is worth noting, they remained mistakes).12 In fact, the 
                                                
9 The first chapter of this thesis (‘“Violator of Chronology”: Shakespeare’s Anachronisms in Con-text(s)’) 
provides a detailed account of the treatment of anachronism in Shakespeare criticism, with references to 
the relevant criticism. 
10 See, for instance, Francis Douce, ‘On the Anachronisms and some other Incongruities of Shakspeare’, 
Illustrations of Shakspeare, and of Ancient Manners: With Dissertations on the Clowns and Fools of 
Shakspeare; on the Collection of Popular Tales Entitled Gesta Romanorum; and on the English Morris 
Dance (London: Richard Taylor, 1807), pp. 281-96. See also Paul Stapfer, Shakespeare and Classical 
Antiquity: Greek and Latin Antiquity as Presented in Shakespeare’s Plays, translated from the French by 
Emily Jane Carey (London: Kegan Paul, 1880). 
11 The editions of Shakespeare’s works by Samuel Johnson (1765) and Edmond Malone (1790) (two of 
the most authoritative editors and critics in the period) repeatedly address anachronisms as mistakes. For 
Johnson, the anachronisms are ‘faults’ perpetrated by a ‘violator of chronology’—the expression appears 
in the preface to his edition of the works (reprinted in Critical Theory Since Plato, edited by Hazard 
Adams (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1971), p. 333). Malone reads temporal deviations in 
Shakespeare as evidence that ‘our author is guilty of an anachronism’ (the phrase is reprinted in A New 
Variorum Edition of Henry the Fourth Part I, edited by Samuel Burdett Hemingway (Philadelphia and 
London: Joshua Ballinger Lippincott, 1936), p. 210n). 
12 See Wilhelm Michael Anton Creizenach, English Drama in the Age of Shakespeare [1893-1916] 
(Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1916), pp. 156-57. 
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whole question of anachronism seemed to vanish from the arena of Shakespeare 
criticism throughout most of the twentieth century; anachronisms, as discrete erroneous 
instances in the plays, were often viewed as insignificant details that could only catch 
the interest of old-fashioned, pedantic scholars.13 Such trifles could in no way interfere 
with the universal genius of the author—this, at least, was a widespread view in the 
period. It was not until the late twentieth century that the notion was addressed again by 
critics.14 This resurgence was inextricably bound up with the developments of new 
historicism and cultural materialism from the early 1980s onwards. With a large 
emphasis on the early modern context in which Shakespeare’s plays were produced, this 
‘return of history in literary criticism’ profoundly altered the meanings and implications 
of anachronisms.15 Using strategies of systematic historical contextualisation, new 
historicists and cultural materialists positioned literary texts in relation to other aspects 
of the social formation within which those texts were produced. 
 
HISTORICISM’S SHAKESPEARE: ANACHRONISMS AS FRAGMENTARY REFLECTIONS OF AN 
AUTHENTIC HISTORICAL SCENE 
Within the critical moment of new historicism, anachronisms could no longer be 
ignored or dismissed as mere incongruities. Instead, they acquired a new, history-laden 
value in the eyes of many critics. Thus, when the common people in Julius Caesar 
throw their ‘sweaty night-caps’ up in the air or ‘pluck’ each other ‘by the sleeve,’ we 
are told that those instances are to be read as a direct effect of an overarching early 
                                                
13 Mungo William MacCallum, Shakespeare’s Roman Plays and Their Background (London: Macmilllan, 
1910), p. 82. 
14 Charles and Michelle Martindale, Shakespeare and the Uses of Antiquity: An Introductory Essay 
(London and New York: Routledge, 1990), pp. 123-24. 
15 Richard Wilson, ‘Historicising New Historicism’, New Historicism and Renaissance Drama, edited by 
Richard Dutton and Richard Wilson (London and New York: Longman, 1992), p. 1. 
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modern reality intruding into the drama (1.2.244 and 180).16 There have been divergent 
views in recent historicist criticism on the question of whether such anachronisms are 
the result of authorial intention. Breaking with an age-old critical tradition that treated 
anachronisms as blunders, Phyllis Rackin presents them as ‘a crucial Shakespearean 
strategy’ that dramatises the distance between past and present.17 Other history-oriented 
critics maintain that there is nothing deliberate about most of the anachronisms that 
have been found in the dramas: in fact, for those critics, the supposed lack of intention 
on Shakespeare’s part testifies to the anachronisms’ function as gateways to the 
historical unconscious of the text. Shapiro, for instance, considers some key 
anachronisms as reflections of the author’s late Elizabethan moment, which ‘seeps into 
the play at the most unexpected and sometimes unintended moments.’18 In this sense, 
the sheer profusion of anachronisms in Julius Caesar implies that there is something 
uncontrollable at work in this play—‘something that has been repressed and now 
returns,’ in Freud’s celebrated phrase. 19  Taking Freud’s insight on board, many 
historicist accounts rely on the implicit postulate that the experience of Shakespeare’s 
drama is determined by an all-encompassing historical reality. The experience of the 
return of the repressed is particularly powerful in plays like Henry V, Julius Caesar or 
Hamlet, Shapiro argues. Thus, in the opening scene of Julius Caesar, Pompey’s return 
to Rome is described ‘in a passage whose topography, with its walls, towers, windows, 
chimney tops, crammed streets and great river, would have been familiar to Londoners 
                                                
16 The footnotes to the Norton edition of the plays testify to a general historical bias towards late 
Elizabethan and early Jacobean England. Thus, the occurrence of ‘sweaty night-caps’ documents the fact 
that ‘artisans wore felt hats on holidays’—in Shakespeare’s time, the footnote implies (Greenblatt, The 
Norton Shakespeare, p. 1540). 
17  Phyllis Rackin, ‘Temporality, Anachronism, and Presence in Shakespeare’s English Histories’, 
Renaissance Drama 27 (1986), 101-23, p. 103. 
18 Shapiro, 1599, p. 100. 
19 Sigmund Freud, The Uncanny, edited by Hugh Haughton, translated from the German by David 
McLintock (London: Penguin, 2003), p. 147. 
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in Shakespeare’s time.’20 For Shapiro and many other historicist critics, anachronisms 
feature as fragmentary reflections of a whole, original historical scene, which 
constitutes the ‘real’ boiling underneath a deceptively smooth literary surface. Viewed 
through the lens of much historicist criticism, the historical ‘real’ of Julius Caesar 
indicates that there is perfect congruence between Caesar’s Rome and Shakespeare’s 
London. 
 
1599, A YEAR IN THE LIFE OF WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE: A KEY INSTANCE OF HISTORICIST 
CRITICISM 
The emphasis on Shapiro’s book (over any other specific historicist account of 
Shakespearean drama) in this introduction is deliberate. In 1599, Shakespearean drama 
is explored through the notion of untimeliness, which is also the central theme of the 
present thesis—as will become clear shortly, the untimely is here explored as an 
aesthetic category in its own right. This affinity (which, it should be said, does not 
extend beyond the realm of the thematic) notably accounts for the choice of the plays 
addressed in the three central chapters of this thesis: with the exception of As You Like 
It, the thesis examines the same works as Shapiro (namely Henry V, Julius Caesar and 
Hamlet).21 On a different level, 1599 also crystallises the recent return, in Shakespeare 
criticism, to the practice that consists in reading the plays exclusively through their 
authorial moment: ‘what Shakespeare achieved and what Elizabethans experienced this 
year […] are nearly inextricable,’ Shapiro writes.22 For the prize-winning American 
                                                
20 Shapiro, 1599, p. 174. 
21 A key methodological concern of the thesis lies in how critics react to literary works which they 
experience as historically loaded. As You Like It is not here examined as it has not been viewed as 
dramatising its historicity to the same extent as other plays produced in the same period. Whether it is 
medieval England, ancient Rome or pre-Christian Denmark, Henry V, Julius Caesar and Hamlet all posit 
a specific (although superficial) spatio-temporal setting. While it is true that As You Like It dramatises the 
temporal contrast between court and forest (‘There’s no clock / in the forest,’ Orlando declares playfully), 
the play is rarely viewed through the lens of a specific historical period (3.2.275-76). 
22 Shapiro, 1599, p. 1. 
 
 
11 
critic, but also for many other historicists, the untimeliness that can be experienced in 
the plays is inextricably (or very ‘nearly’ so) bound up with late Elizabethan politics.23 
Therefore, ‘it’s [not] possible to talk about Shakespeare’s plays independently of his 
age,’ Shapiro claims rather confidently in the preface to his book.24 Viewed as a whole, 
the present thesis can be described as an examination and subsequent refutation of this 
single statement. The essentialistic notion that the ultimate meaning of Shakespeare’s 
plays is anchored in a specific ‘age’ is here repeatedly questioned. Thus, each individual 
chapter of the thesis can be viewed as a demonstration of the possibility of talking about 
Shakespeare’s plays independently of ‘his age’. A guiding thread throughout is the 
sense (and there is nothing new or especially groundbreaking about this recognition) 
that there is no exclusive ‘age’ that the dramas demand to be viewed through. This 
notion inevitably challenges the conviction, implicit in much historicist criticism, that 
the dramas contain an inalienable core of historical presence. Thus, the present work 
takes issue with the systematic approach that consists in viewing Shakespeare’s plays as 
mere reflections of an overarching, ‘objective’ historical reality. Specifically, the thesis 
challenges the default historicist framework in which many of Shakespeare’s plays have 
been embedded. Thus, Julius Caesar, Hamlet and Henry V are here looked at with a 
large emphasis on the present of interpretation (as opposed to the authorial moment). A 
key thread of the thesis is the sense that the meaning of these plays is directly 
determined by the criticism. In other words, their meaning is essentially constructed in 
the present—a fundamentally unfixed and ever-moving category. This approach notably 
aims at challenging the hegemonic status of new historicism in Shakespeare studies. 
 
 
                                                
23 1599 won the 2006 BBC Four Samuel Johnson Prize for Non-Fiction. 
24 Shapiro, 1599, pp. xv-xvi. 
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‘I SHOULD BE THE ONE TO KNOW’: HISTORICISING NEW HISTORICISM 
Looking back to the last thirty years or so, critics have recently pointed out the extent to 
which ‘Shakespeare criticism has […] been dominated […] by the mode of critical 
thought termed “the new historicism”.’25 Not only seeking to provide an alternative to 
the timeless formalisms of new criticism (the predominant critical mode in literary 
studies until the late 1970s), new historicism had also defined itself against a so-called 
‘old’ historicism (which prevailed in the early twentieth century). While old historicism 
was solely preoccupied with ‘the historicity of texts’, new historicism also insisted, in 
Louis Montrose’s phrase, on ‘the textuality of history.’26 In its early stages, the critical 
movement included a strong self-reflexive element and displayed a characteristic 
resistance to classification. In his introduction to New Historicism and Renaissance 
Drama, Richard Wilson argues that this ‘strategic eclecticism’ was indebted to a 
generation of French philosophers who broke with Marxism in the early 1970s and 
called themselves the nouveaux philosophes (‘new philosophers’).27 Generally viewed 
as the starting point of new historicism, Stephen Greenblatt’s influential Renaissance 
Self-Fashioning (1980) testifies to this diversity (the book deals with historical figures 
as varied as Thomas More, William Tyndale, Thomas Wyatt, Edmund Spenser, 
Christopher Marlowe and Shakespeare). In an attempt to define—or rather ‘situate’, as 
he puts it—new historicism in a 1986 address, Greenblatt alluded to his general 
reluctance to ‘endorse propositions or embrace a particular philosophy, politics or 
rhetoric.’ Therefore, he insisted that new historicism is ‘a practice rather than a doctrine, 
                                                
25 Duncan Salkeld, ‘Shakespeare Studies, Presentism and Micro-History’, in Cahiers Élisabéthains 76 
(2009), 35-43, p. 36. 
26 Louis Adrian Montrose, ‘Professing the Renaissance: The Poetics and Politics of Culture’, in The New 
Historicism, edited by Harold Aram Veeser (New York: Routledge, 1989), 15-36, p. 20. 
27 Richard Wilson, ‘Historicising New Historicism’, p. 4. 
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since as far as I can tell (and I should be the one to know) it’s no doctrine at all.’28 This 
statement represents no less than Greenblatt’s official claim to authority over the 
concept. In a very insightful essay aimed at ‘Historicizing New Historicism’, Catherine 
Belsey notes that ‘new historicism was in effect Greenblatt’s creation.’ Indeed, ‘the 
credit for establishing the concerns and modelling the outlines of new historicism must 
go to Greenblatt himself, who invented the name in 1982.’ And ‘that credit, or at least 
the responsibility, was one that Greenblatt himself was disarmingly prepared to accept.’ 
Paraphrasing the American critic’s memorable formulation, Belsey suggests (with more 
than a touch of irony) that ‘he should indeed be the one to know. And as he indicates, 
new historicism was institutionalized extraordinarily fast, academically speaking.’ The 
publication in 1986 of a special issue of the journal English Literary Renaissance on 
new historicism, which included an ‘authoritative account of the movement’s main 
concerns’ by Montrose, was ‘a sure sign of success,’ Belsey remarks.29 
 
‘YOUNG SCAMELS FROM THE ROCK’: THE WANING OF NEW HISTORICISM 
While the academic success of new historicism remained largely unquestioned in the 
1980s and for most of the 1990s, ‘there has, for some years now, been a gathering sense 
that this hitherto dominant critical movement is on the wane,’ Duncan Salkeld pointed 
out in a recent overview of the current state of Shakespeare studies.30 For Salkeld, the 
‘waning’ of new historicism can be detected in Greenblatt’s treatment of a single word 
                                                
28 Stephen Greenblatt, ‘Towards a Poetics of Culture’, in Learning to Curse: Essays in Early Modern 
Culture [1990] (Oxon: Routledge, 2007), pp. 197-98. The essay is the transcript of a lecture given at the 
University of Western Australia on 4 September 1986 and was originally published in Southern Review 
20(1) (1987), 3-15. 
29 Catherine Belsey, ‘Historicizing New Historicism’, in Presentist Shakespeares, edited by Hugh Grady 
and Terence Hawkes (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), 27-45, pp. 27-28. 
30 Salkeld, ‘Shakespeare Studies, Presentism and Micro-History’, p. 36. 
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in The Tempest. In ‘Learning to Curse’, the American critic examines the complex 
quality of Caliban’s rhetoric by singling out a particular passage, reproduced below: 
I prithee, let me bring thee where crabs grow; 
And I with my long nails will dig thee pig-nuts; 
Show thee a jay’s nest, and instruct thee how 
To snare the nimble marmoset; I’ll bring thee 
To clustering filberts, and sometimes I’ll get thee 
Young scamels from the rock. Wilt thou go with me? 
(2.2.159-64) 
What characterises this passage, on the level of syntax, is its rhetorical intricacy: ‘the 
rich, irreducible concreteness of the verse compels us to acknowledge the independence 
and integrity of Caliban’s construction of reality,’ Greenblatt argues. More importantly, 
‘Caliban’s world has what we may call opacity,’ the critic suggests. Many of the 
expressions in this passage—including ‘pig-nut’, ‘marmoset’ and ‘clustering filberts’—
testify to this opacity. For Greenblatt, ‘the perfect emblem of that opacity is the fact that 
we do not to this day know the meaning of the word “scamel”.’ And ‘so,’ he concludes, 
‘most of the people of the New World will never speak to us. That communication with 
all that we might have learned, is lost to us forever.’31 Commenting on Greenblatt’s 
reading of the passage, Salkeld admits that ‘the argument is poignant and powerful.’ 
But in The Norton Shakespeare [published in 1997], Greenblatt follows the 1986 
Oxford emendation of ‘scamels’ to ‘seamews’, an alteration based on a 
supposed compositorial misreading. A seamew is a seagull and well suits the 
context of jays’ nests amid clustering filberts. Yet to favour ‘seamews’ over 
‘scamels’ is to be convinced of something. It is to regard an argument for 
compositorial misreading as somehow more compelling, more historically valid, 
than an interpretation guided by ideology. On the smallest of orthographical 
points, a solidifying new historicism has silently melted into air. Contractual 
obligations may have constrained the Norton editors to keep, by and large, to the 
Oxford text. Yet to make sense of ‘scamels’ is to encounter questions of 
historical plausibility. ‘Scamels’ remains an intriguing mystery, but its 
                                                
31 Stephen Greenblatt, ‘Learning to Curse: Aspects of Linguistic Colonialism in the Sixteenth Century’, in 
Learning to Curse, pp. 43 and 45. The essay was originally published in First Images of America: The 
Impact of the New World on the Old, edited by Fredi Chiapelli (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 1976), pp. 561-80. 
 
 
15 
illegibility means that we cannot make anything we like of it. Limits of 
warranted assertion, persuasiveness and argument must apply.32 
What is here implied is that Greenblatt’s editorial compromise over a single word in his 
edition of Shakespeare’s works marks the end of a certain new historicism—the one that 
defined itself through its resistance to classification and overt reluctance to foreclose the 
meaning of texts. For ‘to favour “seamews” over “scamels” is to be convinced of 
something’, Salkeld maintains. This is significant—especially in the light of 
Greenblatt’s initial reading of the phrase (which dates back to 1976) as an inviolable 
symbol of literary opacity.33 
 
NEW HISTORICISM AND POSTSTRUCTURALISM 
Whether an effect of the large-scale institutionalisation of new historicism or of its 
subsequent waning, Greenblatt’s semantic foreclosure of ‘scamels’ in The Norton 
Shakespeare brings into play an assumption of presence that subverts his earlier claims 
for the movement. This abjuration of opacity brings new historicism surprisingly close 
to the old historicism from which the critic was so keen to distance himself in the 1980s. 
According to Cary DiPietro and Hugh Grady, ‘it is becoming harder and harder to 
distinguish much recent historicist criticism from an earlier generation’s old historicism.’ 
For ‘methods which once challenged complacency as the new historicism and cultural 
materialism of the 1980s have slowly evolved into today’s de-radicalized historicism.’34 
This potential for de-radicalisation can be detected in new historicism’s dubious—or 
                                                
32 Salkeld, ‘Shakespeare Studies, Presentism and Micro-History’, p. 41. For Greenblatt’s glossing of 
‘seamews’ as ‘seagulls’, see The Norton Shakespeare, p. 3081. 
33 The definition of ‘scamel’ in the online Urban Dictionary as ‘the generic name for a word whose 
meaning is not known’—as in ‘foreign languages are full of scamel’—suggests the extent to which 
Greenblatt’s early reading of the phrase has seeped into the Anglo-Saxon cultural unconscious. ‘Scamel’, 
Urban Dictionary, http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=scamel [accessed 29 January 2013]. 
34 Cary DiPietro and Hugh Grady, ‘Presentism, Anachronism and the Case of Titus Andronicus’, 
Shakespeare 8(1) (2012), 44-73, p. 49. 
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‘disingenuous,’ as Greenblatt himself calls it—relation to literary theory, which was 
manifest from the beginning. In his 1986 lecture, quoted above, Greenblatt explained 
that ‘what distinguishes the new historicism from the positivist historical scholarship of 
the early twentieth century’ is ‘an openness to the theoretical ferment of the last few 
years.’ While putting great emphasis on ‘the presence of Michel Foucault on the 
Berkeley campus’ during those years, Greenblatt also acknowledges ‘the influence in 
America of European (and especially French) anthropological and social theorists,’ 
which ‘helped to shape [his] own literary critical practice.’ Significantly, one of the 
aims of his intervention was to ‘situate [him]self in relation to […] poststructuralism.’35 
Looking back to the critical reception of Renaissance Self-Fashioning, Belsey points 
out that ‘the early accounts stressed the influence of poststructuralism on the 
composition of the book.’ In fact, ‘by the end of the 1980s it had become an established 
“fact” that [Greenblatt’s] model of self-fashioning was derived directly from 
poststructuralism in general and Foucault in particular. Since then, this view has been 
widely reiterated.’36 Wilson, for instance, acknowledges ‘Foucault’s thesis that truth is 
an effect of words, and knowledge the exercise of power’ as a central theoretical axiom 
of new historicism. Thus, by invoking the ghost of the French thinker in his 1986 
lecture, Greenblatt proposed what was in effect ‘a big bang theory of the origin of New 
Historicism.’ ‘But there is irony in this tribute,’ Wilson remarks, ‘since the message 
Foucault brought to America was that there is no founding moment, because every 
utterance or event has to be understood as part of something else.’37 
 
                                                
35 Greenblatt, ‘Towards a Poetics of Culture’, p. 197. 
36 Belsey, ‘Historicizing New Historicism’, p. 29. This idea is put forward by several contributors in 
Veeser, The New Historicism. See notably the essays by Gerald Graff (‘Co-optation’, 168-81), Elizabeth 
Fox-Genovese (‘Literary Criticism and the Politics of the New Historicism’, 213-24) and Frank 
Lentricchia (‘Foucault’s Legacy: A New Historicism?’, 231-42). 
37 Wilson, ‘Historicising New Historicism’, pp. 1-2. 
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RENAISSANCE SELF-FASHIONING, OR HOW NEW HISTORICISM IS BASED ON A MISREADING 
OF FOUCAULT’S POWER/RESISTANCE DIALECTIC 
There is irony not only in Greenblatt’s own tribute but also in the continued association, 
in the literary criticism of the last thirty years, of the American critic’s work with 
Foucault’s theory of power. In his inaugural lecture at the Collège de France (1970), 
Foucault declared that ‘power is reinforced by the complicity of those who are 
dominated’ and that ‘it is transmitted by and through them.’38 Crystallising the French 
thinker’s preoccupation with the complex dialectic between power and resistance, this 
maxim would appear as a central theme in Greenblatt’s early work. But, and as Belsey 
brilliantly demonstrates in her essay, new historicism (and Renaissance Self-Fashioning 
in particular) was founded on a misreading of Foucault. In The History of Sexuality 
(1976), Foucault returned to his analysis of the power-resistance paradigm in greater 
detail: 
Where there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, this 
resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power. Should it be 
said that one is always ‘inside’ power, there is no escaping it, there is no 
absolute outside where it is concerned, because one is subject to the law in any 
case? Or that, history being the ruse of reason, power is the ruse of history, 
always emerging the winner?39 
In other words, and as Belsey rephrases it, Foucault’s central question here is: ‘should 
we say that power always prevails over resistance?’40 For Greenblatt, the answer is clear: 
power must necessarily prevail. His early work systematically undermines the 
possibility for a resistance that would not collude with the power that created it. As 
Belsey notes, Renaissance Self-Fashioning presents ‘a succession of figures who shape 
themselves in relation to the prevailing authority.’ Marlowe’s protagonists, in particular, 
                                                
38 Michel Foucault, ‘The Order of Discourse: Inaugural Lecture, Collège de France’, translated from the 
French by Ian McLeod, Untying the Text: Post-Structuralist Reader, edited by Robert Young (London: 
Routledge, 1981), 48-78, p. 52. 
39 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume 1, An Introduction, translated from the French by 
Robert Hurley (London: Allen Lane, 1979), p. 95. 
40 Belsey, ‘Historicizing New Historicism’, p. 32. 
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‘consistently fashion themselves in defiance of authority. But, true to type, they do not 
thereby escape the social system’s shaping power.’41 On the contrary, Greenblatt writes, 
the attempts to challenge this system—Tamburlaine’s world conquests, 
Barabas’s Machiavellianism, Edward’s homosexuality, and Faustus’s 
scepticism—are subjected to relentless probing and exposed as unwitting 
tributes to that social construction of identity against which they struggle.42 
For Belsey, Renaissance Self-Fashioning testifies to the sense that ‘there is in 
Greenblatt’s 1980 analysis no rebellion that is not complicit with the power that 
produced it, and no chance of a revolt that is not subject to co-option or worse.’43 It 
would be easy to blame Foucault for evading his own questions and leaving the difficult 
task of providing meaningful answers up to his readers. Along with most twentieth-
century French thinkers associated with poststructuralism, Foucault has often been 
accused of rhetorical obscurantism.44 It is certainly worth noting that Foucault duly 
answers the question he raises in The History of Sexuality. Should we say that power 
always prevails over resistance? Here is Foucault’s answer: 
To suppose that power always prevails would be to misunderstand the strictly 
relational character of power relationships. Their existence depends on a 
multiplicity of points of resistance: these play the role of adversary, target, 
support, or handle in power relations. These points of resistance are present 
everywhere in the power network. […] There is a plurality of resistances, each 
of them a special case: resistances that are possible, necessary, improbable; 
others that are spontaneous, savage, solitary, concerted, rampant, or violent; still 
others that are quick to compromise, interested, or sacrificial; by definition, they 
can only exist in the strategic field of power relations. But this does not mean 
                                                
41 Ibid., pp. 32-33. 
42 Stephen Greenblatt, Renaissance Self-Fashioning: From More to Shakespeare (Chicago, IL: University 
of Chicago Press, 1980), p. 209. 
43 Belsey, ‘Historicizing New Historicism’, p. 33. 
44 In an article entitled ‘Foucault and the Revolutionary Self-Castration of the Left’ (2011), Jérôme 
Emmanuel Roos voices his frustration at what he feels is Foucault’s ‘obscurantist writings.’ More 
generally, Roos describes what he calls the thinkers of ‘the post-1968 Left’ as ‘a bunch of fashionable 
bourgeois intellectuals holding obscure and unintelligible conversations about the linguistic construction 
of social reality.’ The article was published on Roos’ website, ROARMAG.org: reflections on a revolution 
(1 December 2011)—‘an online magazine of radical critique and revolutionary imagination.’ 
(http://roarmag.org/2011/12/foucault-chomsky-left-postmodernism-poststructuralism-anarchism/, 
accessed 5 February 2013). 
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that they are only a reaction or rebound, forming with respect to the basic 
domination an underside that is in the end passive, doomed to perpetual defeat.45 
For mysterious reasons, Foucault’s answer to his own question has been largely ignored 
by critics; this is all the more puzzling when we know that the answer figures on the 
same page as the question (it is not hidden in a footnote or strategically deferred to 
another section of the book). Unsurprisingly, this overlooking has had a major impact 
on the reception of Foucault’s theory of power in America. 
 
‘WE ARE ALWAYS FREE’: FOUCAULT’S ACCOUNT OF RESISTANCE 
Greenblatt’s Renaissance Self-Fashioning provides a striking instance, if not the 
founding instance, of what has now become a standard misreading of Foucault. It is 
certainly not to be ruled out that the widespread view of the French thinker as a 
determinist may be, to a large extent, the creation of new historicism itself.46 As Belsey 
demonstrates in her essay, there is a major rift between Foucault’s account of power and 
that of Greenblatt in his landmark 1980 book: 
What is distinctive and surprising in Foucault’s version is its instability: power 
is always threatened, perpetually precarious. In Greenblatt’s version, power 
works: irresistible, pervasive, it incites self-fashioning and takes advantage of 
attempts at subversion to intensify repression.47 
Viewed in this light, Greenblatt’s account of power essentially operates a foreclosure of 
Foucault’s open-ended theory of resistance. In its assertion that power inexorably 
‘works’, the American critic’s narrative effectively negates the multiple sites of 
resistance posited by the French thinker. In other words, and as Belsey maintains, the 
                                                
45 Foucault, The History of Sexuality, pp. 95-96. 
46 Roos argues, and this is a common criticism, that ‘Foucault’s critique of Western civilization [is] a 
deterministic one’ because it implies that ‘there is ultimately no way for willful agents to escape the 
choking grasp of their culture without reproducing the same forms of oppression they are trying to 
overcome.’ Rehearsing a key new historicist assumption, Roos suggests that, ‘far from posing a counter-
hegemonic challenge to the dominant powers in the world, Foucault’s armchair philosophy simply made 
resistance impossible’ (‘Foucault and the revolutionary self-castration of the Left’). 
47 Belsey, ‘Historicizing New Historicism’, p. 36. 
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new historicist assumption that resistance is always complicit with power is 
fundamentally at odds with Foucault’s account. 
Resistances as Foucault defines them are untidy, unpredictable: they are plural, 
heterogeneous, sometimes co-opted, sometimes not, not necessarily sympathetic, 
not always effective. There is no Romantic idealization of resistances here, and 
no promise that history will permit them to triumph. But nor is there any 
concession to the view that they are ‘doomed to perpetual defeat’.48 
In her insistence on the potential for resistance, Belsey calls attention to a key difference 
between new historicism and its British counterpart cultural materialism. While the 
former focuses on how social and ideological structures restrain subjects, the latter often 
stresses the ongoing potential for resistance. ‘To British historicist critics in the Eighties 
[…], Renaissance texts were sites of conflict, not containment,’ Wilson writes. And 
while ‘materialist criticism would admit that “power uses circuses”, […] it would also 
affirm that no sign system, however dominant, is truly global.’49 This view was 
epitomised in Belsey’s influential book, The Subject of Tragedy (1985), which was 
concerned with how ‘subjects […] exceed the space allotted to them’ and ‘“work by 
themselves” to challenge as well as confirm the existing order.’50 The treatment, by 
many cultural materialists, of early modern texts as sites of conflict is undeniably more 
in line with Foucault’s account of power than the new historicist narrative of 
containment. In a late interview, Foucault was asked to consider the power-resistance 
relationship and the implication, often associated with his work, that ‘we are always 
trapped inside that relationship.’ ‘I don’t think the word trapped is a correct one,’ he 
replied: 
It is a struggle, but what I mean by power relations is the fact that we are in a 
strategic situation towards each other. For instance, being homosexuals, we are 
in a struggle with the government, and the government is in a struggle with us. 
                                                
48 Ibid., p. 34. 
49 Wilson, ‘Historicising New Historicism’, p. 13. 
50 Catherine Belsey, The Subject of Tragedy: Identity and Difference in Renaissance Drama (London: 
Routledge, 1985), p. 224. 
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When we deal with the government, the struggle, of course, is not symmetrical, 
the power situation is not the same, but we are in this struggle, and the 
continuation of this situation can influence the behavior or nonbehavior of the 
other. So we are not trapped. We are always in this kind of situation. It means 
that we have always possibilities, there are always possibilities of changing the 
situation. We cannot jump outside the situation, and there is no point where you 
are free from all power relations. But you can always change it. So what I’ve 
said does not mean that we are always trapped, but that we are always free. Well 
anyway, that there is always the possibility of changing. […] You see, if there 
was no resistance, there would be no power relations. Because it would simply 
be a matter of obedience. You have to use power relations to refer to the 
situation where you’re not doing what you want. So resistance comes first, and 
resistance remains superior to the forces of the process; power relations are 
obliged to change with the resistance. So I think that resistance is the main word, 
the key word, in this dynamic.51 
It is easy to see, in the light of these comments, how Foucault’s account of resistance 
provided the theoretical framework for cultural materialism. By contrast, his conviction 
that resistance is ‘the key word’ in the power-resistance dynamic sits ill at ease with the 
literary politics of new historicism. 
 
GREENBLATT’S ‘DISINGENUOUS’ RELATION WITH FRENCH THEORY—THE INSTANCE OF 
DERRIDA 
In their allegiance to new historicism, cultural materialists themselves have often 
misconstrued the role of poststructuralism in the development of Greenblatt’s creation. 
Alan Sinfield, for instance, remarked that ‘this historicism is “new” in that it draws 
upon [a] range of theoretical innovations’ directly affiliated with poststructuralism.52 
However, Belsey’s recent historical survey of the American movement brings a timely 
rectification to this assumption. Thus, she argues that the unbridgeable ‘gap […] 
between Greenblatt’s work […] and Foucault’s’ fundamentally calls into question ‘the 
common perception of a poststructuralist influence on the new historicism that 
                                                
51 Michel Foucault, ‘Sex, Power and the Politics of Identity’ [1982], in Ethics, Subjectivity and Truth: The 
Essential Works of Michel Foucault, 1954-1984, volume 1, edited by Paul Rabinow, translated by Robert 
Hurley (New York: The New Press, 1997), 163-74, p. 167. 
52 Alan Sinfield, ‘Introduction’, New Casebooks: Macbeth, edited by Alan Sinfield (London: Macmillan, 
1992), p. 8. 
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established itself in the first years of the 1980s.’ Belsey also aptly points out that if 
‘Michel Foucault, Jacques Lacan and Louis Althusser appeared in the footnotes’ of 
Renaissance Self-Fashioning, it was ‘in extremely attenuated form.’53 This strategic 
attenuation certainly testifies to Greenblatt’s ‘unwilling[ness]’, in the critic’s own words, 
to ‘enrol’ himself in a ‘dominant theoretical camp’. On the other hand, the systematic 
repression of all theoretical material to the secondary realm of footnotes also confirms 
the extent to which his relation to poststructuralist theory has been ‘disingenuous,’ as he 
freely admits.54 This disingenuity is particularly evident in Hamlet in Purgatory (2001), 
whose unique reference to Jacques Derrida (generally viewed as a key figure of 
poststructuralism) appears, rather predictably, shrouded in a footnote. From a 
comfortable distance, Greenblatt casually implies, in the vaguest of statements, that 
Derrida’s book ‘has many acute observations about the functioning of the ghost in 
Shakespeare’s play.’55 This non-reference (the absence of a quote or even a page 
number suggests the self-cancelling quality of the footnote) testifies to the critic’s 
refusal to engage with the French theory which he claims ‘has helped to shape [his] own 
literary critical practice’. In fact, Greenblatt is even more brutally disingenuous when he 
mentions Derrida in ‘Towards a Poetics of Culture’. Curiously, the reference is not to be 
found in a footnote this time: it is displayed, rather self-consciously, in the ‘main’ text 
                                                
53 Belsey, ‘Historicizing New Historicism’, pp. 32 and 29. On the other hand, and as Belsey duly points 
out in her essay, it must be said that ‘Montrose made excellent use of Althusser, and [Joel] Fineman 
appropriated Lacan with great subtlety’—both Montrose and Fineman have been identified as key 
protagonists of new historicism (p. 29). In The Subjectivity Effect in Western Literary Tradition, Fineman 
saw a ‘considerable overlap’ between Shakespeare’s work and contemporary theory; and such an overlap 
‘suggests either that Shakespeare was very theoretically acute or, instead, that contemporary theory is 
itself very Shakespearean’ (The Subjectivity Effect in Western Literary Tradition: Essays Toward the 
Release of Shakespeare’s Will (Cambridge, MA and London: Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
Press, 1991), p. 112). As far as cultural materialism is concerned, Jonathan Dollimore and Alan Sinfield 
must also be credited for engaging with Althusser’s ideology critique (see ‘History and Ideology: The 
Instance of Henry V’, in Alternative Shakespeares, second edition, edited by John Drakakis (London and 
New York: Routledge, 2002)). 
54 Greenblatt, ‘Towards a Poetics of Culture’, p. 197. 
55 Stephen Greenblatt, Hamlet in Purgatory (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2001), p. 
297n. 
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of the essay. ‘My use of the term circulation here is influenced by the work of Derrida,’ 
Greenblatt claims; ‘but sensitivity to the practical strategies of negotiation and exchange 
depends less upon poststructuralist theory than upon the circulatory rhythms of 
American politics.’56 This is the only allusion to Derrida in the essay; and Greenblatt 
does not seem to think that it might be necessary to reference any of his work (nor does 
he even bother mentioning the thinker’s first name). As Andrea Loselle observes in 
‘How French Is It?’, 
Greenblatt has unconsciously singled out Derrida as the one reference 
undeserving of a footnote indicating where specifically or in what context he 
picked up the concept of circulation (he is quite conscientious in providing 
bibliographic data for his other references). There is a certain irony in this 
omission when we recall how much of Derrida’s work has been devoted to the 
idea of the debt—for example his reading in La carte postale of Freud’s 
symptomatic refusal to acknowledge his debt to Nietzsche, that phobic object-to-
be-avoided.57 
Thus, Derrida only figures in Greenblatt’s influential essay as a lieu commun (literally a 
‘common locus’—but also a commonplace) or even a trademark. If ‘Derrida’ belongs to 
the public domain, as the essay seems to imply, this means that the most basic academic 
conventions need not be observed when it comes to using the thinker’s ideas (the fact 
that Derrida himself was often accused of circumventing those very conventions has 
been used as a powerful, if dishonest, justification by conservative scholars to account 
for their refusal to engage with his work ‘seriously’).58 
                                                
56 Greenblatt, ‘Towards a Poetics of Culture’, p. 207. 
57 Andrea Loselle, ‘How French Is It?’, in French Theory in America, edited by Sylvère Lotringer and 
Sande Cohen (London: Routledge, 2001), 217-36, p. 227. 
58 As Johann Gregory notes, Derrida has often been ‘accused of being something of an antisocial, 
nihilistic, punning Hamlet-like antic, a figure that has endangered the articulation and future of 
philosophical and academic discourse’ (‘Wordplay in Shakespeare’s Hamlet and the Accusation of 
Derrida’s “Logical Phallusies”’, English Studies 94(3) (2013), 313-30, p. 324). In his biography of the 
thinker, Benoît Peeters recounts how, ‘in order to stigmatize Derrida’s style and thought, a perfectly 
imaginary formula (“logical phallus[i]es”) was attributed to him’ (Derrida: A Biography, translated from 
the French by Andrew Brown (Cambridge and Malden, MA: Polity, 2013), p. 447). Peeters is here 
alluding to the so-called ‘Cambridge affair’. In 1992, Cambridge University was considering whether to 
award Derrida an honorary doctorate; however, several academics opposed the enterprise by signing a 
letter published in The Times. The main argument that was put forward was that, ‘in the eyes of 
philosophers, […] M. Derrida’s work does not meet accepted standards of clarity and rigour.’ Besides, the 
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‘THE LIMITS OF A COMPROMISE’: FRENCH THEORY AS NEW HISTORICISM’S PHARMAKON 
Of course, and as Loselle points out, ‘Derridian terminology has tended to circulate 
quite freely, that is, transdiscursively,’ which means that ‘one does not always need to 
cite a specific source when one uses the term différance.’59 However, Greenblatt’s 
acknowledgement of the influence of ‘the work of Derrida’ on his use of the term 
circulation is rather vague, if not obscure (is he thinking about Derrida’s writings on 
dissémination?). For Loselle, this disingenuous tribute reveals more than might appear 
at first glance: 
Derrida plays a small but significant role in Greenblatt’s essay; his work may 
haunt the new historicism in a way that cannot be forgotten in that he occupies 
the singular position of an ambivalent secondary source. […] Greenblatt’s 
reference is not an essential omission but an open annulment. Fueling the 
sentence’s logic is an internal judgment contained in the words sensitivity and 
                                                                                                                                          
signatories pointed out that ‘M. Derrida’s career had its roots in the heady days of the 1960s and his 
writings continue to reveal their origins in that period. Many of them seem to consist in no small part of 
elaborate jokes and the puns “logical phallusies” and the like, and M. Derrida seems to us to have come 
close to making a career out of what we regard as translating into the academic sphere tricks and 
gimmicks similar to those of the Dadaists or the concrete poets’ (Barry Smith et al., ‘Derrida Degree: A 
Question of Honour’, The Times (9 May 1992), 138-39). After Cambridge University had finally voted to 
award him the honorary doctorate, Derrida responded to the attack—‘I challenge anyone to find in my 
writings the expression “logical phallusies,” by which the signatories of this document, in what is a 
serious and dogmatic abuse of their authority in the press, try to discredit me’ (‘Honoris Causa: “This is 
also extremely funny”’, in Points…: Interviews, 1976-1994, edited by Elisabeth Weber, translated from 
the French by Peggy Kamuf (Stanford University Press, 1995), p. 404). However, ‘the polemic was 
widely publicized, in Britain and elsewhere’ and, unfortunately for Derrida, the apocryphal pun was 
repeatedly used by the media to consolidate his reputation as a rhetorical trickster (Peeters, p. 447). 
Following Derrida’s death in 2004, The Economist published an obituary whose hostility was only 
matched by its overt philistinism: ‘subjected to his weak puns (“logical phallusies” was a famous 
example), bombastic rhetoric and illogical ramblings, an open-minded reader might suspect Mr Derrida of 
charlatanism.’ Indeed, ‘there were no arguments, nor really any views either’ in the works of Derrida, 
who ‘contradicted himself, over and over again.’ Thus, for The Economist, the French thinker’s academic 
success illustrates the extent to which ‘there has always been a market for obscurantism’ (‘Jacques 
Derrida, French intellectual, died on October 8th, aged 74’ (21st October 2004), The Economist, 
http://www.economist.com/node/3308320 (accessed 8 February 2003)). Perhaps more than any other 
public figure, Derrida has been (and still is) repeatedly associated with ideas or words that do not actually 
occur in his work. In his official biography of the American rapper Tupac Shakur (also known as 2pac), 
Jamal Joseph credits Derrida for saying that ‘we must each define the meaning of our own existence’ (the 
book description, which features the quotation, is available on 2pac’s official website 
http://www.2pac.com/keep-ya-head-up/ (accessed 21 February 2013)). In a recent anthology of Western 
philosophy, the notion that ‘we must each define the meaning of our own existence’ is attributed to Jean-
Paul Sartre, whose existentialist philosophy has little in common with Derrida’s own ideas—both Sartre 
and Derrida are French though, which might have led to some unfortunate confusion (The Philosophy 
Book, Sam Atkinson, Cecile Landau, Andrew Szudek and Sarah Tomley (London: Dorling Kindersley, 
2011), p. 221). 
59 Loselle, ‘How French Is It?’, p. 227. 
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practical. Derrida’s ‘work’ in general lacks a certain sensitivity to American 
political practicality, and cannot be incorporated because his work is not 
dependent on capitalist circulatory ‘rhythms’. The author’s use of the term 
circulation owes itself therefore to that which confirms the importance of 
borrowing, or acknowledging an influence in order to acknowledge in turn the 
‘signs of the legal and economic system’ […] that paradoxically usurp and 
replace Derrida’s authorship of a concept called circulation.60 
While Foucault is presented by Greenblatt as an essential component within the genesis 
of new historicism, Derrida ‘occupies the singular position of an ambivalent secondary 
source’. As Loselle puts it, the critic’s refusal to engage with the French thinker’s work 
according to usual academic standards in his essay is ‘not an essential omission but an 
open annulment’. In his remarkable study of French theory and its influence on 
American intellectual life, François Cusset notes that new historicism’s ‘disciplinary 
tactics represent a […] retreat of literary theory and criticism back into their traditional 
domain (genetic criticism, the history of texts, and their political context)’—that new 
historicism should be here referred to as ‘literary theory’ is rather ironic (for Greenblatt 
defines literary theory precisely as that which is exogenous to the ‘practice’ of new 
historicism). Cusset goes as far as to refer to Greenblatt’s enterprise as a ‘protectionist 
withdrawal inside the boundaries of the literary world.’61 In Shakespeare in French 
Theory (2007), Wilson provides his own interpretation of Cusset’s argument by 
suggesting that ‘New Historicism’s theorising of Shakespeare […] was a “protectionist 
tactic” to secure “the borders of the discipline” by assimilating enough French theory to 
immunise the literary canon against “the insolent advances of deconstruction, post-
colonial criticism, and the ‘pop-culture’ of media studies.”’62 From this perspective, 
                                                
60 Ibid., pp. 226-27. 
61 François Cusset, French Theory: How Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze, & Co. Transformed the Intellectual 
Life of the United States [2003], translated from the French by Jeff Fort (Minneapolis, MN: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2008), p. 165. 
62 Richard Wilson, Shakespeare in French Theory: King of Shadows (Oxon: Routledge, 2007), p. 263. 
Wilson here relies on his own translation of Cusset’s book, which was only translated into English in 
2008. 
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French theory would have been nothing less than the pharmakon of Greenblatt’s 
movement—the little bit of poison ensuring new historicism’s monopoly over the 
literary canon. Put on display as an apotropaic symbol, Derrida’s head would have been 
used in order to ward off the threat posed by poststructuralist theories. But such an 
immunological transfer might not have been possible after the 1980s, Wilson 
hypothesises: 
New Historicism […] expressed the bad conscience of America’s universalist 
decades, when the USA promulgated a liberal world economic order to underpin 
its sponsorship of decolonisation in the former empires of its old rivals. But like 
the actual frontiers of the hyper-power, America’s academic boundaries could 
not, on this view, remain open to such theoretical imports once the terms of 
global trade tipped so decisively towards Europe and Asia after the 1980s. New 
Historicism’s hospitality to Foucault expressed ‘the limits of a compromise’, 
therefore, in Cusset’s account, just as its imperviousness to [Pierre] Bourdieu 
betrayed its intolerance of any radical critique of its own foundations. Thus, 
French theories about language, sexuality and power were the foreign imports 
that made the American model of Shakespeare competitive enough with the old-
fashioned British one to ensure it continued to secure ‘a massive transfer of 
authority and cultural capital […] to American society’.63 
Wilson’s intricate literary economics suggests that new historicism remains a 
quintessentially American institution: while Greenblatt’s school of thought might have 
had an interest, in its early stages, in meddling with French theory (on a very superficial 
level though), America’s academic boundaries could not have remained open to such 
theoretical imports after the 1980s. Loselle emphasises how ‘Derrida’s “work” in 
general lacks a certain sensitivity to American political practicality, and cannot be 
incorporated because his work is not dependent on capitalist circulatory “rhythms”.’ 
However, she suggests that 
the backlash against French theory does not […] always find its impetus 
exclusively in the fact that it is French; it is un-American because it denies the 
                                                
63 Ibid.. In his reference to the ‘massive transfer of authority and cultural capital’ to American society 
ensured by the import of French theory, Wilson is quoting from Michael Bristol, Shakespeare’s America, 
America’s Shakespeare (London: Routledge, 1990), p. 10. 
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meaning of, for example, the development of capitalism in the United States. 
And meaning is provided for, predictably, by reference to history and origins.64 
What those critics imply is that new historicism’s fundamental resistance to 
poststructuralist theories might testify to a larger phenomenon of cultural 
incompatibility.65 From this viewpoint, the alleged lack of [X] sensitivity to American 
political practicality in Derrida’s work might perhaps explain why the French thinker 
never made it past the realm of the footnotes in Greenblatt’s work. 
 
‘A DECLARATION OF CRITICAL INDEPENDENCE’: RENAISSANCE SELF-FASHIONING AS AN 
‘AMERICAN TALE’ 
For Belsey, however, it is in new historicism’s noisily advertised, and ultimately 
shallow, relation to Foucauldian theory that the limits of a compromise can be detected. 
In her historical overview of Greenblatt’s movement, she wonders: 
How should we account for the fact that the resistance in Foucault’s work 
remained imperceptible to the generation of American intellectuals, including 
Greenblatt himself, who so evidently believed that new historicism was rooted 
in poststructuralism in general and in Foucault in particular?66 
Belsey invokes several reasons to account for this phenomenon. Firstly, she argues that 
Foucault’s account of resistance is inextricably bound up with twentieth-century 
European history, and specifically World War II. 
Born in 1926, Michel Foucault would have been 18 at the time of the Normandy 
Landings. He would have been intensely aware of the extent of French 
collaboration with a force that presented itself as beneficient, but also of the 
work of those unofficial warriors ‘without uniform’ who resisted the occupation 
                                                
64 Loselle, ‘How French Is It?’, p. 228. 
65 However, this controversial assertion is contradicted by Derrida’s own account of his experience of 
American academia. In a late interview with the French magazine L’Humanité, he declared: ‘the 
reception of my work in America (as elsewhere) has been more generous, more attentive. There, I 
encountered less censorship, fewer barriers, fewer conflicts than in France—it is true. And even though 
deconstruction has been the object of raging battles in the USA, the debate was more open than in France. 
There was always more space to manoeuvre.’ In fact, towards the end of his life, Derrida adamantly 
wished he could be ‘cleared of the “American” image’ that so often preceded him (my translation) 
(‘Entretien avec Jacques Derrida – Penseur de l’événement’, L’Humanité (28 January 2004), 
http://www.jacquesderrida.com.ar/frances/evenement.htm (accessed 22 February 2013)). 
66 Belsey, ‘Historicizing New Historicism’, p. 36. 
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that brought them into being. The isolated French individuals and groups who 
obstructed German operations, while smuggling Jews and prisoners of war out 
of France, can have had little hope that they would succeed in defeating their 
oppressors. Moreover, they lived in constant awareness that they faced the 
penalty of summary execution. When Foucault invokes the word ‘resistance’ for 
his post-war French readers, it therefore carries a degree of pessimism, certainly, 
but at the same time intensely heroic overtones that were evidently inaudible to 
the discontented post-Watergate intellectuals of Ronald Reagan’s America who 
so readily coupled Greenblatt’s understanding of power with Foucault’s.67 
‘While the Normandy Landings were indubitably part of American history,’ Belsey 
points out, ‘French collaboration-and-resistance were not.’ Consequently, ‘for 1970s 
America the word “resistance” carried few of the connotations it had in post-war 
France.’68 Instead, what influenced Greenblatt (certainly more than poststructuralism), 
was ‘a pervasive functionalism,’ based in the theories of the American sociologist 
Talcott Parsons. 69  Acknowledging the influence of this arch-American theoretical 
tradition on the work of the new historicist critic, Belsey notes that ‘the primary 
antecedents of Renaissance Self-Fashioning are American […] and the outline of their 
ideas was already familiar in the United States.’ In this sense, Greenblatt’s book is 
essentially an ‘American tale’.70 For ‘self-fashioning is another name for the American 
Dream’ and ‘in the sheer American-ness of its allegiances, Renaissance Self-Fashioning 
constituted a declaration of critical independence.’71 Ultimately, Belsey argues that 
‘poststructuralism played virtually no part in the composition of Renaissance Self-
                                                
67 Ibid., p. 32. 
68 Ibid., p. 36. In a late interview, Derrida confessed: ‘I have always dreamed of resistance—I mean the 
French Resistance. Going back to my childhood, and being too young to do it—to do some Resistance—I 
dreamed of it, I identified with the heroes of all the Resistance films: secrecy, bombs on the rails, 
capturing German officers, and so on.’ Thus, he admitted that ‘deconstruction is resistance’ in that it 
entails ‘not yielding to the occupying power, or to any kind of hegemony (Jacques Derrida, ‘What Does It 
Mean to Be a French Philosopher Today?’, in Paper Machine [2001], translated from the French by 
Rachel Bowlby (California: Stanford University Press, 2005), 112-20, pp. 115-16. For an account of 
resistance as a central theme of poststructuralism, see David Couzens Hoy, Critical Resistance: From 
Poststructuralism to Post-Critique (Cambridge, MA and London: The MIT Press, 2005). 
69 Belsey, ‘Historicizing New Historicism’, p. 39. 
70 Ibid., p. 41. 
71 Ibid., p. 43. 
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Fashioning’; rather, its ‘roots […] are to be found in American culture, and this fact 
played a major part in its extraordinary success.’72 
 
‘A VERY PUZZLING SENTENCE’: GREENBLATT’S CRAVING FOR FREEDOM 
Belsey observes that the epilogue of Renaissance Self-Fashioning contains ‘a very 
puzzling sentence.’73 In the book’s very last lines, Greenblatt writes: ‘the Renaissance 
figures we have considered understand that in our culture to abandon self-fashioning is 
to abandon the craving for freedom, and to let go of one’s stubborn hold upon selfhood, 
even selfhood conceived as a fiction, is to die.’74 This sentence is puzzling in that it 
seemingly contradicts the Renaissance-based project of new historicism (Greenblatt’s 
‘desire to speak with the dead,’ expressed at the beginning of Shakespearean 
Negotiations, epitomises this project).75 Indeed, 
it is not clear what these Renaissance figures are doing in ‘our’ culture, at least 
in a historicist work which insists that we best understand them in the light of 
their own. Nor is it clear […] why a craving for freedom constitutes a virtue. 
The proposition that to give up selfhood is to die seems rather extreme.76 
Here again, Belsey’s reaction to Greenblatt’s epilogue testifies to a key difference 
between British and American historicists. Responding to the passage in a very similar 
way, Wilson quips at ‘Greenblatt’s existential panic at the end of Renaissance Self-
Fashioning.’77 Unlike new historicism, Wilson implies, cultural materialism remains 
attuned to the fundamental indeterminacy that haunts literature. In order to illustrate this 
contrast, the critic refers to Francis Barker’s reading of Shakespeare’s arch-cryptic 
                                                
72 Ibid., p. 29. 
73 Ibid., p. 44. 
74 Greenblatt, Renaissance Self-Fashioning, p. 257. 
75 Stephen Greenblatt, Shakespearean Negotiations: The Circulation of Social Energy in Renaissance 
England (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1988), p. 1. 
76 Belsey, ‘Historicizing New Historicism’, p. 44. 
77 Wilson, ‘Historicising New Historicism’, p. 14. 
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character in The Tremulous Private Body. ‘Hamlet is nothing but the prince’s evasion of 
a series of positions offered him,’ Barker notes: 
The point is not to supply this absence, but to aggravate its historical 
significance. […] Rather than a gap to be filled, Hamlet’s mystery is a void to be 
celebrated, therefore, against the individualist illusion of man as free and full of 
meaning; a fable which it is still ours to undo today.78 
Barker’s reading of Hamlet’s mystery as ‘a void to be celebrated’ contrasts sharply with 
Greenblatt’s ‘existential panic’ when he suggests that to abandon the idea of selfhood is 
to die. This critical stance suggests that cultural materialism might be more open to the 
possibility of non-presence (a key locus of poststructuralism) than new historicism—
this is at least what critics like Wilson or Belsey seem to believe. However, it should be 
borne in mind that the present thesis does not pronounce on the oft-contested notion that 
there is a significant difference between new historicism and cultural materialism 
(mainly because such a distinction is ultimately irrelevant to the thesis’ concerns). 
 
NEW HISTORICISM, CULTURAL MATERIALISM, PRESENTISM AND THE PRESENT OF CRITICISM 
As Belsey remarks, it is not clear what the early modern figures of Renaissance Self-
Fashioning are doing in ‘our culture’—from a new historicist perspective at least. 
Greenblatt’s out-of-the-blue reference to ‘our culture’ in the very last lines of his book 
acknowledges the historical presence of the critic at the very core of the interpretive 
process. Taking into account the present moment from which its criticism is produced 
was never part of new historicism’s critical project though. It is true, on the other hand, 
that some new historicist critics have at times argued in favour of the movement’s 
connection to the present.79 But cultural materialists have been certainly more upfront in 
their acknowledgement of the role of present concerns in the production of historicist 
                                                
78 Francis Barker, The Tremulous Private Body: Essays on Subjection, quoted in Wilson, ‘Historicising 
New Historicism’, p. 14. 
79 See notably Harold Aram Veeser, ‘Introduction’, in The New Historicism, pp. ix-xvi. 
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criticisms. In their foreword to Political Shakespeare (often considered as the manifesto 
of cultural materialism), Jonathan Dollimore and Alan Sinfield wrote: 
A play by Shakespeare is related to the contexts of its production—to the 
economic and political system of Elizabethan and Jacobean England and to the 
particular institutions of cultural production (the court, patronage, theatre, 
education, the church). Moreover, the relevant history is not just that of four 
hundred years ago, for culture is made continuously and Shakespeare’s text is 
reconstructed, reappraised, reassigned all the time through diverse institutions in 
specific contexts. What all the plays signify, how they signify, depends on the 
cultural field in which they are situated.80 
By taking on board the notion that ‘the relevant criticism is not just that of four hundred 
years ago’, cultural materialism fashioned itself as being in tune with the situatedness of 
the critical presents it produces. The recognition, in particular, that ‘what all the plays 
signify, how they signify, depends on the cultural field in which they are situated’ 
anticipates the more recent developments of presentism in the field of Shakespeare 
studies. In Shakespeare in the Present (2002), Terence Hawkes introduced presentism 
as a response to the ubiquitous urge ‘to read the plays historically,’ that is ‘to reinsert 
them into the context in which they first came to be, and on which, it’s said, their 
intelligibility depends.’81 This was in direct reaction to David Scott Kastan’s landmark 
book, Shakespeare After Theory (1999), which aimed to 
restore Shakespeare’s artistry to the earliest conditions of its realization and 
intelligibility: to the collaborations of the theater in which the plays were acted, 
to the practices of the book trade in which they were published, to the unstable 
political world of late Tudor and early Stuart England in which the plays were 
engaged by their various publics.82 
Hawkes questions Kastan’s project of restoration and its reliance on ‘facts’—‘facts 
about specific historical conditions that have determined the reading and writing of 
literature, facts about the material circumstances of literary production, facts about how 
                                                
80 Jonathan Dollimore and Alan Sinfield, ‘Foreword to the First Edition: Cultural Materialism’, Political 
Shakespeare: Essays in Cultural Materialism [1985], edited by Jonathan Dollimore and Alan Sinfield, 
second edition (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1994), p. 281. 
81 Terence Hawkes, Shakespeare in the Present (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), p. 1. 
82 David Scott Kastan, Shakespeare After Theory (New York and London: Routledge, 1999), p. 16. 
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books and playscripts were actually produced, sold and received.’ These ‘facts’, with all 
the objectivity which the term implies, constitute a way of warding off the spectre of 
presentism, Hawkes suggests. Thus, the critic wonders whether Kastan’s project of 
restoration might ‘hint at the recovery of a lost purity, of a final arrival at truth-
revealing origins, of the Restoration at last of the genuine monarchy of genius, even of a 
more fundamental confrontation, no longer in a glass, darkly, but now face to face.’83 
These are, in Hugh Grady’s words, some of ‘the stagnating assumptions of “post-
theory”’ that have characterised Shakespeare studies for the last fifteen years or so. And 
in the wake of so-called ‘post-theory’ criticism, the political component that 
distinguished the modes of historicism which developed in the 1980s has become 
‘domesticated and academicized, leaving behind an empty fetishism of depoliticized 
“facts” and “objects” called “new new historicism” or “the new materialism”.’84 
 
PRESENTISM: MOVING BEYOND NEW HISTORICISM 
For proponents of presentism, the domestication and academicisation of what were once 
supposed to be radical methods of critical inquiry prompted the sense, in 2012, that ‘the 
field of Shakespeare studies seems now to have reached a turning point.’ In fact, there is 
‘widespread agreement that it is time to move beyond the methods of new 
historicism’—and ‘critical presentism is one of the new tendencies’ that can provide 
‘alternatives to an exhausted new historicism,’ they suggested.85 According to Cary 
DiPietro and Hugh Grady, a key feature of presentism is the recognition that 
                                                
83 Hawkes, Shakespeare in the Present, p. 2. 
84 Hugh Grady, Shakespeare and Impure Aesthetics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 
pp. 38 and 37. For a more detailed overview of this phenomenon, see Hugh Grady, ‘Shakespeare Studies, 
2005: A Situated Overview’, Shakespeare: A Journal 1(1) (2005), 102-20. See also Jonathan Gil Harris, 
‘The New New Historicism’s Wunderkammer of Objects’, European Journal of English Studies 4(3) 
(2000), 111-23. 
85 DiPietro and Grady, ‘Presentism, Anachronism and the Case of Titus Andronicus’, p. 44. 
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interpretation needs to involve awareness of historical difference but also that 
the nature of historical difference is itself an open question connected to our 
consciousness and discursive environment in the here and now, so that 
‘historicism’ and ‘presentism’ are always (already) connected.86 
In other words, and as Grady puts it elsewhere, ‘there can be no historicism without a 
latent presentism’—Greenblatt’s ‘very puzzling sentence’ at the end of Renaissance 
Self-Fashioning provides a good example of this intrinsic connection.87 Slavoj Žižek 
(whose writings are addressed extensively in this thesis) can be said to have anticipated 
a key aspect of presentism when he wrote, in 1991, that ‘the “past” is always actually 
synchronic with the present; the “past” is simply the way the universe thinks its 
antagonism.’88 But a key theoretical figure for presentism (along with Derrida) is Walter 
Benjamin. In his ‘Theses on the Philosophy of History’ (1940), Benjamin noted that 
‘history is the subject of a structure whose site is not homogeneous, empty time, but 
time filled by the presence of the now [Jetztzeit].’89 This recognition is at the core of the 
presentist critical ethos. Although ‘there is [no] single, defined critical methodology 
called presentism,’ the movement can be affiliated to ‘a set of general principles’: 
an approach to the past based on a self-conscious positioning of the perceiver in 
the present, aware of historical difference but aware as well of the approachable 
but real epistemological barrier between ourselves and the past, and deliberately 
choosing to highlight our presentness.90 
DiPietro and Grady specifically advocate a presentism that is ‘based on a kind of 
anachronism.’ In fact, what underpins their critical approach to Shakespeare is the 
deliberate use of 
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87 Hugh Grady, ‘Shakespeare Studies, 2005: A Situated Overview’, p. 115. See also Hugh Grady, 
‘Introduction: A Postmodernist Shakespeare: The Current Critical Context’, in Shakespeare’s Universal 
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89 Walter Benjamin, ‘Theses on the Philosophy of History’, Illuminations, translated from the German by 
Harry Zorn (New York: Schocken Books, 1969), p. 261. 
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an anachronism that reinserts the presence of experience back into the past, to 
speak in meaningful ways about the history and continuity of the literary or 
dramatic experience, and the historicity of that experience in the present. A 
critical and productive use of anachronism, a deliberate ‘presentism’, offers one 
way of disrupting that ‘violent hierarchy’ between present and past, collapsing 
the distance between them in a double gesture that both inverts and 
defamiliarises.91 
 
REGISTERING THE VIEWER’S EYE WITHIN THE LITERARY SCENE: ANACHRONISM AS A KEY 
TOOL OF PRESENTIST CRITICISM 
DiPietro and Grady’s definition of anachronism as that which ‘reinserts the presence of 
experience back into the past’ is crucial to the developments in the following chapters. 
In contrast with the typically historicist preoccupation with the authorial present of 
literature, anachronism here features as the registration of the viewer’s eye within the 
literary scene. Although it is generally overlooked, the function of the critic in the 
elaboration of the reality referred to as ‘Shakespeare’s anachronisms’ is crucial. A key 
aim of the thesis is to demonstrate the extent to which the experience of the untimely is 
primarily an effect of interpretation. From this perspective, the main function of 
anachronisms (insofar as that they are acknowledged as such) is to reveal the presence 
of the critic in a given work. In this sense, the thesis is not so much interested in 
examining the discrete instances that have been referred to as being anachronistic in 
Shakespeare’s works—although it addresses the critical genesis of many of those 
instances. Rather, it sets out to investigate the theoretical and cultural implications of 
the concept of anachronism for literature. Anachronism here features as that which is 
experienced as untimely at a particular point in space and time. In other words, 
anachronism is that which eludes presence (as a very broad category of experience) in 
the experience of literature. 
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LITERATURE AS AN EXPERIENCE OF DISPLACEMENT: DERRIDA AND THE QUESTIONING OF 
PRESENCE   
Presence constitutes the central theme of the thesis. The idea that literature is haunted 
by a core of untimeliness that precludes presence is the main guiding thread throughout. 
The following chapters explore the ways in which Shakespearean drama can be said to 
make presence elusive. If the displacement of presence is a key motif of 
poststructuralism, it is particularly persistent in Derrida’s work. In fact, ‘presence has 
become highly suspect in the wake of Derrida,’ DiPietro and Grady point out.92 Overall, 
the thesis shares Derrida’s project, as spelt out in Of Grammatology (1967), ‘to make 
enigmatic what one thinks one understands by the words “proximity”, “immediacy”, 
“presence” (the proximate [proche], the own [propre], and the pre- of presence).’93 
Crucial in the following chapters is Derrida’s approach to ‘literature as a certain 
experience of displacement, a questioning of any and every sense of place.’94 It would 
be difficult to write about this displacement without referring to some key concepts of 
Derridean terminology—although Derrida himself would no doubt have objected to the 
very idea of a Derridean terminology. Thus, différance is ‘neither a word nor a concept,’ 
Derrida insisted.95 If literature involves a certain experience of displacement, this is a 
direct effect of différance. As he put it in Speech and Phenomena (1967), différance 
describes ‘the operation of differing which at one and the same time both fissures and 
retards presence.’96 One of Derrida’s most important contributions to literary criticism 
is the recognition of différance as a constitutive feature of textuality. Différance is what 
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93 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, translated from the French by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak 
(Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), p. 70. 
94 Royle, Jacques Derrida, p. 45. 
95 Jacques Derrida, ‘Differance’ [1968], in Speech and Phenomena and Other Essays on Husserl’s Theory 
of Signs, translated by David Allison (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1973), 129-60, p. 131. 
96 Derrida, Speech and Phenomena, p. 88. 
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guarantees that ‘a text remains […] forever imperceptible,’ he wrote in the opening lines 
to ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’ (1968).97 We have to reckon with the idea that ‘the text is not a 
presence,’ he noted elsewhere.98 In fact, ‘there is no present text in general,’ Derrida had 
suggested in ‘Freud and the Scene of Writing’ (1966): ‘there is not even a past present 
text, a text which is past as having been present. The text is not conceivable in an 
originary or modified form of presence.’ 99  Such a recognition can only have a 
tremendous impact on our approach to textuality as it inevitably challenges a number of 
assumptions about the relationship between text and history. 
 
THE TEXT’S ITERABILITY AS THE ‘SIGNATURE OF THE THING “SHAKESPEARE”’ 
In an interview from 1989, Derrida used the example of Shakespeare to describe this 
relationship: 
Here the example of Shakespeare is magnificent. Who demonstrates better that 
texts fully conditioned by their history, loaded with history, and on historical 
themes, offer themselves so well for reading in historical contexts very distant 
from their time and place of origin, not only in the European twentieth century, 
but also in lending themselves to Japanese or Chinese transpositions? 
This has to do with the structure of a text, with what I will call, to cut corners, its 
iterability, which both puts down roots in the unity of a context and immediately 
opens this non-saturable context onto a recontextualization. All this is historical 
through and through.100 
The notion that the text is based on a structure of iterability implies that it can be re-
presented endlessly, within any given linguistic, cultural or historical context. In other 
words, the text lends itself to any transposition; and as such, it can be said to be 
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inexhaustible. As Derrida pointed out oftentimes, the fundamentally open quality of 
textuality is particularly apparent in Shakespeare’s plays—or at least in the ways they 
are generally experienced (could there possibly be a better example than that of Hamlet 
to illustrate the text’s structure of iterability?). In Specters of Marx (1993), he wrote: 
‘this is the stroke of genius, the insignia trait of spirit, the signature of the Thing 
“Shakespeare”: to authorize each one of the translations, to make them possible and 
intelligible without ever being reducible to them.’101 Thus, the iterability of a text is 
what conditions its non-saturability, its perpetual openness to re-contextualisation or 
new translations. This is precisely what Derrida meant when he wrote, in Of 
Grammatology, that ‘there is nothing outside of the text.’102 This statement, too often 
misinterpreted in academic circles and beyond, has largely contributed to shaping 
Derrida’s reputation as a determinist thinker for whom there is nothing but language. It 
is undeniable that, generally speaking, Derrida’s writing requires unusual levels of 
attention and intellectual rigour on part of the reader (his logic is so uncompromising 
that it can be hard to follow at times). But when he wrote that ‘there is nothing outside 
of the text’, Derrida certainly did not mean that everything is linguistic and that we are 
enclosed in language. This phrase, he would note later, has ‘for some become a slogan, 
in general so badly misunderstood, of deconstruction.’ Therefore, and in order to clear 
all misunderstanding, he re-formulated the infamous statement, suggesting instead that 
‘there is nothing outside context.’103 Or, in a slightly different formulation, ‘there is 
nothing but context.’104 ‘Context’ (or, indeed, the text), Derrida specifies, could be 
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‘speech, life, the world, the real, history, and what not.’ In this sense, ‘deconstruction 
would be the effort to take this limitless context into account, to pay the sharpest and 
broadest attention possible to context, and thus to an incessant movement of 
recontextualization.’105 On a very superficial level, it might appear that Derrida is 
saying exactly the same thing as new historicists—namely that there is nothing but 
context. But while new historicism’s definition of ‘context’ is systematically bound to a 
specific historical period, Derrida’s remains open-ended. ‘Thus, as Derrida suggests, all 
reading is historical through and through, but there is no direct access to any past 
context,’ DiPietro and Grady remark.106 
 
THE TEXT AS AN OPEN-ENDED COLLECTION OF NON-SATURABLE CONTEXTS 
The proposition that ‘no meaning can be determined out of context, but no context 
permits saturation’ is a powerful leitmotiv in Derrida’s work.107 In Mémoires: For Paul 
de Man (1986), he insisted that ‘everything depends upon contexts which are always 
open, non-saturable.’ 108  In fact, this notion of non-saturability had already been 
developed in ‘Signature Event Context’ (1972): 
Every sign, linguistic or non-linguistic, spoken or written (in the usual sense of 
the opposition), as a small or large unity, can be cited, put between quotation 
marks; thereby it can break with every given context, and engender infinitely 
new contexts in an absolutely nonsaturable fashion. This does not suppose that 
the mark is valid outside its context, but on the contrary that there are only 
contexts without any center of absolute anchoring.109 
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The critical developments in the present thesis are dictated by a recognition of the non-
saturability of signs. The idea that ‘there are only contexts without any center of 
absolute anchoring’, in particular, is crucial for the critique of historicism that is 
deployed throughout. As DiPietro and Grady remark, ‘every reading of Shakespeare in 
our own time is a citation, a relocation of a text from its original to an entirely new 
context—including all “historicist” readings, which necessarily construct new contexts 
in our present.’110 The perpetual movement of relocation that determines textuality 
means that there can be no definitive reading of a play by Shakespeare (or of any other 
text). All readings inevitably construct new contexts in our present. However, the 
operation of re-contextualisation which underlies all criticism is often silenced, 
especially in the case of historicist readings. In such readings, the narrow context of the 
text’s official moment of production becomes an artificial anchoring point for the text’s 
ultimate meaning. But, from the beginning, such an anchoring point is subverted by the 
ongoing process of deconstruction. Deconstruction corresponds to the recognition that 
the only stable characteristic of the text is its irreducibility—a text elicits a multiplicity 
of contexts which define it, every time in a different way. The fundamental différance 
that haunts the text guarantees that no centre of absolute anchoring can be assigned to it; 
this notably means that, within the semantic field of the text, complete historical 
presence is impossible. 
 
THE THEATRE OF THE IMPOSSIBLE: INTRODUCING THE UNTIMELY AESTHETICS OF 
SHAKESPEAREAN DRAMA 
Nicholas Royle notes that there is ‘a fascination that Shakespeare and Derrida evidently 
share with the motif of “the impossible” or what Derrida calls, in his essay on Romeo 
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and Juliet, “the theater of the impossible”.’111 In this essay from 1986 (‘Aphorism 
Countertime’), Derrida notably suggests that Shakespeare’s drama testifies to the sense 
that ‘the impossible happens.’112 The motif of the impossible is inextricably bound up 
with deconstruction. In fact, ‘the least bad definition’ of deconstruction is the 
‘experience of the impossible,’ Derrida once suggested.113 Deconstruction, John Caputo 
argues, is ‘the relentless pursuit of the impossible, which means, of things whose 
possibility is sustained by their impossibility, of things which, instead of being wiped 
out by their impossibility, are actually nourished by it.’114 Viewed in the light of 
deconstruction, Shakespeare’s theatre can indeed be described as a relentless pursuit of 
the impossible. In its staging of long lost historical scenes, this uncanny theatre ‘strive[s] 
with things impossible,’ to use Ligarius’ memorable formula in Julius Caesar (2.1.324). 
But far from being wiped out by their impossibility, these ‘things’ are instead nourished 
by it. The repeated (almost compulsive) acknowledgement of the distance between past 
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and present in the dramas does not nullify the aesthetic value of Shakespeare’s theatre. 
Rather, and this is the central claim of the thesis, the untimely (and, by extension, the 
impossible) figures as an aesthetic category in its own right in this theatre of alienation. 
‘How many times shall Caesar bleed in sport?’, Brutus marvels after Caesar’s downfall 
(3.1.115). By acknowledging the representational plot in which they partake, 
Shakespearean characters can be, and have been, said to register the differential quality 
of the whole literary experience.115 This is one of many possible ways of illustrating 
Derrida’s sense that Shakespeare’s theatre stages the impossible. ‘Le théâtre de 
l’impossible,’ as it is referred to in Derrida’s original essay, conjures up the French 
expression être le théâtre de (literally ‘to be the theatre of’), which can be translated as 
‘to be the scene of’ or ‘to be the locus of’.116 In its relentless staging of ‘things 
impossible’, Shakespeare’s theatre registers the madness of representation: that is, 
representation is mad precisely because it is impossible. Following Derrida’s insight, 
the thesis considers Shakespeare’s theatre as the locus of the impossible. In particular, it 
aims at demonstrating how this theatre welcomes the impossible as an aesthetic 
category. The theme of the impossible in Shakespeare is closely related to that of the 
untimely, which manifests itself through the aestheticisation of différance in the dramas. 
The untimely, as it is addressed in the thesis, is that which crystallises the inherent gap 
that divides signs from within. A central concern throughout is to determine the extent 
to which this gap can be said to be integrated as part of the aesthetics of the drama. It 
should perhaps be noted that the term ‘aesthetics’ is used in a very broad sense in the 
thesis. What is referred to as ‘aesthetic’ here does not imply a subjective judgement of 
value about what is beautiful or artistically pleasing to the senses. Rather, ‘aesthetics’ 
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describes how a work of art is perceived at a particular point in history—thus conjuring 
up an objective, historically-defined reality. The aesthetics of a literary work is here 
viewed as the direct result of interpretation. In other words, the aesthetics of any work 
(like its meaning) is constructed in the present. By examining ‘the aesthetically 
productive temporal fissures that anachronism produces,’ the thesis makes a case for the 
untimely aesthetics of Shakespearean drama—although it would be possible, 
alternatively, to speak of an aesthetics of impossibility.117 
 
THE FORECLOSURE OF THE HERMENEUTIC FIELD IN HISTORICIST CRITICISM: THE INSTANCES 
OF JULIUS CAESAR AND HAMLET 
Chapter 1 can be viewed as an extension of the present introduction in that it provides a 
general overview of the topic of anachronism in Shakespeare criticism. The chapter 
notably suggests that the theoretical implications of anachronism for literature have not 
yet been fully explored. Throughout the twentieth century, historicist critics have 
repeatedly argued that specific anachronistic instances unveil the inalienable presence of 
the author’s historical moment within the works. A key effect of this exclusive 
contextual determination is to question the validity of the historical planes that are 
seemingly posited by the plays’ settings. Thus, Julius Caesar is not ‘really’ about 
Caesar’s Rome, critics have suggested—Caesar’s Rome is only a superficial historical 
layer that defines the artistic form of Shakespeare’s play. Underneath it, there lies 
another, supposedly more ‘real’, historical layer: that of Shakespeare’s London. 
However, the thesis suggests that all historical layering testifies to a loss of presence. In 
this sense, Shakespeare’s London cannot provide the original framework that needs to 
be retrieved in order to be able to fully elucidate Julius Caesar. The same reasoning 
applies to all the plays that are addressed in the thesis. The assignment to literature, in 
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any context, of a fixed and exclusive core of historical reality inevitably results in the 
foreclosure of the hermeneutic field. This notion is illustrated in Chapters 2 and 3, 
which focus respectively on Julius Caesar and Hamlet. The characteristic untimeliness 
that has been found to pervade these two plays is generally explained in view of the 
historical moment of their production. However, and as the two chapters suggest, the 
defamiliarisation effect incurred by potential anachronisms is primarily the effect of the 
viewer’s own cultural biases (whether the viewer in question is a reader, a critic, a 
playgoer or anything else). In order to illustrate this notion, Chapter 2 adopts an 
essentialistic approach to Julius Caesar that could be described as deliberately naïve. 
The chapter suggests that, far from being the effect of an objective historical reality 
(namely that of Shakespeare’s late Elizabethan moment), the play’s untimeliness can in 
fact be read on the plane of character psychology as it is experienced in the present of 
interpretation. The focus on the characters’ distinct obsession with the disjointedness of 
time is presented as an alternative to the model of systematic historical contextualisation 
provided by much recent criticism of the play. The chapter explores the (admittedly 
quaint) idea that, prior to any operation of historical determination, the diegetic world of 
the play ‘in itself’ is haunted by an aesthetics of untimeliness. Such an overtly 
essentialistic reading is deployed only in order to demonstrate that Julius Caesar, like 
all literature, fundamentally resists historical foreclosure. It should be noted right away 
that, from the perspective of the thesis as a whole, the chapter deliberately resorts to 
notions that are problematic. For instance, it assumes that there is such a thing as a play 
‘in itself’ qua positively defined ontological centre that transcends all contexts. It also 
takes it for granted (rehearsing, with more than a touch of irony, the default strategy 
adopted by many literary critics past and present) that there is such a thing as a uniform 
audience addressed by the play (the all-encompassing critical ‘we’—a staple of literary 
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criticism—is repeatedly used throughout the chapter). These notions are obviously 
questioned in subsequent chapters; for one of the key concerns of the thesis is to 
challenge the idea of literature as having an inalienable core of presence. With this aim 
in mind, Chapter 3 explores the notion of ‘Hamlet’ as a multi-faceted signifier that 
eludes definitive historical elucidation. There is no ‘in itself’ to Hamlet, the chapter 
argues—in fact, this absence of a stable ontological core is treated as the play’s one and 
only defining feature. Instead, the drama’s meanings are seen to be produced through a 
dazzling array of critical perspectives in the perpetually moving present of interpretation. 
And although it refuses to be amalgamated into an organic whole, the oceanic 
hermeneutic field of Hamlet contributes to the elaboration of a fragmented literary 
aesthetics—this is the chapter’s central proposition. In the absence of a stable semantic 
core, the fragmented quality of the critical field of Hamlet illustrates another facet of the 
untimely aesthetics of Shakespearean drama. 
 
THE AESTHETICISATION OF THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF PRESENCE IN HENRY V 
Chapter 4 returns to the question of character by focusing on the Chorus in Henry V. 
The chapter specifically examines the intersubjective relation that binds the Chorus with 
the audience it repeatedly invokes throughout the play. The critical strategy that is 
deployed throughout is characterised by non-identification with the audience addressed 
by the Chorus through the play. Audience identification constitutes the subjective grid 
par défaut of the majority of the play’s criticism. The main effect of such an 
identification is that it collapses the ‘we’ used by many critics and the phenomenon 
often referred to as ‘the audience’ into a single, monolithic entity. The chapter questions 
the validity of terms such as ‘we’ or ‘the audience’ to refer to fixed realities. Thus, the 
particular assumption that there can be such a thing as a stable audience is repeatedly 
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challenged. In order to do so, the Chorus is considered as the main subject of Henry V 
(as opposed to ‘us’ qua audience par défaut—as was the case in the chapter on Julius 
Caesar). The chapter specifically examines how the Chorus attempts to circumscribe its 
audience in space and time through the use of linguistic markers of presence. But the 
Chorus’s rhetoric of presence only emphasises the absence of the supposedly authentic 
historical scene it invokes. Ultimately, the chapter argues that the dramatisation of this 
absence, through the figure of the Chorus, represents a key feature of the aesthetics of 
impossibility (or untimeliness) in Shakespeare’s theatre. The theoretical implications of 
the impossibility of presence in Henry V are also examined thoroughly in the chapter. 
Although—or rather precisely because—it remains inscrutable, the invoked audience 
features as the key instance upholding the Chorus’s fantasy of historical presence. Seen 
through the lens of Lacanian psychoanalysis, this ghostly audience occupies the 
function of the ‘big Other’—the symbolic instance that regulates social interaction. By 
essence elusive, the big Other testifies to the constitutive displacement that underlies 
subjectivity. 
 
MEDIATION AS KEY FACTOR OF DIFFÉRANCE: LACAN’S BIG OTHER 
Aiming to illustrate the radical shift that lies at the very core of subjectivity, Chapter 5 
returns to an audience-based mode of experience. From the perspective of a given 
audience, the big Other is the instance that looks at ‘us’ precisely from the point ‘we’ 
are watching. In other words, the big Other is what guarantees that, from the beginning, 
subjectivity is displaced. ‘The picture, certainly, is in my eye. But I am […] in the 
picture,’ Jacques Lacan pointed out in one of his seminars.118 The chapter uses the 
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examples of the ghost in Hamlet and the witches in Macbeth to illustrate the notion of a 
spectral gaze that circumscribes audiences within the space of representation. The 
chapter engages with the theories of Slavoj Žižek, paying particular attention to his 
reading of Lacan in view of contemporary popular culture. For Žižek, the big Other 
stands for the inherent mediation of enjoyment. A pervasive feature of mass 
entertainment, mediation testifies to the sense that, within any given representational 
space, presence is impossible (whether there are any non-representational spaces is 
another question that probably deserves a book-length study). The chapter pays close 
attention to the concept of interpassivity, which is concerned with how enjoyment is not 
an intrinsic function of the subject. Ultimately, the big Other stands for the instance that 
takes over the process of enjoyment for the subject. With its interpassive Chorus, Henry 
V illustrates the extent to which staged entertainment is inherently mediated. Thus, on 
the one hand, the untimely aesthetics of Shakespearean drama can help us identify the 
core of mediation that underlies the contemporary entertainment industry. On the other 
hand, specific examples from our own present can illustrate the notion of untimely 
aesthetics within the framework of Shakespeare’s works. 
 
THE SUBJECTIVITIES OF LITERARY CRITICISM: MEANING AS A LOCATION OF CHANGE 
Throughout the thesis, the constitutive displacement that characterises subjectivity is 
illustrated through a variety of subjective modes. In many ways, the present work can 
be viewed as an investigation into the subjectivities of literary criticism—which 
constitute the overarching preoccupation of the thesis. In this sense, the adoption of a 
different subjective mode in every chapter serves a specific purpose: it points out that 
the untimely aesthetics of Shakespearean drama is essentially the effect of interpretation 
(as opposed to authorial intention). This plurality also aims at promoting the fact that 
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there are many different ways (all valid) that the plays can be looked at, many different 
ways in which the untimely aesthetics can be experienced in the present of 
interpretation (it should be remembered at all times that the assertion of the fundamental 
openness of the interpretive field throughout the thesis specifically aims at contesting 
the hegemony of new historicism in Shakespeare studies). In other words, the untimely 
aesthetics is not here presented as an intrinsic feature of the drama. Rather, it is the 
result of deliberate critical positions. As Grady puts it, ‘aesthetic paradigms have a 
paradoxical relation to temporality—they always construct art in the present for us in a 
form peculiar to the specific era of cultural history in which they are situated.’119 This 
means that the present of interpretation remains unfixed; it is open and in perpetual 
motion (in the title of his essay, Grady pays tribute to the ‘moving aesthetic’ of the 
‘now’). In this sense, the focus on different levels of perception in each chapter of the 
thesis demonstrates in a practical way that what is generally referred to as ‘the present’ 
is at heart a plural experience. As Belsey writes in The Subject of Tragedy, ‘the subject, 
however defined […] does not stay in place. Meaning, the condition of subjectivity, is a 
location of change.’120 
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CHAPTER 1 – ‘VIOLATOR OF CHRONOLOGY’: SHAKESPEARE’S 
ANACHRONISMS IN CON-TEXT(S) 
 
 
 
When you consider a major achievement of writing such as a play by Shakespeare, you are 
continually reinterpreting it. This object is there and it’s like a sputnik, it turns round, and over 
the years different portions of it are nearer to you, different bits are further away. It’s rushing 
past you and you are peeling off those meanings. In that way a text is dynamic. The whole 
question of what Shakespeare intended doesn’t arise, because what he has written not only 
carries more meanings than he consciously intended, but those meanings are altered in a 
mysterious way as the text moves through the centuries. If you dig into it you find some new 
aspect, and yet you never seize the thing itself. 
– Peter Brook, ‘Shakespeare on Three Screens’1 
 
 
 
I- SHAKESPEARE, ANACHRONISM AND THE CRITICISM 
 A. ANACHRONISM AS THE UNIVERSAL FATE OF LITERATURE 
Investigating the topic of anachronism in literature requires that we take into account 
two defining contexts. The first context, which could be referred to as the authorial 
moment, looks back at the historical conditions in which a text was written: literature is 
addressed as the product of material and cultural contingencies. However, the meaning 
of a literary work cannot be reduced exclusively to the historical moment of its 
production. Underlying the idea of literature is a constantly shifting present that gestures 
towards another crucial literary moment: that of ‘reading’. This second context 
corresponds to the critical or interpretive moment. The present chapter suggests that, in 
order to make sense of what has been called ‘Shakespeare’s anachronisms’, both 
authorial and interpretive moments need to be addressed—although more emphasis is 
put on the latter, as will soon be made clear. The thesis’s preoccupation with literature 
as an essentially interpretive process springs from the sense that a text ‘exists’ through 
the cultural conditions in which it is received and distributed. Accordingly, this chapter 
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is not so much concerned with text (e.g. ‘Shakespeare’s works’) as with con-text, 
namely the web of invisible threads through which a text is woven into existence at a 
particular time. In this sense, it can be said that textuality has a temporality of its own, 
which always implicitly refers to a ‘present’, but every time a different one—for there 
are as many presents as there are readings or theatrical representations. The différance 
that springs from this endless division of the present within itself is a crucial aspect of 
literature, explored in this chapter. Thus, the notion of ‘Shakespeare’s anachronisms’ is 
not viewed in terms of discrete, disconnected instances but rather as evidence of the 
intrinsic disjointedness of literature itself. In many ways, the starting point here is the 
sense that it is not possible to think about literary anachronisms without first 
recognising anachronism as the universal fate of literature. As soon as we start thinking 
about its implications, ‘anachronism ceases to be a local and occasional phenomenon; it 
becomes a universal fate,’ Thomas Greene suggests.2 
 The genre labels that have been used extensively to classify Shakespeare’s plays 
are artificial and often misleading—e. g. Hamlet as ‘tragedy’, Henry V as ‘history play’, 
etc. Thematically, the plays themselves can be said to be concerned with an 
irremediable overlapping of genres; a good example would be Polonius’ pompous 
distinction, in Hamlet, between ‘tragedy, comedy, history, pastoral, pastorical-comical, 
historical-pastoral, tragical-historical [and] tragical-comical-historical-pastoral’ 
(2.2.379-381). Such systematic labelling can only distract us from the fact that all 
Shakespearean writing is, by essence, ‘historical’. The vast majority of the plays deal 
with a historical context (a ‘setting’) that is brought to a present, that of a reader or a 
playgoer at a given time. With their multi-layered temporality, Shakespeare’s plays 
address the disjointedness of the present in relation to ‘the dark backward and abysm of 
                                                
2 Thomas McLernon Greene, ‘History and Anachronism’, The Vulnerable Text: Essays on Renaissance 
Literature (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 223. 
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time’, thus problematising the sense of an irrecoverable gap between past and present 
(The Tempest, 1.2.50). On many occasions, they fashion themselves in terms of a 
deliberate operation of re-presentation of the past to a present readership or theatrical 
audience. For instance, the epic tirades of the Chorus in Henry V draw our attention to 
the self-conscious theatrical strategy that consists in ‘jumping o’er times’ and ‘Turning 
th’accomplishment of many years / Into an hour-glass’ (Prologue, 29-31). In Stages of 
History, Phyllis Rackin suggests that a central feature of Shakespeare’s theatre is ‘the 
consciousness of anachronistic distance from a lost historical past.’3 Such a recognition 
undermines the very possibility of investigating the so-called topic of ‘Shakespeare’s 
anachronisms’—for the good reason that everything in Shakespeare is anachronistic. 
The notion of theatre as a historiographic project is thwarted from the beginning, as the 
numerous metadramatic references in the Chorus of Henry V illustrate. For this very 
reason, it seems difficult—not to say impossible—to say anything at all about 
‘Shakespeare’s anachronisms’ (which ones, anyway?). It seems more interesting and 
feasible, on the other hand, to historicise the concept of anachronism in relation to 
Shakespeare criticism. Where does the idea of ‘Shakespeare’s anachronisms’ originate 
from? What historical conditions allowed it to appear? At what point did ‘Shakespeare’ 
and ‘anachronism’ become associated in the criticism and in popular culture? What can 
be the meaning of such crystallisation? As should now be clear, the aim here is not to 
compile an exhaustive list of all the anachronisms that appear in Shakespeare’s plays—
an impossible task as there will always be more anachronisms than can be counted. 
Rather, the chapter looks at what critics mean when they refer to ‘Shakespeare’s 
anachronisms’. The thesis’s interest in the moments in which a literary text is performed, 
                                                
3 Phyllis Rackin, Stages of History: Shakespeare’s English Chronicles (Ithaca, New York: Cornell 
University Press, 1990), p. 88. Rackin’s study has been very helpful for the elaboration of this chapter. A 
thought-provoking ‘attempt to historicize Shakespeare’s historical practice,’ it explores Shakespearean 
historiography and its socio-cultural context (p. ix). See in particular the chapter on ‘Anachronism and 
Nostalgia’ (pp. 86-145). 
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received, interpreted and criticised leads to a thorough questioning of what every act of 
criticism reveals about the context of its production. 
 
 B. THE CONSTITUTIVE ANACHRONISM THAT HAUNTS LITERARY CRITICISM 
From the seventeenth century, commentators have been eager to pick on temporal and 
geographical inconsistencies in Shakespeare’s plays. One of the most famous and 
earliest recorded examples is Ben Jonson’s reported comment that ‘Sheakspear in a play 
brought in a number of men saying they had suffered Shipwrack in Bohemia, wher there 
is no Sea neer by some 100 Miles.’4 For Jonson, this anachorism (a derivative of 
anachronism that signals a geographical misplacement) testifies to Shakespeare’s lack 
of a formal education.5 Following in the tracks of Jonson, many critics went on a 
systematic anachronism-hunt in Shakespeare’s plays. In most cases, this type of critical 
project is grounded in the implicit sense that under the anachronistic blemishes lies a 
pure, accurate historical drama: getting rid of the anachronisms should allow us to 
retrieve the primal, unspoilt historical scene. Seventeenth- and eighteenth-century critics 
did not address the possibility that anachronisms could have been part of a deliberate 
strategy of dramatisation of the historical distance between past and present. However, 
the powerful sense of anachrony that pervades Shakespeare’s work invites us to 
reconsider the relation between literary texts and their historical sources. 
                                                
4 ‘Conversations with Drummond’, Ben Jonson, edited by Charles Harold Herford and Percy Simpson 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1925), p. 138. In The Winter’s Tale, Shakespeare blithely contravenes the most 
elementary neoclassical rules: the play stages kingdoms hundreds of miles apart, features several subplots 
and spans over sixteen years. Although some of these ‘errors’ appear in Robert Greene’s Pandosto (the 
source for the play’s main plot), a common view now is that ‘Shakespeare added most of them, 
provocatively, to make the action even more implausible’ (The Winter’s Tale, edited by John Pitcher 
(London: Arden, 2010), p. 61). 
5 Critics have pointed out many other instances of anachorism in Shakespeare’s plays. For instance, in the 
first act of The Two Gentlemen of Verona, Valentine takes a sea-voyage from Verona to Milan, though 
both are inland cities. 
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What have been viewed as discrete anachronistic instances might actually be 
entry points into the uniformly anachronistic backdrop composed by Shakespeare’s 
meta-historical writing. The notion that, since the seventeenth century, anachronisms 
have been generally treated as an undermining feature of literary works is examined in 
the present chapter. Historical accuracy itself is often used as a critical barometer to 
assess the intrinsic quality of literary texts, and especially those dealing with official 
recorded history in one way or another. The intense scrutiny to which Shakespeare’s 
historiography has been subjected provides a very good example of the hegemonic 
status of the authorial moment in literary criticism—the notion of a gap between 
‘historicist’ and ‘presentist’ approaches to textuality is deeply ingrained in critical 
practices. In some aspects, the present thesis springs from the conviction that such a gap 
is artificial and that it can be bridged through a rigorous critical historicisation, which 
implies that we carefully historicise every act of criticism. This particular methodology 
is rooted in the recognition that, no matter what we do, ‘our modernity is sure to betray 
us in ways we can neither predict nor control,’ as Jonas Barish warns in an essay 
investigating ‘Some Shakespearean Anachronisms’.6 
Because the interpretive moment is a defining feature of literature, this requires 
that literary criticism itself should be scrutinised, challenged and historicised. 
Historicising critical practices entails that we acknowledge the extent to which these 
practices are conditioned by their own historical moment. Amongst other things, this 
means applying to historicist criticism the same methods that it uses to investigate so-
called ‘primary’ texts—such distantiation precisely destabilises notions of ‘primary’ and 
‘secondary’ textuality. A central motif in this thesis is the sense that Shakespearean 
                                                
6  Jonas Barish, ‘Hats, Clocks and Doublets: Some Shakespearean Anachronisms’, Shakespeare’s 
Universe: Renaissance Ideas and Conventions, edited by John Mucciolo (Hants: Scolar Press, 1996), 
p. 29. 
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drama can be viewed as reflecting on the aesthetics of its own representation: this is 
notably illustrated in its compulsive staging of theatre in the act of representing itself. In 
a way, this introductory chapter obeys a similar metadramatic logic by questioning the 
processes through which literature is passed on, represented and interpreted through 
time. Investigating the theme of anachronism in relation to literature implies that we 
take into account the overarching anachronism that haunts every critical operation: 
towards the end of the twentieth century, critics have started to realise that ‘whether a 
given representational work contains an anachronism depends upon the kind of 
representation it is and this in turn depends upon how we interpret the work.’7 Recently, 
Jeremy Tambling has emphasised the idea that ‘reading creates anachronistic thinking’ 
and that ‘who defines what is anachronistic is crucial.’8 Along the same lines, Rackin 
notes that ‘all historical narratives are ideologically motivated’ and that ‘it is therefore 
necessary to historicize historical practice, to focus more on the temporal and social site 
on which a historical narrative is constructed than upon the historical facts it purports to 
represent.’9 Relying on the premise that literary criticism is shaped by the historical 
conditions in which it is produced, this chapter sets out to historicise the practice of 
critics—mainly those who talk about anachronism in relation to Shakespeare’s works, 
but not exclusively—since the beginning of the seventeenth century. Putting every act 
of literary criticism back in its cultural context, whenever possible, can help us grasp the 
theoretical implications of the concept of anachronism. 
 
 
                                                
7 Annette and Jonathan Barnes, ‘Time Out of Joint: Some Reflections on Anachronism’, The Journal of 
Aesthetics and Art Criticism 47(3) (1989), 253-61, p. 257. 
8 Jeremy Tambling, On Anachronism (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2010), 
pp. 13 and 1. 
9 Rackin, Stages of History, p. 36. 
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C. A ‘DISGRACE TO THE STAGE’: SHAKESPEARE’S ANACHRONISMS IN THE 
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 
In the eighteenth century, a fashionable mode of criticism consisted in scanning 
Shakespeare’s English history plays for anachronisms. The two Henry IV plays, in 
particular, proved extremely popular with regard to that practice. In the first part of the 
play, King Henry rebukes Prince Harry: ‘Thy place in Council thou hast rudely lost’ 
(3.2.32). In a footnote to his edition of 1 Henry IV, Edmund Malone observes that ‘the 
prince’s removal from the council in consequence of his striking the Lord Chief Justice 
Gascoigne [took place] some years after the battle of Shrewsbury (1403).’ Thus, the 
event could not have taken place in the time span covered by the play, Malone is eager 
to point out: therefore, ‘our author is guilty of an anachronism.’10 This remark mirrors a 
preoccupation with historical chronology that prevailed in much eighteenth-century 
criticism. Critics were puzzled by the intrusion of Elizabethan commodities in plays 
supposedly set in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. ‘But take my pistol if thou wilt,’ 
Falstaff advises Hal at the end of 1 Henry IV (5.3.51). Although firearms were invented 
in China in the twelfth century, they were not transmitted to Europe before the late 
Renaissance. 11  Commenting on this anachronism, Samuel Johnson notes that 
‘Shakespeare never has any care to preserve the manners of the time’—‘pistols were not 
known in the age of Henry’ but ‘they were, in our author’s time, eminently used by the 
Scots,’ he points out in a footnote.12 These considerations by some of the most 
respected eighteenth-century Shakespeareans sum up the period’s generally hostile 
                                                
10 The reference originally appears in Malone’s sixteen-volume edition of the works (1790) and is 
reprinted in A New Variorum Edition of Henry the Fourth Part I, edited by Samuel Burdett Hemingway 
(Philadelphia and London: Joshua Ballinger Lippincott, 1936), p. 210n. 
11 Joseph Needham, Science & Civilisation in China, volume 5 [Chemistry and Chemical Technology], 
part 7 [‘Military Technology; The Gunpowder Epic’] (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 
1-3. 
12 The reference originally appears in Samuel Johnson’s edition of ‘The Plays of William Shakespeare’ 
(1765) and is reprinted in Hemingway’s New Variorum edition of 1 Henry IV, p. 157n. 
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disposition towards what was viewed as temporal deviations: they are ‘faults’ 
perpetrated by a ‘violator of chronology,’ to use Johnson’s memorable expression.13 In 
his survey of anachronism in Shakespearean drama, the English antiquary Francis 
Douce also deplores the playwright’s ‘absurd violations of historical accuracy.’ These 
manifold ‘errors’, as he calls them, should be hunted down because they are 
‘transgressions against the rules of chronology.’ Throughout the essay, they are 
variously referred to as ‘incongruities,’ ‘whimsicalities,’ ‘blemishes,’ ‘impostures on 
the public’ and even a ‘disgrace [to] the stage.’ As an example, Douce refers to 
Shakespeare’s dramatis personae lists, which he suggests almost always consist in ‘a 
medley of ancient and modern names that is often extremely ridiculous.’14 The French 
critic Paul Stapfer later suggested that Douce’s survey of Shakespearean anachronism 
was ‘written chiefly in the cavilling spirit of a mere pedant’ and that it ‘enters into none 
of those higher considerations that the subject admits of.’15 Both Douce and Stapfer 
provide a tentative, but of course by no means exhaustive, list of what they see as 
‘Shakespeare’s anachronisms’. The fact is that such a list cannot ever be exhaustive and 
can only ever remain incomplete. This is the shopping list syndrome—a shopping list, 
its very possibility, depends on everything that is not on it but could potentially be on it. 
‘By definition the list has no taxonomical closure,’ Derrida remarks in Positions.16 
‘Faced with the ghostliness of Derrida’s shopping list,’ Nicholas Royle observes, ‘we 
                                                
13 Johnson uses the expression in the preface to his edition of Shakespeare’s plays. Reprinted in Critical 
Theory Since Plato, edited by Hazard Adams (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1971), p. 333. 
14 Francis Douce, ‘On the Anachronisms and some other Incongruities of Shakspeare’, Illustrations of 
Shakspeare, and of Ancient Manners: With Dissertations on the Clowns and Fools of Shakspeare; on the 
Collection of Popular Tales Entitled Gesta Romanorum; and on the English Morris Dance (London: 
Richard Taylor, 1807), pp. 281-96. 
15  Paul Stapfer, Shakespeare and Classical Antiquity: Greek and Latin Antiquity as Presented in 
Shakespeare’s Plays, translated from the French by Emily Jane Carey (London: Kegan Paul, 1880), 
p. 107. 
16 Jacques Derrida, Positions, translated from the French by Alan Bass (Chicago: Chicago University 
Press, 1981), p. 40. 
   56 
 
must reckon with the sense that there might be nothing to it, in it or on it (no “contents”) 
and/or that it might in fact be endless, an interminable shopping list.’17 For this very 
reason, any attempt at drawing up a comprehensive list of Shakespeare’s anachronisms 
is doomed to failure. Ultimately, Douce’s judgemental remarks on Shakespeare’s 
dramas illustrate the extent to which literary criticism is contingent on its own cultural 
moment. 
 
II- SHAKESPEARE THROUGH THE AGES: FROM TIMELESS GENIUS TO EMBLEM OF 
DIFFÉRANCE 
A. ‘GUIDED ONLY BY HIS GENIUS’: ROMANTIC SHAKESPEARE IN THE EIGHTEENTH 
AND NINETEENTH CENTURIES 
At the other end of the critical compass is the vision of Shakespeare as a timeless genius 
who transcends social and historical determinations—a vision that originated outside 
England towards the end of the eighteenth century. The development of this model of 
authorship owed much to German Romanticism. The reason that this cultural movement 
became inextricably bound up with Shakespeare can only be understood in relation to 
its historical background. As Jonathan Bate explains in The Genius of Shakespeare, 
the two principal features of German political and cultural life in the middle of 
the eighteenth century were that the language of the nobility was French and that 
a unified nation as such did not exist, since the German-speaking territories were 
divided into an array of independent sovereignties.18 
If it were to regenerate itself, German national culture had to challenge the domination 
of French Enlightenment values. Thus, it was the urge to find an alternative aesthetic to 
the French neoclassical model that led Germany to adopt Shakespeare as its national 
poet: ‘“classical” German literature […] had its origins in a combination of anti-French 
sentiment [and] Shakespearean inspiration,’ Bate observes. This is a very good example 
                                                
17 Nicholas Royle, Jacques Derrida (London and New York: Routledge, 2003), p. 83. 
18 Jonathan Bate, The Genius of Shakespeare [1997] (London: Picador, 2008), p. 180. 
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of how the reception of ‘Shakespeare’ in a particular place at a particular time (in this 
case Germany in the 1770s) is determined by very specific historical and material 
contingencies. If ‘Shakespeare’ was turned into an ideological weapon against French 
cultural hegemony, Bate insists that ‘this was the most significant sense in which he was 
“used” and “made alive” in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,’ both in Germany 
and in Britain.19 By the end of the nineteenth century, Shakespeare was (and, in many 
ways, still is) predominantly perceived as a universal genius who transcends temporal 
and geographical specificities. This reputation for universality meant that any dramatic 
inconsistencies could now be accounted for through ‘the genius of Shakespeare.’20 As 
the German scholar Wilhelm Creizenach noted, ‘in most cases, [Shakespeare’s] 
anachronisms appear to have been due to the indifference of genius rather than to 
intention.’21 
Even though dismissed as irrelevant, the anachronisms remained mostly 
perceived as fallacious occurrences through the Romantic era. Such dismissal is a 
prominent feature of both British and German criticisms from the eighteenth century 
onwards. For the two nationalities, ‘Shakespeare’ also attains the status of national icon 
in the same period, which is certainly no coincidence. Both Britain and Germany have 
used it as a powerful token to reinforce their cultural identity, and more specifically as a 
weapon against French neoclassical culture. Thus, the sense that ‘the eighteenth-century 
deification of Shakespeare was premised upon a demonization of classical French 
                                                
19 Bate, The Genius of Shakespeare, p. 183. 
20 Bate notably argues that ‘Shakespeare is not an example of genius: he is the premiss for genius’ 
(p. 316). Because ‘the genius of Shakespeare is not co-extensive with the life of William Shakespeare,’ 
this means that ‘a knowledge of the “pre-life” and the “after-life” of his art is essential to an 
understanding of his power.’ Bate’s joint reflection on the origins and effects of ‘Shakespeare’ is in 
keeping with the focus, in this chapter, on the authorial and interpretive moments of literary criticism 
(p. x). 
21  Wilhelm Michael Anton Creizenach, English Drama in the Age of Shakespeare (Philadelphia: 
Lippincott, 1916), pp. 156-57. Written in the late nineteenth century, the original study (Das englische 
Drama im Zeitalter Shakespeares) figured in a five-volume anthology, Geschichte des neueren Drama 
(1893-1916). 
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culture’ leads Bates to the conclusion that, in the period, ‘Romanticism and Shakespeare 
idolatry were the two sides of the same anti-Gallic coin.’22 As Hugh Grady explains, 
‘Shakespeare’s reputation grew steadily from decade to decade [in the eighteenth 
century], under a number of impulses, including a growing anti-French English 
nationalism […] and a growing empirical consciousness that refused to accept the neo-
classical “rules” as absolute.’23 Perhaps as a reaction against this demonisation, royalist 
French culture started to define itself against Shakespeare and what Voltaire called his 
‘monstrous farces.’24 Voltaire, one of the most respected French intellectual figures at 
the time, dismissed the playwright as a ‘barbaric mountebank’ and a ‘drunken savage.’25 
However, the relation between the French thinker and the English dramatist is more 
ambivalent than is generally assumed—a mixture of attraction and repulsion, which is 
well exemplified in Voltaire’s own controversial translations of the plays.26 As a young 
Anglophile, Voltaire had once praised the inclusiveness of England, a land where ‘Jew, 
Mohametan and Christian transact together as if they shared the same religion.’27 Later, 
he would also depict London as a place where ‘chair-bearers, sailors, coachmen, dumpy 
shopkeepers, butchers, and even clerks […] found in Shakespeare’s tragedies everything 
                                                
22 Bate, The Genius of Shakespeare, pp. 183 and 230. 
23  Hugh Grady, ‘Hamlet and the Present: Notes on the Moving Aesthetic “Now”’, Presentist 
Shakespeares, edited by Hugh Grady and Terence Hawkes (Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2007), 
p. 145. See also Michael Dobson, The Making of the National Poet: Shakespeare, Adaptation and 
Authorship, 1660-1769 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1992), pp. 99-222. 
24 Voltaire, ‘A Shakespeare Journal’, Yale French Studies 33, ‘Shakespeare in France’ (1964), 5-13, p. 10 
(‘Lettre à d’Alembert’ (1776)). 
25 Ibid. (‘Lettre à d’Argental’ (1776)); Nicholas Clement, quoted in Jean Jules Jusserand, Shakespeare in 
France Under the Ancient Régime (London: Fisher Unwin, 1899), p. 368. For a thorough account of 
Voltaire’s epistolary ramblings on Shakespeare, see Richard Wilson, ‘Making Men of Monsters: 
Shakespeare in the Company of Strangers’, Shakespeare in French Theory: King of Shadows (London 
and New York: Routledge, 2007). Wilson notably argues that the ‘French resistance to Shakespearean 
monstrosity was rooted in racist ideology’ (pp. 242-43). 
26 On Voltaire’s translations of Shakespeare, see Philip Cranston, ‘“Rome en Anglais se prononce 
Roum…”: Shakespeare Versions by Voltaire’, MLN 90(6) (1975), 809-37. 
27 Voltaire, ‘Letters Concerning the English Nation’ (1733), quoted in Robert Winder, Bloody Foreigners: 
The Story of Immigration to Britain (London: Little Brown, 2004), p. 113. 
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that appeals to curiosity.’ 28  Significantly, what the young Voltaire admired in 
Shakespeare was the common notion that he ‘did not even speak Latin and was guided 
only by his genius.’29 Even the older Voltaire had to admit, somewhat reluctantly, that 
Shakespeare’s work contained ‘a few traces of genius’ that ‘begged grace for the rest.’30 
The term ‘genius’ recurs in a poem where the French thinker refers to the English 
playwright, admittedly in less sympathetic terms, as ‘That ape of genius, sent / By Satan 
among men to do his work.’31 Although Voltaire was often critical of Shakespeare, it is 
very significant that he should refer to him repeatedly in terms of his supposed ‘genius’. 
Thus, in the late eighteenth century, critics in England and Germany extolled 
‘Shakespeare’s genius’ unconditionally; and French critics, in spite of their reservations, 
felt compelled to address the playwright in terms of his ‘genius’. 
 
B. ‘SHAKESPEARE WITHOUT A MUZZLE’: THE POLITICISATION OF SHAKESPEARE AS A 
KEY FEATURE OF NINETEENTH-CENTURY LITERARY DISCOURSES 
With its mixed genre, its disregard for traditional unities and its constant mingling of 
sublime and grotesque, Shakespearean drama fell short of the rigid standards of French 
neoclassicism. For these reasons, it seemed rather unlikely that it would ever thrive in 
France. However, the rise of Romanticism in Europe caused neoclassical culture to 
recede. In 1827, the French composer Hector Berlioz noted in his memoirs that ‘the 
success of Shakespeare in Paris—to which the enthusiastic support of the new school of 
writers led by Victor Hugo, Alexandre Dumas and Alfred de Vigny contributed—took 
                                                
28 Voltaire, ‘A Shakespeare Journal’, p. 8 (‘Appel à toutes les nations de l’Europe’ (1761)). 
29 Ibid., p. 7 (‘Discours sur la tragédie, à Milord Bolingbroke’ (1730)). 
30 Ibid., p. 8 (‘Appel à toutes les nations de l’Europe’). 
31 Quoted by Hector Berlioz in his memoirs—see The Memoirs of Hector Berlioz, Member of the French 
Institute, Including his Travels in Italy, Germany, Russia and England, 1803-1865, edited and translated 
from the French by David Cairns (London: Victor Gollancz, 1969), p. 95. 
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Paris by storm.’32 The tide of European Romanticism had finally washed over France. 
Berlioz’s account of his own encounter with the Bard—‘The advent of Shakespeare’—
strikes a number of Romantic clichés: 
Shakespeare, coming to me unawares, struck me like a thunderbolt. The 
lightning flash of that discovery revealed to me at a stroke the whole heaven of 
art, illuminating it to its remotest corners. I recognized the meaning of grandeur, 
beauty, dramatic truth, and I could measure the utter absurdity of the French 
view of Shakespeare which derives from Voltaire […] and the pitiful narrowness 
of our own worn-out academic, cloistered traditions of poetry. I saw, I 
understood, I felt… that I was alive and that I must arise and walk.33 
The ‘advent of Shakespeare’ in France in the 1820s can indeed be compared to a 
thunderbolt. It provides a very good example of the fact that the reception of 
Shakespeare in a particular country at a particular time is inextricably bound up with the 
prevailing politics of the moment. ‘In France in the 1820s, as in Germany in the 1770s,’ 
Bate remarks, ‘Shakespeare is imagined as not just an antidote to the prescriptions of 
Voltaire’s classicism, but a saviour of the artistic spirit, a bringer of sight, feeling and 
freedom—a freedom that is linked to political emancipation.’ Thus, when it eventually 
reached France, ‘Shakespeare’ not only became a symbol of artistic freedom but was 
also ‘in the vanguard of a republican and Bonapartist revolution,’ Bate notes.34 In 
Shakespeare in French Theory, Richard Wilson contrasts French and Anglo-Saxon 
attitudes by suggesting ‘how in France Shakespeare has been seen not as a man for the 
monarchy but a man of the mob.’35 If Shakespeare became a revolutionary figure in 
France, it was mainly the feat of Victor Hugo, who claimed the Bard for his ultra-liberal 
political views. In William Shakespeare (1864), Hugo claimed to unleash, for the first 
time in France, ‘Shakespeare without a muzzle’ through the medium of his son’s highly 
                                                
32 Ibid., pp. 97-98. 
33 Ibid., p. 95. 
34 Bate, The Genius of Shakespeare, p. 232-33. 
35 Wilson, Shakespeare in French Theory, back matter. 
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politicised translations of the plays.36 Hugo introduces the translations in the following 
terms: ‘let it not be forgotten that true Socialism has for its end the elevation of the 
masses to the civic dignity, and that, therefore, its principal care is for moral and 
intellectual cultivation. […] That is why Shakespeare must be translated in France.’37 
By quipping that ‘Shakespeare is a socialist,’ the French poet Charles Baudelaire would 
later ridicule Hugo’s use of the Bard for his own political agenda.38 
The appropriation and politicisation of ‘Shakespeare’ is a central feature of the 
literary discourse of a number of ‘European’ countries in the nineteenth century. 
Viewed from our twenty-first century perspective, the nineteenth-century ‘Shakespeare’ 
cultural construct crystallised political issues whose implications, in retrospect, are 
undeniably European. As we have seen, it was instrumentalised repeatedly in order to 
exacerbate antagonisms between France, Germany and Britain. The commodification of 
Shakespeare reminds us that the question of anachronism is inextricably bound up with 
political form. The poet and critic August Wilhelm von Schlegel, a foremost leader of 
German Romanticism, played a key role in importing Shakespeare to Germany in the 
early nineteenth century. In fact, his renowned translations can be seen as the starting 
point of the ‘Shakespeare genius’ phenomenon in Germany. In the spring of 1808, 
Schlegel delivered several lectures in Vienna on the topic of dramatic art and literature. 
In his lecture on Shakespeare, he undertook ‘to prove that Shakespeare’s anachronisms 
are, for the most part, committed of set purpose and deliberately.’ This argument 
anticipates much twentieth-century criticism (and especially Bertolt Brecht’s 
Verfremdungseffekt, addressed later on in this thesis). Significantly, Schlegel argues that 
‘it was frequently of importance to [Shakespeare] to move the exhibited subject out of 
                                                
36 Victor Hugo, William Shakespeare (Honolulu, Hawaii: University Press of the Pacific, 2001), p. 211. 
37 Ibid., pp. 295-96. 
38 Quoted by Graham Robb in Victor Hugo (London: Picador, 1997), p. 401. 
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the background of time, and bring it quite near to us.’39 In his lecture, Schlegel implies 
that anachronism can be considered as an authorial strategy that problematises the 
question of historical distance. The idea that Shakespeare’s plays ‘move the exhibited 
subject out of the background of time, and bring it quite near to us’ has far-reaching 
implications as it questions what we think is familiar by re-presenting ‘the exhibited 
subject’ to us. Whether Shakespeare’s anachronisms are due to the ‘indifference of 
genius’ (Creizenach) or ‘committed of set purpose and deliberately’ (Schlegel), the 
question of authorial intention—or indeed lack thereof—remains central in German 
criticism. 
 
C. ‘ANACHRONY MAKES THE LAW’: FRENCH THEORY, DIFFÉRANCE AND 
SHAKESPEARE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 
The first half of the twentieth century is characterised by a complete lack of interest in 
Shakespeare’s anachronisms. In his influential survey, Shakespeare’s Roman Plays and 
Their Background (1910), Mungo William MacCallum observed that ‘anachronisms in 
detail are of course abundantly unimportant’ and that ‘they may be disregarded’ for the 
reason that ‘it is not such trifles that interfere with fidelity to antiquity.’ This view 
epitomises the treatment of anachronism in much twentieth-century literary criticism. 
However, MacCallum suggests that ‘perhaps they deserve notice only because they add 
one little item to the mass of proof that the plays were written by a man of merely 
ordinary information, not by a trained scholar’—the widespread idea that Shakespeare 
was ‘of merely ordinary information’ is generally traced back to Ben Jonson’s eulogic 
                                                
39 August Wilhelm von Schlegel, ‘The Art of Shakespeare’s Romantic Drama’, from Lectures on 
Dramatic Art and Literature (1808), translated from the German by John Black (London: Henry George 
Bohn, 1846), p. 356. 
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declaration that the playwright had ‘small Latin and less Greek.’40 The main reason that 
anachronisms were viewed as ‘unimportant trifles’ in the early twentieth century was 
that there was a greater mystery yet to be solved: what loomed large behind most 
critical investigations of Shakespeare’s works was the question of authorship. 
If ‘anachronism-hunting has been out of fashion with scholars in recent times,’ 
the classical historian Patricia Easterling remarked in 1985, it is ‘for the good reason 
that it can easily seem like a rather trivial sort of parlour game.’41 Because it has been 
approached mostly from a narrow, critically conservative perspective, anachronism is 
often perceived as a trivial topic in literary criticism. This might be the reason why, as 
Rackin pointed out in 1990, ‘during the last fifty years, criticism has had almost nothing 
to say about Shakespeare’s use of anachronisms.’42 There is a notable exception, 
however: in Shakespearean Meanings (1968), Sigurd Burckhardt was probably the first 
critic to address the striking clock of Julius Caesar as a deliberate anachronism: no 
longer ‘Shakespeare’s most notorious boner,’ the clock becomes a ‘touchstone’, a hint 
to the sense that ‘time is now reckoned in a new, Caesarean style.’43 This essay seems to 
have unearthed a temporal mode that lay dormant all along in Shakespeare’s Roman 
play. Once again, this landslide critical shift can be interpreted in the light of its cultural 
moment. Shakespeare’s historical writing is a hybrid genre that problematises the 
relation between historicity and textuality. While it has often been pointed out how 
history invades the formal structure of texts, it is easy to overlook the flip side of this 
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phenomenon: the fact that textuality itself is what underlies all historiography (this 
becomes a key new historicist tenet in the 1980s). 
Published in 1968, Burckhardt’s book appeared at a turning point in European 
politics—which obviously includes Europe’s literary and cultural politics. The 
emergence of new theories about literature and textuality uncovered new implications 
regarding texts and their meaning. Derrida’s work, in particular, has had an 
unprecedented impact on the way we read texts. In 1967, Derrida published three books 
that would have a tremendous impact on the institution of literary criticism, especially 
in the Anglo-Saxon world. In De la grammatologie, La voix et le phénomène and 
L’écriture et la différence, Derrida introduces différance, his famous neologism 
deriving from the French verb différer, which means both ‘to differ’ and ‘to defer’.44 
Différance marks the recognition that the production of textual meaning is governed by 
heterogeneous features—namely difference and deferral. From a linguistic perspective, 
difference notably implies that signs can never fully summon forth what they mean: 
they can only be defined dialogically, namely through their relation with other signs 
from which they differ.45 The consequence of this originary difference is that meaning 
is forever deferred through an endless chain of signifiers. Marking the extent to which a 
text is never at one with itself, différance can be said to describe the uncanny 
asynchrony haunting textuality. This recognition—which constitutes the central 
theoretical framework of the present thesis—might explain why critics, in the late 1960s, 
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started toying with the idea that it is perhaps no accident that a ‘clock strikes’ in the 
middle of a play supposedly set in ancient Rome (Julius Caesar, 2.1.192). Studies about 
temporality in Western literature hardly ever fail to mention Shakespeare’s clock, often 
presenting it as the arch-anachronism. 
The conceptualisation of literature’s disjointed temporality—especially in view 
of Shakespeare’s works—is inextricably bound up with the developments of French 
theory in the second half of the twentieth century, when the overarching legacy of 
Enlightenment thinking gave way to new ideas about presence, meaning and 
subjectivity, which were no longer to be seen in essentialist terms but rather as an effect 
of difference. As implied earlier, the construction of Shakespeare as a timeless genius 
both in Britain and Germany was rooted in a latent francophobia. The key function of 
the Shakespearean text in the theories developed by many French thinkers in the second 
half of the twentieth century can be seen as a response to this cultural ostracism. Once 
again, the English Bard was being used (probably not on a conscious level though) as a 
tool to re-shape the cultural identity of a European nation: it was France, this time, 
which instrumentalised Shakespeare in the wake of its so-called ‘May 1968 revolution’. 
The French reaction to German and British cultural models first consisted in declaring 
the traditional model of authorship developed by these two nations as obsolescent. In 
Michel Foucault’s famous essay, ‘What is an Author?’ (1969), Shakespeare features as 
a crucial symbol for what Roland Barthes had called the ‘death of the author’.46 Derrida 
himself would later revisit a similar theme: in Spectres of Marx (1993), ‘the Thing 
“Shakespeare”’ features as the emblem of a ‘hauntology’, whereby the author remains 
shrouded in a veil of undecidability—very much like the ghost of Hamlet’s father, 
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concealed ‘from top to toe’ behind its armour (Hamlet, 1.2.228).47 For Derrida, Hamlet 
is a play where ‘anachrony makes the law’: this is directly linked to the figure of a ghost 
that ‘de-synchronizes’ and ‘recalls us to anachrony.’48 The elective affinity between 
Shakespearean drama and twentieth-century French theories has become a critical motif 
since the 1980s—especially in the Anglo-Saxon academic world.49 In Shakespeare in 
French Theory (2007), Richard Wilson looked at ‘French theory in the shadow of 
Shakespeare’ by exploring ‘the uncanny idea that literary theory shadows 
Shakespearean theatre.’50 
 
III- THE IMPLICATIONS OF ANACHRONISM FOR LITERARY CRITICISM AND ITS 
PRACTITIONERS 
A. ‘THE RENAISSANCE DISCOVERY OF TIME’, OR THE ALLEGED EMERGENCE OF A NEW 
SUBJECTIVITY IN THE PERIOD 
From the second half of the twentieth century, historians and literary critics started to 
argue that the Renaissance saw the development of a genuinely new and complex 
subjectivity which marked a historical shift towards ‘modernity’—this is precisely the 
reason why the period has been labelled ‘early modern’. A key attribute of this new 
subjective mode detected by critics is the perception of historical difference. This is 
                                                
47 Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New 
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notably illustrated by the apparition of a hybrid dramatic genre which was to become 
one of the defining features of the Elizabethan stage: the history play. As they were 
‘played out in the theater, the problems of historiographic representation were redefined 
and intensified,’ Rackin argues: ‘a new sense of anachronism emphasized the absence 
of the historical past and its alienation from the history-writing present.’51 Thomas 
Stearns Eliot had made a similar point in his famous essay ‘Tradition and the Individual 
Talent’ (1921), where he suggested that ‘the historical sense involves a perception, not 
only of the pastness of the past, but of its presence.’52 Some fifty years later, the 
historian Peter Burke would develop this idea in The Renaissance Sense of the Past 
(1969), which posits that Renaissance thought is characterised by a ‘sense of history.’ 
One of the main factors of this sense of history, Burke argues, is the ‘sense of 
anachronism, or sense of historical perspective, or sense of change, or sense of the 
past.’53 In The Vulnerable Text (1986), Thomas Greene notes that the ‘prominence [of 
anachronism] in Renaissance criticism is remarkable, because it is one of the few 
concerns of that era which are not anticipated in some degree by ancient criticism.’54 
Indeed, the possibility to determine what is historically correct depends on the capacity 
to conceptualise what is historically inaccurate or out of place—in other words, what is 
anachronistic. Thus, in the second half of the twentieth century, anachronism takes on a 
new meaning for critics: it becomes no less than the very condition of historical 
perception, allowing the subject to situate itself historically. In contrast with the 
Renaissance, ‘medieval men lacked a sense of the “differentness” of the past,’ Burke 
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argues.55 Thus, ‘the Middle Ages never knew that they were the Middle Ages’; by 
contrast, ‘the Renaissance was quite conscious of the fact that it was the Renaissance.’56 
Because they rely on artificial periodicisation, Burke’s assumptions are questionable; 
but they are representative of the predominant outlook on the early modern period in 
recent times. Indeed, historians and literary critics have repeatedly put forward the idea 
that 
one of the intellectual advances achieved by what has been called ‘the 
Renaissance discovery of Time’ was the realisation that the most interesting 
thing about the past is what makes it the past. A secularised historiography—
involving recognition of anachronism, historical development and the relativity 
of truth—marks a decisive break with medieval thought.57 
The early modern period clearly fashioned itself, and has been seen subsequently, as an 
enterprise of recuperation of the past—renaissance means ‘rebirth’ in French.58 The 
conjuration of Helen of Troy in Christopher Marlowe’s Doctor Faustus, for instance, 
constitutes a famous locus of such ‘Renaissance self-fashioning,’ in Stephen 
Greenblatt’s established phrase. 59  A typical motif of late Elizabethan drama, the 
invocation of the past in a play testifies to a very keen awareness of the potential of 
theatre to dramatise the distance between past and present. The episode in Marlowe’s 
play also illustrates the early modern fascination with classical antiquity, which was 
looked back to as a golden age. 
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 In Shakespeare and the Uses of Antiquity, Charles and Michelle Martindale note 
that ‘Shakespeare, though not a learned man, wrote in an age saturated with matters 
classical’ and that ‘much that was written and thought was dominated by the classical 
tradition.’ According to them, this might explain why ‘one third of Shakespeare’s plays 
are set in the ancient world’ and why ‘he has constant recourse to classical mythology 
and history, and to classical ideas.’60 As is often acknowledged, Homer and Ovid were 
the main literary models for late sixteenth-century English playwrights. For his 
historical sources, Shakespeare relied heavily on the Greek biographer Plutarch and his 
Parallel Lives—a collection of biographies of prominent Greeks and Romans. It has 
been noted, however, that classical antiquity frequently appears anachronistically in his 
plays and in those of other playwrights in the period. From his antiquarian perspective, 
Douce was particularly puzzled by the fact that ‘about the age of Elizabeth, the 
dramatists in particular seem to have been remarkably inattentive to the unities of time 
and place.’61 The treatment of Greek antiquity in Shakespearean drama has always left 
critics baffled. One of the most famous instances is the anachronistic reference to 
Aristotle in Troilus and Cressida (2.2.162-6)—punctilious critics are always eager to 
point out that the Trojan War took place several centuries before the Greek philosopher 
was even born. Thus, in 1698, the famous theatre critic Jeremy Collier used the 
argument that ‘Shakespear makes Hector talk about Aristotle’s Philosophy’ as evidence 
of ‘the immorality and profaneness of the English stage.’62 And in 1712, the English 
dramatist John Dennis remarked that ‘in the same Play mention is made of Milo, which 
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is another very great Fault in Chronology.’63 In the preface to his edition of the plays, 
Samuel Johnson remarked that Shakespeare’s Greek antiquity is ridden with 
anachronisms: ‘we need not wonder to find Hector quoting Aristotle,’ he fulminates, 
‘when we see the loves of Theseus and Hippolyta combined with the gothic mythology 
of fairies.’64 However, this type of approach prompts a number of questions. For 
instance, why focus on distinct occurrences rather than acknowledge that Shakespeare’s 
re-presentation of ancient Greece, as a whole, is indeed anachronistic? 
 
B. FROM SHAKESPEARE’S TIME TO OUR OWN: ANACHRONISM AS METADRAMATIC 
REFLECTION ON THE REPRESENTABILITY OF HISTORY 
If I may be allowed to jump back in time briefly, anachronisms have been spotted 
everywhere in late Renaissance drama—not only in Shakespeare’s plays. Johnson 
himself admitted that ‘Shakespeare, indeed, was not the only violator of chronology’: 
for in the same age [Philip] Sidney, who wanted not the advantages of learning, 
has, in his Arcadia, confounded the pastoral with the feudal times, the days of 
innocence, quiet and security, with those of turbulence, violence, and 
adventure.65 
According to Johnson and other critics, ‘violation of chronology’ was not the feat of an 
isolated, uneducated man from Stratford: rather, it was a widespread activity in 
Renaissance England in the 1590s. Besides, there is strong evidence that chronological 
and geographical misplacements did not go unnoticed in the period. As early as the late 
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1570s, Sidney himself was criticising the new ‘customs’ of the Elizabethan stage, where, 
he remarked, it would not be unusual to see ‘two armies fly in, represented with four 
swords & bucklers: and then what hard heart will not receive it for a pitched field?’66 In 
the prologue to his revised edition of Every Man in his Humour, Ben Jonson observed 
that Shakespeare’s chaotic temporality ‘serve[s] the ill customs of the age.’ He gives a 
few examples of these ‘ill customs’ as they appear in the English history plays: 
To make a child now swaddled, to proceed 
Man, and then shoot up, in one beard and weed, 
Past threescore years; or, with three rusty swords, 
And help of some few foot and half-foot words, 
Fight over York and Lancaster’s long jars. 
And while, on Shakespeare’s stage, the Wars of the Roses are fought ‘with three rusty 
swords,’ the chorus of Henry V shamelessly ‘wafts you o’er the seas.’67 Jonson’s 
criticism of Shakespeare’s historiography anticipates the stance of eighteenth-century 
critics like Johnson, who complained that the Bard ‘had no regard to distinction of time 
or place, but gives to one age or nation, without scruple, the customs, institutions, and 
opinions of another, at the expense not only of likelihood, but of possibility.’68 
Although he was averse to chronological misplacements, Jonson is himself ‘guilty’ of 
several anachronisms in his Roman play Sejanus.69 Contrary to his famous rival, Jonson 
was very anxious to respect the traditional unities of time and place as prescribed in 
Aristotle’s Poetics. Jonson’s attacks on Shakespeare’s alleged lack of historical realism 
illustrate the extent to which historical chronology was a topical issue in the period. But 
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let us bring this anachronistic digression into the seventeenth century to a close and go 
back to where we were (a thesis on the topic of anachronism will be pardoned, I hope, 
for not always strictly adhering to established historical chronology!). 
In the first half of the twentieth century, the question of Shakespeare’s 
anachronisms features mainly in the form of intertextual allusions, as in James Joyce’s 
Ulysses: ‘Why is the underplot of King Lear in which Edmund figures lifted out of 
Sidney’s Arcadia and spatchcocked on to a Celtic legend older than history?’ The 
answer is rather straightforward: 
That was Will’s way, John Eglinton defended. We should not combine a Norse 
saga with an excerpt from a novel by George Meredith. Que voulez-vous? More 
would say. He puts Bohemia on the seacost and Makes Ulysses quote 
Aristotle.70 
While the idea of ‘Shakespeare’s anachronisms’ seems to have become established as a 
commonplace of the Western academic unconscious in the twentieth century, the topic 
of anachronism in itself received virtually no attention until the 1980s. Mentioning 
‘striking clocks in Julius Caesar, references to (e.g.) Turks, and Nero, in King Lear, 
Hector in Troilus mentioning Aristotle,’ Easterling notes that ‘it is well-known that 
there are things in Shakespeare that have no parallel in Greek tragedy.’ In her survey of 
anachronism in Greek tragedy, she suggests that ‘Shakespeare’s imaginative effort to 
evoke antiquity deserves to be taken very seriously’ for the reason that ‘his Romans are 
now seen to be far more than just “Elizabethans in togas”.’71 A major shift in the 
perception of Shakespeare’s anachronisms occurred in the late 1980s when literary 
critics started to consider seriously the possibility that Shakespeare and his 
contemporaries had a ‘sense of anachronism,’ in Burke’s memorable phrase. In a 1987 
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essay, Rackin presents anachronism as ‘a crucial Shakespearean strategy’ that consists 
in ‘the manipulation of the temporal relationship between past events and present 
audience.’ From this perspective, anachronism becomes a theatrical tool whose main 
function is to ‘dramatize the distance and the intersection between past and present, 
eternity and time, and to ponder the problematic nature of history itself.’72 In other 
words, anachronism invites a reflection on the representability of history within our own 
modernity. 
 
C. ANACHRONISM AS REGISTRATION OF THE VIEWER’S EYE WITHIN THE 
REPRESENTATIONAL SCENE 
A common assumption associated with the ‘modern’ is that people from the past could 
not possibly conceptualise time the way ‘we’ do now. The sensation that our present 
perception of space and time is inherently superior to that of past ages is a typical locus 
of ‘modernity’ (i.e. what is contemporary to a perceiving subject at a given time). In 
many ways, the very concept of modernity relies on the implicit sense that now 
surpasses then: the implied superiority of the present over the past is precisely what 
underlies the possibility for subjects to identify themselves as ‘modern’ in ‘the present’. 
Modernity is an odd concept in that it refers to a constantly shifting reality; as such, it is 
closely linked with the critical present of interpretation. As an intrusion within a 
specific scene, the viewer’s eye constitutes the necessary anachronism through which 
representation becomes complete. For Jeremy Tambling, ‘the anachronistic […] is not 
simply the past surviving in the present’: it is ‘something in the present itself, or in “the 
modern”’ that guarantees that ‘the moment is always split, always disjointed.’73 The 
sensation that Renaissance people understood the past as distinct from the present has 
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far-reaching implications in terms of how we read literature. For Thomas Greene, the 
emergence of a distinction between history and literature is precisely what inaugurates 
modern subjectivity: 
One might begin to talk about history and literature in our tradition by returning 
to the moment when they were first perceived to be interdependent. This 
occurred roughly at the opening of the early modern period; it may not be too 
much to say that this occurrence permitted modern history to begin.74 
From Greene’s point of view, Jonson’s rants about Shakespeare’s lack of historical 
consistency give voice to a profound cultural change: the recognition of the distinctness 
between history and literature. And what guarantees this distinctness is the awareness of 
anachronism: for ‘the issue of anachronism […] marked both the emergent boundary 
between history and fiction and the cultural transformation that produced it,’ Rackin 
explains.75 For Rackin, the conceptualisation of anachronism is no less than one of the 
greatest ‘innovation[s] in English Renaissance historiography.’76 And in Shakespeare’s 
plays specifically, anachronism is to be viewed as part of a literary strategy that 
formalises ‘the recognition of temporal distance that alienate[s] a nostalgic present from 
a lost historical past.’77 Recently, anachronisms have been recognised to have wider 
implications than eighteenth-century critics originally thought. There is now wide 
recognition amongst critics that ‘Shakespeare’s anachronisms are in fact of different 
kinds, and it is not easy to determine which are simple errors due to lack of knowledge 
alone.’78 And the concept of anachronism itself has been used to name ‘a range of 
temporal anomalies, from backwardness to prematurity, regression to anticipation, the 
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“primitive” to the future perfect.’79 Thus, anachronism has become a trope that signals 
temporal dislocation in a wide range of contexts—not only literary but also social, 
cultural or political. 
 However, the present thesis does not consider anachronism in terms of temporal 
anomalies. Rather than indicating that something is anomalous in a given scene 
(whether textual or anything else), anachronism is here defined as the registration of the 
critic within the framework of representation. Thus, if anything can be said to be 
anomalous or supplementary in the scene (or the ‘seen’), it is precisely the viewer’s 
eye—not the scene itself. In this sense, the thesis fully adheres to Jacques Lacan’s 
theory of subjectivity, in which ‘the subject becomes a kind of virus infecting the 
picture.’ 80  During his seminar on ‘The Line and the Light’ (1964), the French 
psychoanalyst remarked: ‘if I am anything in the picture, it is always in the form of the 
screen, which I earlier called the stain, the spot.’ 81  Unlike Rackin, who sees 
anachronism ‘in’ Shakespeare as the result of a deliberate dramatic strategy, the thesis 
presents it as a direct effect of interpretation: in other words, anachronism is the 
manifestation of untimeliness within the subjective grid of the critic. This notion is 
illustrated in the next chapter on Julius Caesar, which suggests that the untimeliness 
that might be (and perhaps in the majority of cases is) experienced in the play is a 
reflection of our own critical moment (which is often experienced as disjointed). 
Broadly speaking, this moment could be referred to as Derridean. As suggested earlier, 
Derrida’s insights have profoundly affected, or perhaps even infected, the institution of 
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literary criticism, and by extension the institution of literature itself. For Nicholas Royle, 
‘it is difficult to think of a figure in literary and cultural theory more important than 
Jacques Derrida. Although highly controversial, his writing has transformed 
contemporary thought and his work on deconstruction cannot be ignored.’82 Once we 
become aware of the structural différance that haunts textuality (and it is very hard, after 
Derrida, to deny it is happening), it seems difficult to revert back to a ‘pre-
deconstruction’ approach to texts—precisely because deconstruction (and, for the same 
reason, différance) is always already happening.83 The next chapter explores the notion 
that textuality reflects our own mental predispositions back to us. The 
acknowledgement of the asynchrony that haunts literature can be deeply disturbing on a 
psychological level. It can cause a great deal of anxiety, which is inevitably manifested 
in the mental experience of the text itself. If, when we read Julius Caesar, we 
hallucinate about ‘the all-white face of a handless clock,’ in Hélène Cixous’s ominous 
phrase, this reveals the extent to which ‘we too […] have an all-white, uncertain face.’84 
                                                
82 Royle, Jacques Derrida, backmatter. 
83 See footnote 113 in Chapter 1 of this thesis, ‘Shakespeare or the Theatre of the Impossible’. 
84 Hélène Cixous, ‘What Is It o’Clock? Or the Door (We Never Enter)’, Stigmata [1998] (London and 
New York: Routledge, 2005), p. 76. 
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INTRODUCTORY NOTE 
In or around 1599, Shakespeare wrote what are often considered to be some of his most 
inspired works, including Julius Caesar and Hamlet. Both plays contain references to 
the time being ‘strange-disposed’ or ‘out of joint’; they are ‘sister-plays’ in their ‘out of 
jointedness by the clock,’ Nicholas Royle notes (Julius Caesar, 1.3.33; Hamlet, 
1.5.189).1 The drive towards historical contextualisation in much recent criticism has 
led commentators to elucidate this out-of-jointedness on an exclusively historical plane. 
Thus, the characteristic untimeliness that haunts the diegeses of Julius Caesar and 
Hamlet has been understood to be a direct reflection of Shakespeare’s late Elizabethan 
or early Jacobean moment. Anachronisms, in particular, are often read in the light of 
specific political or religious upheavals in the period. For instance, the intrusion of a 
striking clock in Julius Caesar is generally used to illustrate the idea that the play is 
unquestionably anchored in its historical moment of production. Likewise, the 
numerous allusions to purgatory in Hamlet testify to the play’s topicality at the end of 
the sixteenth century, in a time of bitter confessional struggles. Underneath the two-
dimensional surface of Caesar’s Rome or pre-Christian Denmark is an early modern 
reality that figures as the genuine ontological core of Shakespeare’s drama—this, at 
least, is a typical historicist outlook (thoroughly documented in the next two chapters). 
In this type of approach, anachronisms are treated as gateways towards a ‘real’ 
historical present (Shakespeare’s), as opposed to the ‘fake’ historical setting of the 
dramas. Thus, anachronisms stand for the inclusion of the Elizabethan present within a 
pseudo-ancient scene (thereby declared obsolete)—specific examples will be provided 
                                                
1 Nicholas Royle, ‘The Poet: Julius Caesar and the Democracy to Come’, In Memory of Jacques Derrida 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009), p. 4. 
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in the chapters. Invested with an authentic core of presence, this historical reality 
determines the ultimate meaning of Shakespeare’s drama. 
A striking feature of this approach is the self-effacing mechanism on which it 
relies: the authorial present is asserted at the expense of the critic’s own present. In 
other words, this type of criticism obliterates the extent to which its own subjective 
point of view is always already inscribed in the object of its investigation. Specifically, 
the operation that consists in labelling something an anachronism betrays the presence 
of the critic within the hermeneutic scene—as a perceived discrepancy, an anachronism 
primarily testifies to the observer’s own cultural biases. If anachronisms create a 
powerful effect of defamiliarisation, as it has often been suggested, this crucially 
encompasses the early modern dimension of Shakespeare’s authorial moment. From 
‘our’ contemporary point of view (a moment that is by essence in perpetual movement), 
the dramas are no more anchored in Elizabethan England than they are in Caesar’s 
Rome or pre-Christian Denmark. Generally speaking, the profusion of anachronisms in 
Julius Caesar and Hamlet (within the experiential dimension of the viewer, at least) 
testifies to the recognition of the intrinsic disjointedness of the theatrical medium, and 
by extension of literature itself. These plays do not only distantiate themselves from the 
so-called ‘original’ scene of Caesar’s Rome or pre-Christian Denmark. Ultimately, the 
dramas also assert a fundamental disjunction between themselves and the other so-
called ‘original’ scene of late Elizabethan England. The idea that the dramatic structure 
of Shakespeare’s theatre is often dependent on a core of untimeliness or absence is a 
key concern in the present thesis. Accordingly, the next two chapters examine the extent 
to which Julius Caesar and Hamlet can be said to resist being assigned a core of 
historical presence. In both chapters, the notion that the dramas might reflect specific 
aspects of Shakespeare’s historical moment is duly examined, with close attention to the 
   80 
 
criticism. However, the main concern, ultimately, is to explore why and how they 
ultimately resist such historical foreclosure. The guiding thread throughout is the sense 
that Julius Caesar and Hamlet challenge established ideas about presence and meaning, 
not only in relation to Shakespearean drama but to literature itself. 
The two chapters specifically try to provide credible alternatives to new 
historicism and its predictable methods of early modern contextualisation. The chapter 
on Julius Caesar starts by suggesting that the play crystallises the untimeliness of 
different historical moments: Caesar’s Rome, Shakespeare’s London and modernity 
(taking into account the perpetual slippage that this concept inevitably implies) all 
resonate within what is referred to as the ‘psychic realm’ of the play. In fact, this 
untimeliness can be made relevant to any given historical period, as it is essentially the 
result of an arbitrary operation of critical association. But prior to any act of 
historicisation, the intra-diegetic realm of the play appears to be characterised by a 
powerful sense of temporal derangement. Exploring this disjointed subjective mood, the 
analysis moves inwards, with a deliberate focus on the mental world of the characters—
as if those characters were indeed ‘real’ human beings. The psychological approach that 
is adopted in the chapter on Julius Caesar challenges the primacy of a pseudo-‘original’ 
historical context, asserted in most historicist readings of the play. The chapter adopts a 
peculiar critical position in that it relies on two essentialist assumptions: 
1- that there can be such a thing as a play ‘in itself’; 
2- that there can be such a thing as an undifferentiated audience (referred to 
through the personal pronoun ‘we’). 
These two notions are thoroughly challenged in subsequent chapters though. Although 
it is by no means representative of the critical stance of the thesis as a whole, the 
superficial position adopted in Chapter 2 aims at pointing out that there are possible 
   81 
 
critical alternatives to new historicism. The idea that the criticism is the central factor in 
the construction of the meaning of literary works becomes central in the chapter on 
Hamlet, which takes direct issue with new historicist critical methods (and specifically 
with Stephen Greenblatt’s best-selling book, Hamlet in Purgatory). Shakespeare’s most 
famous play not only resists historical foreclosure: rather, it frustrates all attempts at 
narrowing down its meaning to a specific hermeneutic level (whether it is historical, 
psychological, discursive or anything else). The result of a multitude of contradictory 
points of view, Hamlet’s meaning is fundamentally fragmented. The chapter argues that 
this fragmentation is precisely what defines the play’s aesthetics. Amalgamated into a 
dissonant unity, the fragmented meanings eventually turn out to be meaningful 
fragments. While this fragmentation has been viewed repeatedly as a defect of 
Shakespeare’s work (that is, as a regrettable but ultimately forgivable by-effect of the 
author’s alleged raw, unpolished genius), the next two chapters treat all the critical 
‘fragments’ as meaningful components that participate in the elaboration of an 
aesthetics of untimeliness. 
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CHAPTER 2 – ‘PATHOLOGICAL INTERIORITY’: HUMAN CHARACTER AND 
PSYCHOLOGICAL TIME IN JULIUS CAESAR 
 
 
 
What time is it? is the best-known fateful question, the one we repeat ten times an hour with 
automaton lips, and time doesn’t pass, the one we listen to with the tips of our ears, the gravest 
question in its familiar appearances, the question that admits our anxiety without our knowledge, 
the most wily, the least recognizable, the one that announces. Something is going to happen. And 
we don’t know if it isn’t already, the thing, the hour, already on the way to happening, already 
there, a little to the left, we find ourselves on a terrestrial platform, held back, there to the left in 
the sky, this isn’t the moon, it’s the all-white face of a handless clock, and we too we have an all-
white, uncertain face. 
– Hélène Cixous, ‘What Is It o’Clock? Or the Door (We Never Enter)’1 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Of all Shakespeare’s plays, Julius Caesar is probably the one that is most readily 
associated with the concept of anachronism. Critics and editors have long pointed out 
that Shakespeare’s Rome features a cornucopia of Elizabethan artefacts, including 
doublets, sleeves, feather hats and sweaty nightcaps.2 Even for non-specialists, the clock 
that strikes in Act II of the play has come to epitomise the very idea of literary 
anachronism. Because of its strong historical affinities with Shakespeare’s London in 
the late 1590s, Julius Caesar has also featured as a privileged object of investigation for 
historicism. Thus, the play’s ‘strange-disposèd time’ has been read as a reflection of 
major political and religious upheavals that took place at the end of the sixteenth 
century (1.3.33). For James Shapiro, Julius Caesar testifies to the sensation that 
‘Shakespeare came of age when time itself was out of joint.’3 The present chapter starts 
by examining the proposition that the time was out of joint in late 1590s England and 
that this historical phenomenon can be said to be crystallised in Julius Caesar. After 
                                                
1 Hélène Cixous, ‘What Is It o’Clock? Or the Door (We Never Enter)’, Stigmata [1998] (London and 
New York: Routledge, 2005), p. 76. 
2 See, for instance, Richard Wilson, Julius Caesar (London: Penguin, 1992). 
3 James Shapiro, 1599: A Year in the Life of William Shakespeare (London: Faber and Faber, 2005), 
p. 169. 
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providing a detailed overview of the play’s alleged topicality, the analysis moves away 
from historical context in order to investigate issues of human character in literature. 
Specifically, the chapter examines the argument that, prior to any operation of historical 
contextualisation, there is a profound sense of temporal derangement inscribed within 
the diegetic realm of the play. 
In her epic essay on Julius Caesar, Hélène Cixous points out that the play is 
haunted by a question that the characters keep repeating over and over: ‘What is it 
o’clock?’.4 Building on Cixous’ insight, the chapter looks at this untimeliness from the 
perspective of character psychology without resorting to historical context. Reversing 
the historicist strategy that views characters as reflections of an authentic core of 
historical reality, the analysis treats context as a springboard towards the psychic reality 
of the characters. A key phrase in this chapter, the ‘psychic reality’ of the characters of 
Julius Caesar is defined as a direct effect of the aesthetics of Shakespearean 
characterisation as it manifests itself in the present of interpretation. The recognition in 
much contemporary criticism that fictional characters are not ‘real’ and that therefore 
they cannot be said to have psychological depth is here deliberately bypassed. Although 
this has been stated earlier, it seems important to stress once again that such an approach 
is not representative of the thesis as a whole—in fact, the notion of an inalienable ‘in-
itself’ through which literary works are supposedly anchored is the main bone of 
contention in all subsequent chapters. By contrast, the critical method that is here 
adopted consists in what may be called a productive essentialism: the psychic reality of 
the characters of Julius Caesar is considered from the point of view of an 
undifferentiated audience, referred to through the personal pronoun ‘we’. This reality 
conjures up the cognitive experience of the inner intellectual life of the characters by 
                                                
4 Cixous, ‘What Is It o’Clock?’, p. 76. 
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readers or audiences of Julius Caesar. Of course, all readers and audiences are here 
assigned—in what is in effect a totalitarian Anschluss of the field of interpretation—the 
same experiential grid. Whether such a critical positioning is ‘wrong’ (especially insofar 
as it is deliberate) in view of the undefined (and possibly undefinable) ethics of literary 
criticism is irrelevant, within the boundaries of this chapter at least. 
 Moving away from the play’s early modern topicality eventually allows the 
focus to shift onto the depth of Shakespeare’s characterisation in Julius Caesar. Thus, 
the chapter focuses on the psychological dimension of the play, treating it (for the 
purposes of the analysis) as a self-contained reality. In spite of being problematic on 
many levels, such a character-based approach emphasises the obsession with time that is 
inscribed within the diegetic realm of the play. The sense of the radical openness of the 
future, in particular, features as a key theme throughout. ‘There is a “to”-effect to Julius 
Caesar,’ Nicholas Royle writes in his landmark essay on the play—a formula that 
encapsulates the characters’ uncanny obsession with what is to come.5 The tentative 
psychological reading of the play that is deployed in this chapter notably challenges the 
default historicist framework within which Julius Caesar has been embedded. Such a 
reading is preoccupied with human character and the (subjective) time of the mind (as 
opposed to supposedly objective historical time). Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’s 
sensation that, in Julius Caesar, Shakespeare’s Romans are ‘human beings, human from 
head to foot’ provides a blueprint for the critical perspective that is here adopted.6 At 
odds with historicist methodologies, the analysis moves resolutely inwards, towards the 
muddy waters of character psyche. Eventually, the mental realm of Julius Caesar is 
addressed in terms of what Charles Bernheimer calls ‘pathological interiority’—a mode 
                                                
5 Nicholas Royle, ‘The Poet: Julius Caesar and the Democracy to Come’, in In Memory of Jacques 
Derrida (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009), p. 3. 
6  Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, ‘Shakespeare und kein Ende!’ (1807-1816), 
http://pages.unibas.ch/shine/shakespundkeinende.html (accessed 14 March 2012). 
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of experience that provides a first instance, within the thesis, of how Shakespearean 
drama can be read in terms of an aesthetics of untimeliness.7 
 
I- ‘WHAT IS IT O’CLOCK?’—MOVING IN THROUGH HISTORICAL LAYERS 
A. TIME OUT OF JOINT IN ENGLISH CULTURE: ANACHRONISM AS NATIONAL 
INSTITUTION 
‘In or about December 1910, human character changed,’ Virginia Woolf famously 
declared in ‘Mr Bennett and Mrs Brown’ (1924).8 An unmistakable expression of this 
change, she argued, was the generational rift that divided Edwardian and Georgian 
writers over the question of literary character. Marking the advent of modernism, 
December 1910 had tolled the death knell for the traditional Edwardian character—‘we 
are trembling on the verge of one of the great ages of English literature,’ Woolf 
predicted in her essay.9 Transcending mere issues of literary style, the historical change 
at hand seemed to reach beyond the world of fiction. Woolf’s preoccupation with what 
makes character ‘real’ sprang from the sense that literary form is shaped by actual 
human interaction. Looking back to the fateful date, she noted: 
All human relations have shifted—those between masters and servants, 
husbands and wives, parents and children. And when human relations change 
there is at the same time a change in religion, conduct, politics, and literature.10 
As her subsequent writing testifies, the idea of an irreversible historical shift having 
occurred early on in the twentieth century had made a strong impression on Woolf’s 
imagination. When ‘Mr Bennett and Mrs Brown’ reached publication, she was finishing 
her masterpiece, Mrs Dalloway (1925). The novel opens on a cold morning—‘fresh as if 
                                                
7  Charles Bernheimer, ‘Introduction: Part I’, Dora’s Case: Freud—Hysteria—Feminism, edited by 
Charles Bernheimer and Claire Kahane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), p. 1. 
8 Virginia Woolf, ‘Mr Bennett and Mrs Brown’, Collected Essays, volume 1, edited by Leonard Woolf 
(London: Hogarth, 1966), p. 319. 
9 Ibid., p. 337. 
10 Ibid., p. 321. 
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issued to children on a beach,’ Clarissa Dalloway observes on her way to buy flowers 
for her party that evening. Her train of thought flows uninterrupted until the gigantic 
tolling of Big Ben breaks in: ‘There! Out it boomed. First a warning, musical; then the 
hour, irrevocable. The leaden circles dissolved in the air.’ For Clarissa, the ‘irrevocable 
hour’ materialises the odd ‘feeling […] that something awful [is] about to happen.’11 
And indeed, something peculiar does happen later that day, when a stranger called 
Septimus takes his own life by jumping out of a window. Clarissa’s ominous foreboding 
might sound strangely familiar to us; this is perhaps because it rehearses a theme that 
has haunted English literature for a long time now: the disjointedness of historical time. 
It is the very same theme which prompts Woolf’s idea that 1910 marked a fundamental 
change in human character. For the historian Peter Stansky, this disturbing sensation 
can be explained on the grounds that, ‘unexpectedly and perhaps belatedly, England in 
1910 entered the story of a modernism that since the turn of the century had had a 
number of its major events occur on the Continent.’12 Although such an assumption is 
questionable (turning points in history are rarely tidy, self-contained events), it draws 
attention to a strange feeling of historical belatedness that recurs in English culture.13 
 Incidentally, the ‘irrevocable hour’ that sets the tone for Mrs Dalloway conjures 
up another uncanny literary moment in another English masterpiece. In Shakespeare’s 
                                                
11 Virginia Woolf, Mrs Dalloway, edited by David Bradshaw (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 
pp. 3-4. 
12 Peter Stansky, On or About December 1910: Early Bloomsbury and Its Intimate World (Harvard: 
Harvard University Press, 1996), p. 1. 
13 This feeling of belatedness can be mapped in view of the development of clock-making—for Lewis 
Mumford, it is not the steam engine but the clock that constitutes ‘the key machine of the modern 
industrial world’ (quoted by Carlo Cipolla in Clocks and Culture, 1300-1700 (New York: Walker, 1967), 
p. 60). Relying on textual evidence, David Landes suggests that clocks were invented in the thirteenth 
century (Revolution in Time: Clocks and the Making of the Modern World (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1984), pp. 55-56). Paraphrasing Cipolla, Phyllis Rackin remarks that ‘by the sixteenth 
century domestic clocks and watches had become relatively common, and pocket watches had appeared. 
In the development of clock-making as in the development of modern historiography, England lagged 
behind the continent, but by the last two decades of the sixteenth century, both the new technology and 
the new historiography had become established there’ (Stages of History: Shakespeare’s English 
Chronicles (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1990), p. 16). 
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play Julius Caesar, the irrevocability of Caesar’s assassination is sealed by the august 
striking of a clock that marks the play’s ‘strange-disposèd time’ (1.3.33). As it has often 
been noted, the sensation that ‘The time is out of joint’ is a recurring leitmotiv in 
Shakespeare’s late Elizabethan plays; by suggesting that ‘Shakespeare came of age 
when time itself was out of joint,’ critics have emphasised the historical resonance of 
this dramatic theme (Hamlet, 1.5.189). Richard Wilson, for instance, argues that ‘Julius 
Caesar is theatre that reflects upon its own conditions of existence, its moment of 
production, and its cultural position within other forms of play and recreation.’14 It was 
Sigurd Burckhardt who first put forward the idea that the intrusion of a modern clock in 
the formal setting of a so-called ‘Roman’ play testifies to the fact that ‘Shakespeare had 
something in mind.’15 What exactly did the playwright have in mind when he decided to 
write a play set in Julius Caesar’s time? On reading Plutarch’s historical account, he 
might have been struck by unnerving analogies between Caesar’s Rome and late 
Elizabethan England. In Parallel Lives, the Greek historian alludes to Caesar’s 
landmark institution of the Julian calendar in 46 BC—a reform aimed at sorting out 
discrepancies that had developed in the traditional Roman calendar. ‘The ordinaunce of 
the kalender, and reformation of the yeare’ by Caesar was ‘a great commoditie unto all 
men,’ Plutarch comments; but it was also ‘the chiefest cause that made him mortally 
hated’ (for ‘the Roman conservatives felt it to be an arbitrary and tyrannical interference 
with the course of nature,’ Burckhardt explains).16 By the end of the sixteenth century, 
the Julian calendar (also the Christian calendar) had drifted off the celestial cycle by 
almost ten days. In order to set the time right, Pope Gregory XIII decreed a new 
                                                
14 Wilson, Julius Caesar, p. 41. 
15 Sigurd Burckardt, Shakespearean Meanings (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), p. 5. 
16 From Thomas North’s translation of Plutarch’s Lives (1579), cited in Geoffrey Bullough, Narrative and 
Dramatic Sources of Shakespeare, volume 5 (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966), pp. 79-80; 
Burckhardt, Shakespearean Meanings, p. 6. 
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calendrical reform; a papal bull (Inter gravissimas) was issued in 1582 and the 
Gregorian calendar was adopted in the same year by Catholic countries. As in Caesar’s 
time, the reform encountered a great deal of resistance—in people’s minds, the Julian 
calendar was inextricably bound up with Christ’s revelation. Elizabeth I was initially 
willing to go along with the change but her bishops, determined not to follow the lead of 
the Pope, convinced her to stand firm. Thus, ‘at the turn of the century […] a situation 
existed in Europe exactly analogous to that of Rome in 44 BC,’ Burckhardt remarks; ‘it 
was a time of confusion and uncertainty, when the most basic category by which men 
order their experience seemed to have become unstable and untrustworthy, subject to 
arbitrary political manipulation.’17 In 1582, time had become literally ‘strange-disposed’ 
or ‘out of joint’ as England was effectively lagging ten days behind its continental 
neighbours. ‘Like the Romans of Julius Caesar’s age, Shakespeare and the Elizabethans 
were compelled to live, work and worship in Caesar’s time,’ Steve Sohmer observes. 
Thus, Queen Elizabeth’s decision to stick to the old calendar had far-reaching 
consequences; for ‘with her decision, England became a national anachronism.’18 This 
single historical event may account for the profusion of anachronisms in the work not 
only of Shakespeare but that of other writers in the late Elizabethan period (Philip 
Sidney’s Arcadia being another good example). In fact, it has been suggested that the 
conceptualisation of anachronism is no less than the great ‘innovation in English 
Renaissance historiography.’19 
 
                                                
17 Ibid. 
18 Steve Sohmer, Shakespeare’s Mystery Play: The Opening of the Globe Theatre, 1599 (Manchester and 
New York: Manchester University Press, 1999), pp. 77 and 20. 
19  Phyllis Rackin, ‘Temporality, Anachronism, and Presence in Shakespeare’s English Histories’, 
Renaissance Drama 27 (1986), 101-23, p. 104. For a thorough analysis of this critical phenomenon, see 
Chapter 1, ‘“Violator of Chronology”: Shakespeare’s Anachronisms in Con-Text(s)’. 
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B. TEMPORAL CRISIS IN LATE ELIZABETHAN ENGLAND: JULIUS CAESAR AS 
HISTORICAL DOCUMENT 
The modern currency of the word ‘anachronism’ can be traced back to a work by 
French scholar Joseph Justus Scaliger, De emendatione temporum. As Herman Ebeling 
remarks, it is hardly a coincidence that the first edition of this ‘epoch-making work’ 
appeared in 1583 (a year after Pope Gregory’s approval of the new calendar): ‘it was an 
auspicious time for the “father of chronology” to bring before the world of scholars a 
work on chronology of stupendous learning, in which numerous errors in ancient history 
were corrected.’ 20 In Scaliger’s study, educated Englishmen would have found a 
manifesto that theorised the spell of untimeliness that had struck England the year 
before. The book’s publication provides a landmark point of reference for the now 
fashionable argument that ‘Shakespeare’s plays appear just when anachronicity 
becomes noticeable’ and for the no less fashionable idea that ‘anachronism, in literary 
terms, starts with Shakespeare.’21 A second edition of Scaliger’s study came out in 1598: 
revised and enlarged, it reached a much wider readership in England. For a number of 
religious and political reasons, the national sentiment of belatedness seems to have 
climaxed at the turn of the century, more than fifteen years after the calendrical 
reform.22 
Nowhere is the dramatic awareness of England’s ‘strange-disposèd time’ more 
palpable than in Julius Caesar, critics have suggested—the play was apparently written 
                                                
20 Herman Ebeling, ‘The Word Anachronism’, Modern Language Notes 52(2), 120-21. 
21 Jeremy Tambling, On Anachronism (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2010), 
pp. 4-5. 
22 For an overview of this delayed historical phenomenon, see James Shapiro’s book, 1599, mentioned 
earlier. In Hamlet in Purgatory, Stephen Greenblatt also talks about a ‘fifty-year effect’ to characterise 
this feeling of historical disjointedness: ‘perhaps there is what we might call a fifty-year effect, a time in 
the wake of the great, charismatic ideological struggle in which the past is all dying out and the survivors 
hear only hypocrisy in the sermons and look back with longing at the world they have lost’ (Princeton and 
Oxford: Princeton University Press (2001), p. 248). 
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some time between 1598 and 1599.23 In the eyes of many critics, its alleged heightened 
sensitivity to its own historical moment takes the shape of countless references to 
Elizabethan artefacts and customs. With its distinctly early-modern artefacts, Julius 
Caesar is profoundly uncanny—even more so if viewed as a rigorous historical account 
of Julius Caesar’s life (a preposterous idea, admittedly). John Dover Wilson’s dutiful 
reminder, in his Cambridge edition of the play, that ‘togas had no sleeves’ sums up the 
improbable status of Julius Caesar as a ‘history’ or ‘Roman’ play, as it is often referred 
to.24 Even more powerful, the intrusion of a modern clock in what is supposed to be 
‘Caesar’s Rome’ disrupts rigid assumptions about historical time and its representation. 
But, as the Arden editor observes, ‘the anachronism of a striking clock in 44 BC is only 
distressing to those shut off from imaginative time’ as ‘the dramatic action is more 
“here and now” than “then”.’25 Although Julius Caesar is officially ‘set’ in pre-
Christian Rome, editors and critics have often claimed that Shakespeare’s London 
intrudes repeatedly into the play. A key example of this pattern is Murellus’ memorable 
description of Pompey parading through the streets of Rome amidst ‘walls and 
battlements,’ ‘towers and windows’ and ‘chimney tops’ in the first scene of the play 
(1.1.37-39).26 The ill-fated tribune then embarks on a passionate plea to the Roman 
crowd: 
Have you not made an universal shout, 
That Tiber trembled underneath her banks 
To hear the replication of your sounds 
Made in her concave shores? 
                                                
23 David Daniell (editor), Julius Caesar (London: Arden, 1998), pp. 12-15. 
24 John Dover Wilson (editor), Julius Caesar (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1949), p. 5. 
25 Daniell, Julius Caesar, p. 209n. 
26 For Daniell, ‘the vivid scene, not in Plutarch, has the mark of occasions in London’ and the reference to 
‘chimney tops’ confirms the general sensation that ‘the picture is more London than Rome’ (Ibid., p. 
159n). Cf. also Shapiro, 1599, p. 174. 
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     (1.1.43-46) 
This passage is often read as an allegorical reference to the Globe theatre and its 
playgoers in Shakespeare’s time. In the Arden editor’s view, ‘the huge sudden sound 
from a crowd, and its echo across the river, make the first of many references to the 
experience of playgoing on London’s Bankside, additionally appropriate if Julius 
Caesar opened the new Globe there.’27 The widely accepted idea that Julius Caesar was 
chosen to inaugurate the Globe theatre in 1599 is based on Thomas Platter’s famous 
account of a performance, ‘the tragedy of the first Emperor Julius Caesar,’ which he 
would have seen in a ‘straw-thatched house’ in September that year.28 But whether what 
the Swiss doctor saw was a first performance of Shakespeare’s play remains ultimately 
uncertain. 
In Shakespeare’s Mystery Play, Steve Sohmer has raised the possibility that 
Julius Caesar opened the Globe earlier that year, on 12 June—the date of the summer 
solstice according to the Julian calendar, coinciding exceptionally with a new moon. 
Because of its powerful astrological implications, the date confirms the sense that the 
play was produced both ‘at the height of the English Julian calendar controversy, and in 
response to that controversy,’ Sohmer argues.29 Often associated with crosswords, 
weather forecast and Sudoku in our own time and on our side of the planet, astrology 
has undergone a drastic devaluation over the last four hundred years. In early modern 
England, though, astrology was ever-present in human affairs, to the point that ‘scarcely 
any new venture was undertaken without an astrologer’s pronouncement,’ Keith 
Thomas observes in Religion and the Decline of Magic.30 The conjunction of the sun 
                                                
27 Daniell, Julius Caesar, p. 159n. 
28 Edmund Kerchever Chambers, The Elizabethan Stage, volume 2 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1923), pp. 364-65. 
29 Sohmer, Shakespeare’s Mystery Play, p. 25. 
30 Keith Thomas, Religion and the Decline of Magic (London: Penguin, 1971), p. 372. 
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and moon (an astrological phenomenon known as syzygy) is considered to be extremely 
propitious for new ventures. Thus, ‘to open a theatre on the summer solstice, coinciding 
with the sun-moon-earth conjunction and exceptional high tides, on a date which was 
astrologically promising, would show wisdom.’31 The discrepancy in the Julian calendar 
caused Midsummer day to fall on 12 June 1599 (instead of 21 June). If Julius Caesar 
opened the Globe on that date, as Sohmer has suggested, the second line of the play 
might well have produced a powerful response in the audience: for ‘“Is this a holiday?” 
was a question that touched a deep cultural nerve,’ Shapiro remarks.32 The play’s 
tribunes, it has been suggested, would have reminded Elizabethan audiences of the 
London City fathers, who opposed the public theatres and objected to working men 
turning the day into a holiday—for ‘by the 1570s it was unclear whether St George’s 
Day, along with other days printed in red ink on the calendar, remained a holiday.’33 
Seen from this perspective, the play seems to echo the inevitable confusion with dates 
brought about by the calendrical imbroglio. One of the most striking instances of 
‘strange-disposèd time’ occurs in the famous ‘orchard scene’: 
BRUTUS Is not tomorrow, boy, the ides of March? 
LUCIUS I know not, sir. 
BRUTUS Look in the calendar and bring me word. 
       (2.1.40-42) 
As it appears in most contemporary editions of Julius Caesar, Brutus’ question is the 
result of an unfortunate emendation by the eighteenth-century editor Lewis Theobald. In 
the folio text from 1623, Brutus’ question figures as follows: ‘Is not tomorrow, boy, the 
first of March?’ Based on the assumption that ‘his question to Lucius would have been 
familiar to all Elizabethans,’ the Arden edition (one of the very few modern editions of 
Julius Caesar to do so) leaves the line unaltered—for the reason that Brutus’ address 
                                                
31 Daniell, Julius Caesar, p. 16. 
32 Shapiro, p. 170. 
33 Ibid., p. 168. 
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simply indicates that ‘he needs to know what calendar he is working under.’34 If most 
modern editors silently correct the line, it is because they assume Shakespeare made a 
mistake in the timeline of his play.35 But as the scene opens, Brutus (not Shakespeare) 
appears in a state of profound confusion: 
I cannot by the progress of the stars 
Give guess how near to day […] 
When, Lucius, when? 
    (2.1.2-5) 
Although the orchard scene is set on the eve of the ides of March (15 March), Brutus is 
unable to tell what time or even what day it is; this temporal crisis is embodied in the 
repeated interrogative pronoun ‘when’. 
 
C. ‘WHAT IS IT O’CLOCK?’: UNTIMELINESS AS KEY DIEGETIC FEATURE OF JULIUS 
CAESAR 
Far from being an isolated instance, Brutus’ confusion on the eve of Caesar’s 
assassination gestures towards a more general phenomenon of temporal derangement 
suffusing Julius Caesar—a play ‘bathed in the light of a handless clock,’ in Hélène 
Cixous’s evocative phrase. Prior to any historical parallel with Shakespeare’s time, this 
uncanny sensation lies at the very heart of the play’s diegesis and manifests itself in the 
characters’ unnerving obsession with time. As Cixous grasped, the structural 
untimeliness of Julius Caesar is encapsulated in a single question that recurs throughout: 
‘What is’t o’clock?’ 
O this sentence disguised as a cliché, ‘what time is it?’—see how it sounds 
ceaselessly as soon as the play begins, each goes around asking the other what 
                                                
34 Daniell, Julius Caesar, p. 21. 
35 Others, following Theobald, explain away F’s ‘first’ as a misreading of a manuscript contraction. Thus, 
the Penguin edition notes: ‘F reads first which is clearly an error, probably due to the compositor reading 
the abbreviation “js” (for “ides”) as “ɪst”’ (Norman Sanders (editor), Julius Caesar (London: Penguin, 
2005), p. 137n). 
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time it is (What is it o’clock?). As though one knew! What are they all up to, 
even the smallest roles, the walk-ons, looking at their watches all the time?36 
As the clock strikes at the beginning of Act II, Brutus pricks up his ears anxiously: 
 BRUTUS Peace! Count the clock. 
 CASSIUS    The clock hath stricken three. 
 TREBONIUS ’Tis time to part. 
         (2.1.192-94) 
In the wake of the clock’s uncanny signal, Brutus’ injunction opens a breach in the 
historical surface of the play. The intrusion of time causes ripples throughout Act II: 
‘What is’t o’clock?’, Caesar asks his murderers; ‘What is’t o’clock?’, Portia asks the 
soothsayer (2.2.114; 2.4.24). If anachronisms in Shakespeare prove to be ‘loopholes’, as 
Nicholas Royle suggests, it is perhaps because they disrupt the conventional expectation 
of a uniform literary aesthetics. One might think of ‘loopholes’ as 
a term that would refer to the slits in the walls of the castle as well as to forms of 
ambiguity or double-meaning (the loophole as a way out of a contract, for 
example). This second sense of ‘loophole’ is what, up ‘to’ Derrida, might have 
been called an anachronism. The OED dates the first figurative use of ‘loophole’ 
to 1663. But anachronism, in Shakespeare as in Derrida, proves a loophole.37 
In Specters of Marx, Jacques Derrida sensed that Hamlet’s acknowledgement of the 
disjointedness of time 
opened one of these breaches, often they are poetic and thinking peepholes 
[meurtrières] through which Shakespeare will have kept watch over the English 
language; at the same time, he signed its body, with the same unprecedented 
stroke of some arrow.38 
Although Derrida’s work is littered with references to Shakespeare—for whom he had 
‘infinite admiration and gratitude’—he admitted, in an interview with Derek Attridge, 
that he was not a ‘Shakespeare expert’: 
I would very much like to read and write in the space or heritage of Shakespeare, 
in relation to whom I have infinite admiration and gratitude; I would like to 
                                                
36 Cixous, ‘What Is It o’Clock?’, p. 76. 
37 Royle, ‘The Poet’, p. 3. 
38 Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New 
International, translated by Peggy Kamuf (New York and London: Routledge, 1994), p. 18. 
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become a ‘Shakespeare expert’; I know that everything is in Shakespeare: 
everything and the rest, so everything or nearly.39 
The ‘unprecedented stroke of some arrow’ which Derrida associates with Hamlet’s 
remark does have a precedent though: an oddly similar arrow was cast in Julius Caesar, 
through the recognition that the time is ‘strange-disposèd’. As Royle notes, ‘Julius 
Caesar is a sort of sister-play to Hamlet in its out of jointedness by the clock.’40 In fact, 
the sense of untimeliness arguably reaches a much more critical level in Julius Caesar, 
where the same arrow is cast again and again through Shakespeare’s multitudinous 
‘poetic and thinking peepholes’. ‘What is’t o’clock?’. For Royle, the compulsive 
repetition of this arrow-shaped question embodies an effect of what he calls the 
‘iteraphonic’, whereby 
the words of one character eerily repeat, singularly, without that character’s 
knowledge or control. […] ‘What is’t o’clock?’ Iteraphonically this question 
recurs, or occurs twice, in separate scenes involving two characters who never 
hear each other speak.41 
The fact that Caesar and Portia never hear each other speak makes the iteraphonic effect 
even more arresting: their ghostly communication illustrates the extent to which, in 
Julius Caesar, words flow out of control and propagate in a manner that makes one 
think of telepathy. ‘What is’t o’clock?’. The answer, of course, is ‘not yet’—for, in this 
uncanny play, ‘the hour is always not-yet and imminent,’ Cixous muses.42 What might 
be experienced as imminent in the first two acts is the assassination of Caesar, the 
foreknowledge of which is tied in to an extra-diegetic dimension. The self-reflexive 
awareness of potential audiences watching or reading Julius Caesar belongs to this 
dimension. From the beginning, the imminence of Caesar’s death haunts the ‘audience 
                                                
39 Derek Attridge (editor), Acts of Literature (New York and London: Routledge, 1992), p. 67. 
40 Royle, ‘The Poet’, p. 4. 
41 Ibid., pp. 11-12. 
42 Cixous, ‘What Is It o’Clock?’, p. 79. 
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unconscious’ (past, present and future). From the perspective of Elizabethan or more 
contemporary audiences, the repeated question signals that one of the foundational 
events of Western civilisation is about to be re-presented. For these audiences, Caesar’s 
murder is a certainty, for the good reason that it has already happened. On the other 
hand, there is no such conviction for the characters in the first two acts of Julius Caesar; 
for them, ‘What’s to come is still unsure’ (to borrow Feste’s formula in Twelfth Night) 
(2.3.45). There is a crucial distinction between the future of potential audiences and that 
of the characters in the play. Derrida uses two different terms in order to distinguish 
between what he sees as two different types of futurity: 
In general, I try to distinguish between what one calls the future and ‘l’avenir’. 
The future is that which—tomorrow, later, next century—will be. There is a 
future which is predictable, programmed, scheduled, foreseeable. But there is a 
future, ‘l’avenir’ (to come), which refers to someone who comes, whose arrival 
is totally unexpected. For me, that is the real future. That which is totally 
unpredictable. The Other who comes without my being able to anticipate their 
arrival. So if there is a real future beyond this other known future, it’s l’avenir in 
that it’s the coming of the Other when I am completely unable to foresee their 
arrival.43 
Derrida’s distinction between the future and the ‘avenir’ provides the basis for the 
exploration, later on in this chapter, of the uncanny temporality experienced by the 
characters in the play. 
 
II- SHAKESPEARE’S ROME: DIFFERENT PLANES OF REALITY 
 A. THE ‘ROMANNESS’ OF SHAKESPEARE’S ROMANS  
As the Romantic critic Samuel Taylor Coleridge expressed a long time ago, looking at 
literary characters and how they perceive the worlds in which they navigate 
                                                
43 This remark features in Kirby Dick and Amy Ziering Kofman’s 2002 film Derrida. For a transcript of 
the film, see Gil Kofman, ‘DERRIDA - Screenplay’, Derrida: Screenplay and Essays on the Film 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005), 51-109, p. 52. 
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fundamentally entails a ‘willing suspension of disbelief’ on the part of the onlooker.44 
Coleridge here makes the rather sweeping statement that, if we are to engage with 
literature at all, it is essential that we acknowledge the core of ‘realness’ underlying the 
diegetic realm. For the statue to come to life, ‘It is required / You do awake your faith,’ 
Paulina warns her (intra-diegetic and, potentially, extra-diegetic) audiences at the end of 
The Winter’s Tale (5.3.94-95). In her role as a grand priestess, Paulina stands for 
literature’s supposed universal demand that we awake our faith so that characters can 
come to life ‘for real’. Perhaps as a result of criticism’s inherent reliance on 
categorisation, the experience of literature has been reduced to two domains of reality 
that are generally viewed as mutually exclusive: thus, historical contextualisation often 
seems to exclude the examination of psychological character and its potential for 
literary depth. However, and this is a key assumption in this chapter, these two critical 
levels of reality are dependent on one another. That Julius Caesar is set in pre-Christian 
Rome is hardly questionable: there are common people, tribunes and patricians, all 
Roman; there are multiple references to the Capitol (the ultimate symbol of Rome) and 
the great Julius Caesar himself roams the streets of this antique world. But, as Gary 
Miles wonders, ‘How Roman Are Shakespeare’s “Romans”’ exactly? In a painstaking 
effort to ‘situate the terms of ancient discourse within the sociopolitical context 
according to which Romans structured and interpreted their lives,’ Miles recognises that 
on one level the question of Shakespeare’s historicity is not open to clear and 
decisive answers. We cannot say with confidence what Julius Caesar was ‘really’ 
like, because […] this is a matter of substantial disagreement and confusion 
among the ancient sources themselves.45 
                                                
44 Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Biographia Literaria or Biographical Sketches of my Literary Life and 
Opinions, volume 2 (London: Rest Fenner, 1817), p. 2. 
45 Gary Miles, ‘How Roman are Shakespeare’s “Romans”?’, Shakespeare Quarterly 40 (1989), 257-83, 
pp. 258-59. 
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As Miles suggests, the historical reality of Julius Caesar—and by extension that of the 
Romans at large—is strikingly elusive. However, there has always been intense debate 
around the question of whether Shakespeare’s Romans are genuine. As Terence John 
Bew Spencer observes, ‘Shakespeare has, at various times, received some very 
handsome compliments for his ancient Romans; for his picture of the Roman world, its 
institutions, and the causation of events.’46 As early as 1664, Margaret Cavendish, 
Duchess of Newcastle, praised the verisimilitude of the so-called ‘Roman plays’: 
& certainly Julius Caesar, Augustus Caesar, and Antonius, did never Really Act 
their parts Better, if so Well, as [Shakespeare] hath Described them, and I 
believe that Antonius and Brutus did not Speak Better to the People, than he hath 
Feign’d them; nay, one would think that he had been Metamorphosed from a 
Man to a Woman, for who could Describe Cleopatra Better than he hath done.47 
In 1680, the Irish poet Nahum Tate assured his readers that Shakespeare ‘never touches 
on a Roman Story, but the Persons, the Passages, the Manners, the Circumstances, the 
Ceremonies, all are Roman.’48 This view was later made popular by Alexander Pope, 
who remarked that in Julius Caesar, ‘not only the Spirit, but Manners, of the Romans 
are exactly drawn.’49 Echoing Pope, Paul Arthur Cantor more recently set out to 
investigate what he called the ‘Romanness’ of Shakespeare’s Romans.50 But as new 
historicists, cultural materialists and Marxist critics have been keen to observe from the 
1980s onwards, ‘Shakespeare does not always adhere to “Romanness”’ in his ‘Roman’ 
                                                
46 Terence John Bew Spencer, ‘Shakespeare and the Elizabethan Romans’, Shakespeare Survey 10 (1957), 
27-38, p. 27. 
47 Quoted in Gwynne Blakemore Evans, Appendix B, ‘Records, Documents, and Allusions’, in The 
Riverside Shakespeare (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1974), p. 1847. 
48 Nahum Tate, address prefatory to ‘The Loyal General, A Tragedy’ (1680), The Shakspere Allusion 
Book: A Collection of Allusions to Shakspere from 1591 to 1700, edited by Clement Mansfield Ingleby, 
Lucy Toulmin Smith and Frederick James Furnivall (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1932), p. 266. 
49 Quoted by Spencer in ‘Shakespeare and the Elizabethan Romans’, p. 27. 
50 Paul Arthur Cantor, Shakespeare’s Rome: Republic and Empire (Cornell University Press, 1976), 
pp. 21- 52. 
   99 
 
plays.51 In Julius Caesar, particularly, the apparent consistency of a Roman spatio-
temporal order is turned topsy-turvy by traumatic incursions of historical time. In this 
sense, ‘What is’t o’clock?’ can be said to signal the unavoidable intrusion of ‘the 
audience’ into the text—it becomes a mere rhetorical question that stands for the 
exterior gaze embedded in every literary process.52 Focused on a certain level of 
‘authentic’ historical reality, this type of reading has become a critical commonplace in 
the twenty-first century. 
 
 B. ‘ROME’ AS A MULTI-LAYERED SIGNIFIER 
By contrast, the more traditional emphasis on the intrinsic or self-evident ‘Romanness’ 
of Shakespeare’s Romans now risks being viewed as a naïve, easily subverted 
essentialism. In his famous essay, ‘The Romans in Films’, Roland Barthes debunks the 
farcical obsession with verisimilitude in Joseph Leo Mankiewicz’s film adaptation of 
Julius Caesar from 1953. Barthes’ focus on a specific ‘performance’ of the play (a 
filmic one) and its material conditions illustrates his general concern with how meaning 
is produced in modern culture. In Mythologies, he examines the semiology of the 
process of myth creation in contemporary Western society; and Mankiewicz’s Julius 
Caesar provides a graphic example of this process. For Barthes, the film’s explicit 
‘Romanness’ is a myth that can be read through a number of key signs, the most 
overarching of which is the fringe worn by all the actors, which he refers to as the 
‘mainspring of the Spectacle’. 
What then is associated with these insistent fringes? Quite simply the label of 
Roman-ness. We therefore see here the mainspring of the Spectacle—the sign—
operating in the open. The frontal lock overwhelms one with evidence, no one 
                                                
51 Paul Noah Siegel, Shakespeare’s English and Roman History Plays: A Marxist Approach (Cranbury NJ: 
Associated University Presses, 1986), p. 123. 
52 For a representative example of this audience-oriented type of historicist criticism, see Phyllis Rackin, 
‘The Role of the Audience in Richard II’, Shakespeare Quarterly 36(3) (1985), 262-81. 
   100 
 
can doubt that he is in Ancient Rome. And this certainty is permanent: the actors 
speak, act, torment themselves, debate ‘questions of universal import’, without 
losing, thanks to this little flag displayed on their foreheads, any of their 
historical plausibility.53 
By relying on pseudo-Roman fringes to impart ‘historical plausibility’, Mankiewicz’s 
film provides an arch-essentialist reading of Julius Caesar, which is guilty of 
overindulging in verisimilitude, Barthes argues. There is a shared assumption 
underlying the essentialist and the historicist approaches though: whether for or against 
the authenticity of Shakespeare’s Romans, they both hinge on the notion that there is a 
genuine core of ‘Romanness’ available or known to us. As Gary Miles has 
demonstrated in his historical overview of ancient Rome (quoted above), this is far from 
being the case. In many ways, the original reality of the historical Romans is 
irretrievable—because of confusion amongst the ancient sources mainly, but also 
because of a ceaseless, palimpsestic rewriting of ‘Rome’ and ‘the Romans’ through the 
centuries. In his landmark study, Shakespeare’s Rome, Robert Miola writes: 
Neither Rome nor Romans […] could be so easily fitted into categories or so 
summarily reduced. Conscious of the city’s multi-faceted diversity, Shakespeare 
did not insist on any exclusive, dogmatic interpretation, but drew upon various 
attitudes, stories, and traditions as he pleased.54 
And as Spencer appropriately points out, 
the part played by Shakespeare himself in creating our notions of the ancient 
Romans should not be forgotten. It has become difficult to see the plays straight, 
to see the thing in itself as it really is, because we are all in the power of 
Shakespeare’s imagination, a power which has been exercised for several 
generations and from which it is scarcely possible to extricate ourselves. 
Thus, while ‘it is well known […] that Shakespeare created the fairies,’ Spencer does 
not rule out the idea that ‘Shakespeare also practically created the ancient Romans.’55 In 
Shakespeare and the Uses of Antiquity, Charles and Michelle Martindale describe the 
                                                
53 Roland Barthes, ‘The Romans in Films’, Mythologies [1957], translated from the French by Annette 
Lavers (New York: The Noonday Press, 1972), p. 24. 
54 Robert Miola, Shakespeare’s Rome (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 11. 
55 Spencer, ‘Shakespeare and the Elizabethan Romans’, p. 37. 
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circular process whereby ‘Englishmen form their view of Rome partly from 
Shakespeare’s plays, and then congratulate him on the veracity of his portrait.’56 Such a 
recognition has far-reaching implications in terms of how we approach the diegetic 
world of Shakespeare’s Rome—the most obvious one being that the pseudo-original 
historical event and its ‘copy’ become loosely reversible. As Marjorie Garber points out 
in her aptly-named essay ‘A Rome of One’s Own’, the very idea of Rome, from the 
beginning, has the status of a quotation or a revenant: ‘like any instated view of a 
civilization and its artefacts, the idea of Rome is from the first belated, already a 
nostalgic and edited memory when it first appears.’57 Garber is here referring to 
Sigmund Freud’s ‘failed analogy’ in Civilization and Its Discontents: 
Now let us, by a flight of imagination, suppose that Rome is not a human 
habitation but a psychical entity with a similarly long and copious past—an 
entity, that is to say, in which nothing that has once come into existence will 
have passed away and all the earlier phases of development continue to exist 
alongside the latest one.58 
As a psychical entity, ‘Rome’ encompasses a multitude of temporal realities which 
‘continue to exist’ alongside one another through the ages. From this perspective, 
Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar, Freud’s Civilisation and Its Discontents, Garber’s 
Shakespeare’s Ghost Writers or Julius Caesar’s Commentaries can all be said to add up 
to a multi-faceted idea of Rome. Such a recognition should bring us to the inevitable 
conclusion that no one historical site can sensibly be privileged when considering 
‘Rome’ as a concept—and especially through the lens of a literary work. This is 
guaranteed, for instance, by the realisation that ‘one of the archaeological layers of 
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Freud’s Rome is Shakespeare’s Rome. And in Shakespeare’s plays “Rome” is self-
evidently “in quotation”, already idealized, historicized, and put in question.’59 Along 
the same lines, Richard Wilson notes that ‘the realization that history is a story is 
already implicit in Shakespeare’s version of the death of the Roman dictator.’60 For 
Goethe, this intrinsic self-questioning is evident in Shakespeare’s glib approach to 
‘outward costume’: 
No one despised outward costume more than he; he knew very well the inner 
human costume, and here all are alike. They say he hit off the Romans 
admirably; but I don’t find it so, they are all nothing but flesh-and-blood 
Englishmen, but they are certainly human beings, human from head to foot, and 
the Roman toga sits on them perfectly well.61 
That Shakespeare’s Romans are ‘flesh-and-blood Englishmen’ is definitely not the main 
message here. Goethe is keen to point out that the inconsistency of ‘outward costume’ 
proves that Shakespeare’s chief dramatic concern lies in the ‘inner human costume’—a 
concern echoed in Samuel Johnson’s remark that the playwright’s drama may ‘require 
Romans or kings, but he thinks only on men.’62 By implying that historical time can be 
taken for granted, such a perspective challenges the typical shying away, in many recent 
historicist accounts, from the intradiegetic frame of literary works. Goethe’s reflections 
imply that the outward-going movement (that is, from text to context) that underlies 
most historicist methodologies can be reversed for the reason that historical context 
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60 Wilson, Julius Caesar, p. 1. 
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invariably leads back to the psychic world of the characters—a pattern that is magnified 
in Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar. 
 
C. UNMASKING THE POLITICS OF REPRESENTATION: JULIUS CAESAR AS 
POSTMODERN METADRAMA 
In the historical reality of a performance of the play Julius Caesar, there is a 
mesmerising self-reflexivity underway: the characters seem to know that they are part of 
an overarching representational scheme. In Brutus’ words, Caesar’s assassination is ‘our 
performance’ (2.1.134). However, the conspirators’ sense of self-aware theatricality 
culminates after the deed: 
 CINNA Liberty! Freedom! Tyranny is dead! 
   Run hence, proclaim, cry it about the streets. 
 CASSIUS Some to the common pulpits, and cry out 
   ‘Liberty, freedom, and enfranchisement!’ […] 
 BRUTUS Then walk we forth even to the market-place, 
   And, waving our red weapons o’er our heads, 
   Let’s all cry ‘peace, freedom, and liberty!’ 
        (3.1.78-111) 
The conspirators do not merely shout ‘peace, freedom and liberty’ in the aftermath of 
Caesar’s assassination: rather, they self-consciously ask their Roman audience to 
‘proclaim [and] cry it about the streets’. If they do so, it is because they know that 
Caesar’s assassination, as a standalone event, does not convey a self-evident message: 
in order to produce meaning, it needs to be supplemented through a process of 
representation. ‘“Peace, freedom, and liberty!”’—the inverted commas that 
circumscribe Brutus’ grandiose formula can be understood to indicate the characters’ 
keen awareness of the power of representation and the extent to which it fashions reality. 
Along those lines, John Drakakis argues that ‘Julius Caesar is not so much a celebration 
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of theatre as an unmasking of the politics of representation per se.’63 On a certain level 
of reality (the one which is concerned with theatricality’s ability to comment on its own 
representational function), this statement can be said to take the play at its word. Julius 
Caesar thus becomes a meditation on its own representability, on its own potential to be 
staged in different places and in different times. In this specific domain of reality, the 
characters’ ‘Romanness’ (as artificial as it might be) becomes a mere factor of 
différance whose function is to emphasise the play’s structural alienation from the 
Roman setting it posits: ultimately, the gap between past and present, between ideas and 
action is what comes to define the play’s aesthetics. As Richard Wilson puts it, ‘Julius 
Caesar processes the Roman past through the Elizabethan present, with an eye always 
to future audiences.’64 Such an intricate, multi-layered temporality culminates in a 
monumental exchange between Brutus and Cassius following the assassination: 
 CASSIUS    How many ages hence 
   Shall this our lofty scene be acted over, 
   In states unborn and accents yet unknown! 
 BRUTUS How many times shall Caesar bleed in sport? 
       (3.1.113-15) 
Seen from the angle of the historical reality of Julius Caesar, the ‘lofty scene’ that 
Brutus talks about inscribes a ‘real’ Elizabethan present within a ‘fake’ Roman past: in 
other words, the historical site of the play’s production (Shakespeare’s England) is 
registered as the anchoring point for the interpretive process. While immersed in its 
foundational Elizabethan moment, the play also keeps ‘an eye always to future 
audiences’, in Wilson’s phrase. Such a mental projection, whereby the play envisions 
potential audiences to come, remains firmly rooted in Shakespeare’s authorial moment. 
On the level of this particular temporal plane, the ‘acting over’ of the conspirators’ 
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‘lofty scene’ is a key metadramatic moment, through which the play predicts its own 
dazzling reiteration ‘In states unborn and accents yet unknown’. However, the 
systematic elucidation of the play’s diegetic world through a fixed historical discourse 
has obvious limitations. The main risk is that characters end up featuring as mere 
allegorical amalgams that gesture towards a more or less encrypted Elizabethan kernel 
of reality. 
The notion that Shakespeare’s drama remains fundamentally open to a plurality 
of interpretive discourses constitutes the ideological core of the present thesis. From this 
angle, the sense of futurity that pervades Julius Caesar cannot be contingent on the 
Elizabethan present for the reason that it operates on several planes of reality—as 
opposed to the spatio-temporally set frame of reality that underlies historicist criticism. 
‘Emphasizing the difference between “acting”, “seeming”, “appearing”, “fashioning”, 
“construing”, and being, the language of the play suggests the maddeningly elusive and 
complicated nature of reality,’ Miola proposes.65 In much recent criticism, the self-
contained logic of a critical act often seems to be legitimated by a foundational decision 
that designates either historicity or textuality as its undeconstructible site of origin. By 
definition, historicist criticism relies on the sense that every text is historically 
determined. In discursive (or so-called ‘deconstructionist’) accounts, on the other hand, 
historical events are seen as always already textualised. Too often taken out of its 
original context, Derrida’s oft-quoted aphorism that ‘there is nothing outside of the text’ 
has come to emblematise this factionalist type of approach.66 However, it is worth 
emphasising the fact that Derrida himself always distanced himself from the simplistic 
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and reductive notion that there is nothing outside textuality.67 In a late interview, 
Derrida was asked: ‘What’s the most widely held misconception about you and your 
work?’ His reply challenges a number of assumptions that are often associated with his 
work:  
That I’m a skeptical nihilist who doesn’t believe in anything, who thinks nothing 
has meaning, and text has no meaning. That’s stupid and utterly wrong, and only 
people who haven’t read me say this. It’s a misreading of my work that began 35 
years ago, and it’s difficult to destroy. I never said everything is linguistic and 
we’re enclosed in language. In fact, I say the opposite, and the deconstruction of 
logocentrism was conceived to dismantle precisely this philosophy for which 
everything is language. Anyone who reads my work with attention understands 
that I insist on affirmation and faith, and that I’m full of respect for the texts I 
read.68 
But let us come back to Julius Caesar. A textual reading of the play could start by 
acknowledging how, prior to any historical contextualisation, the play’s syntax is 
haunted by a maddening sense of futurity (always keeping in mind that this is only one 
of many possible approaches to the play). But, as Derrida points out, such a reading (no 
matter how ‘textual’ it claims to be) does not have to bow to the radical notion that 
‘everything is linguistic and we’re enclosed in language’. Such a reading can be ‘full of 
respect’, of ‘affirmation and faith’ for the texts it addresses. In the context of a 
discursive approach, giving the world of character all the attention it deserves is one of 
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Taste for the Secret, translated from the French by Giacomo Donis (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2001), p. 76). 
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many ways of paying tribute to the fundamental openness of Julius Caesar and its 
infinite potential for meaning—as opposed to the radical and rather nihilistic suggestion 
that ‘text has no meaning’. By paying close attention to character psyche, Royle’s essay 
testifies to the openness of the hermeneutic field of Julius Caesar. Thus, Royle declares 
that ‘there is a “to”-effect to Julius Caesar,’ which culminates in the frantic repetition of 
the preposition ‘to’ throughout the play. According to Royle, the play’s semiotics are 
haunted by a sense of ‘movement towards’ that manifests itself through the recurring 
temporal adverbial phrases ‘today’, ‘tonight’ and ‘tomorrow’—‘the “to” of “tomorrow” 
conveys that sense of movement towards which eerily transfers, iterates and reiterates 
itself in the “to” of “today” and “tonight”.’69 
 CICERO Indeed, it is a strange-disposed time. […] 
Comes Caesar to the Capitol tomorrow? 
 CASCA He doth. 
        (1.3.33-37) 
On the plane of syntax, the strangeness of the ‘strange-disposed time’ that Cicero talks 
about initiates an uncontrollable dissemination. In Cicero’s question, the uncanny 
association of the present tense with the marker of futurity ‘tomorrow’ testifies to the 
sense that, in Shakespeare’s play, ‘the “to” of “tomorrow” is not to come: it “comes” 
already.’70 Although it pays close attention to the play’s linguistic markers, Royle’s 
essay on Julius Caesar is anything but strictly textual. It remains attuned to the idea that 
words like ‘tomorrow’ do not exist on their own as free-floating signifiers and that, 
crucially, they are spoken by characters in a play. In the psychological dimension of 
Julius Caesar (the one that is posited and examined in this chapter at least), the 
characters appear to be haunted by the future and its radical openness. ‘How many times 
shall Caesar bleed in sport?’—on a certain level, this is a genuine question that voices a 
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deep-seated anxiety regarding what is to come. Such anxiety is palpable at the very 
heart of the play’s diegesis. 
 
III- A WORLD OF PHANTASMA: MAPPING OUT CHARACTER PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 
 A. A LESSON IN CHARACTER: EXPLORING THE INNER HUMAN COSTUME 
Exploring what Goethe called the ‘inner human costume’ in Julius Caesar implies that 
we take a step forward and consider Shakespeare’s Romans not merely as historical 
puppets or textual constructs but as ‘human beings, human from head to foot’. It is 
required we do awake our faith. In this strangest of plays, nothing is ever so certain 
when it comes to ‘tomorrow’. As the clock strikes, the conspirators remain profoundly 
unsure about what is to come: ‘But it is doubtful yet / Whether Caesar will come forth 
today or no,’ Cassius warns his co-conspirators (2.1.193-94). His remark illustrates the 
extent to which the ‘to’-effect of Julius Caesar is inextricably bound up with the 
psychological world of the characters, where what ‘will come forth today’ remains 
characteristically unknowable. Thus, whether the conspirators will have Antony ‘to 
friend’ is very uncertain in the aftermath of Caesar’s demise. 
BRUTUS I know that we shall have him well to friend. 
CASSIUS I wish we may. But yet have I a mind 
That fears him much; and my misgiving still 
Falls shrewdly to the purpose. 
       (3.1.144) 
What comes today remains suspended in the radical openness of the avenir. ‘Ironised by 
the knowledge that there can be no such knowledge, no grounds for such knowledge,’ 
Royle notes, ‘the “to” is the mark of interruption, the very disjunction with the future.’71 
This subjective sense of disjunction between the diegetic present of the characters and 
the future is precisely what all the characters brood over in Julius Caesar. It has often 
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been suggested that the complexity and depth of the characters in Julius Caesar—and 
subsequently Hamlet—marks a turning point in the development of Shakespearean 
characterisation, which is often read in parallel with the emergence of what has been 
called a ‘modern subjectivity’ in the early modern period. Like Julius Caesar, ‘Hamlet 
seems to mark an epochal shift not only in Shakespeare’s own career but in Western 
drama,’ Stephen Greenblatt remarks: ‘it is as if the play were giving birth to a whole 
new kind of literary subjectivity.’72 In so-called ‘old’ historicist criticism (i.e. pre-new 
historicism), the intensity of Shakespeare’s psychological world is repeatedly 
understood as an artistic echo of this perceived historical shift. But for self-styled new 
historicists like Greenblatt, Shakespeare’s drama is a catalyst for historical change: far 
from being mere reflections, representations are viewed as shaping reality. Of course, 
the pseudo-universal concept of reality that new historicism silently enthrones is 
problematic: for in the end, it remains inevitably attached to a narrow domain of reality 
(historical).73 
‘Reality’, as an overarching concept, remains characteristically elusive within 
the frame of language. Acknowledging the existence of several levels of reality 
(historical, textual, psychological, etc.) opens up the possibility for literary criticism not 
to be constrained by grand narratives. Rather than limiting itself to a specific critical 
discourse, the present thesis embraces this prolific plurality. As pointed out before, the 
psychological stance adopted in this chapter does not define the ethos of the whole 
thesis; instead, it should be viewed as an experiment in a specific subjective mode. A 
post-historicist psychological account of Shakespearean drama can emphasise the extent 
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73 For a detailed overview of new historicism in the field of Shakespeare studies, see the introduction to 
the thesis, ‘Shakespeare or the Theatre of the Impossible’. 
   110 
 
to which character identity directly shapes our reading of the plays. In The Time Is Out 
of Joint, Agnes Heller suggests that 
every categorization violates the Shakespearean universe simply because in this 
universe in a crucial sense identity reigns supreme. Each Shakespearean 
character is identical with himself or herself. […] It is precisely the complexity 
of identity constitution, along with the problematization of this identity by the 
characters themselves and by others, that allows for unpredictability, diversity, 
and uniqueness.74 
Shakespearean characters often problematise their own identity as well as that of other 
characters; and, as Heller remarks, this is particularly relevant to Julius Caesar. When 
Caesar draws the portrait of Cassius for Marc Antony, he gives what may be called ‘a 
lesson in character.’75 
CAESAR Antonio. 
ANTONY Caesar. 
CAESAR Let me have men about me that are fat, 
  Sleek-headed men, and such as sleep a-nights. 
  Yon Cassius has a lean and hungry look. 
  He thinks too much. Such men are dangerous. 
ANTONY Fear him not Caesar, he’s not dangerous. 
  He is a noble Roman, and well given. 
CAESAR Would he were fatter! But I fear him not. 
  Yet if my name were liable to fear, 
  I do not know the man I should avoid 
  So soon as that spare Cassius. He reads much, 
  He is a great observer, and he looks 
  Quite through the deeds of men. He loves no plays, 
  As thou dost, Antony; he hears no music. 
  Seldom he smiles, and smiles in such a sort 
  As if he mocked himself, and scorned his spirit 
  That could be moved to smile at anything. 
  Such men as he be never at heart’s ease 
  Whiles they behold a greater than themselves, 
  And therefore are they very dangerous. 
  I rather tell thee what is to be feared 
  Than what I fear, for always I am Caesar. 
        (1.2.191-213) 
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Caesar’s analysis is fascinating not only in terms of what it tells us about the character 
of Cassius but also in terms of what it tells us about Caesar himself. Shakespeare’s 
Caesar is ‘the best judge of human character,’ Heller observes: ‘he wants to understand 
the temperament, the character, the morality, the ideas, the psychology of a man in its 
entirety.’76 In Shakespeare’s play, Caesar is portrayed as cold, fearless, robotic and 
intensely analytical: ‘I rather tell thee what is to be feared / Than what I fear, for always 
I am Caesar,’ he tells Marc Antony. These traits of character reach a climax in Caesar’s 
final declaration, before the multiple stabbing occurs: 
I am constant as the Northern star 
Of whose true fixed and resting quality 
There is no fellow in the firmament. 
(3.1.60-62) 
 
 B. PSYCHIC DYSFUNCTION AS CHARACTERISTIC SYMPTOM OF SHAKESPEARE’S ROME 
The idiosyncratic identity of Shakespeare’s Caesar shines through in the Roman 
statesman’s little ‘lesson on character’—one of the dramatist’s unmistakable 
psychological contributions to the historical narrative of Plutarch, Heller points out. 
Almost the whole of this splendid characterization is Shakespeare’s invention, 
based on a few sentences from Plutarch’s Brutus and Caesar. And even these 
sentences are entirely changed in meaning by Shakespeare. In Plutarch (in 
Brutus and Caesar) Caesar says that he fears most the pale-visaged and 
carrionlike people such as Brutus and Cassius. Yet Shakespeare’s Caesar does 
not fear anyone, and he speaks only of Cassius and not of Brutus. There is not 
even a hint in Plutarch that Caesar, the excellent judge of character, also 
considers Cassius a good judge of character […]. Cassius, Caesar says, looks 
through the deeds of man; he cannot be misled; he sees the motivation behind 
the act and therefore cannot be deceived. And Cassius will live up to every bit of 
Caesar’s characterization in Shakespeare’s play.77 
In many aspects, the characterisation of the Roman statesman in Julius Caesar appears 
as a grotesque parody of Plutarch. The Greek biographer’s passing reference to Caesar’s 
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visceral fear of ‘pale-visaged and carrionlike people’ provides Shakespeare with the 
perfect pretext to endow his own Caesar with a fetish for lean men: ‘Let me have men 
about me that are fat, / Sleek-headed men, and such as sleep a-nights,’ he commands. 
Marc Antony’s suggestion that Cassius is a ‘noble Roman’ remarkably fails to distract 
Caesar’s attention from his homoerotic attraction/repulsion towards the suspected 
conspirator: ‘Would he were fatter!’ If, in the mind of Shakespeare’s Caesar, men who 
are ‘spare’ (like Cassius) are dangerous, it is primarily because they are dangerously 
attractive. Cassius has ‘a lean and hungry look’ and he ‘reads much’: he is ‘a great 
observer’ who ‘looks / Quite through the deeds of men’. In a word, he is an intellectual. 
And in Shakespeare’s Rome, the intellectual features as a scapegoat figure that needs to 
be sacrificed. As a fictional construct, this idea of Rome rests on the stereotype that 
there is no space for intellectuals in a society that defines itself through a warring 
patriarchal order. And yet, is it not mad that all the main protagonists in Julius Caesar 
are intellectuals—and especially Caesar? His clever little ‘lesson in character’ testifies 
to the fact that he is himself the thinker par excellence: the elaborate speech that 
denounces Cassius’ inveterate intellectualism betrays Caesar’s own over-analytical 
tendencies: like Cassius, ‘he looks / Quite through the deeds of men’. If Caesar wants to 
be surrounded by fat men only, it is perhaps because men like Cassius remind him too 
much of himself, the ‘hook-nosed fellow of / Rome’ (2 Henry IV, 4.2.37). In the world 
of Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar, physical leanness is associated with intense, excessive 
thinking—Caesar’s mistrust of Cassius has to do primarily with the latter’s unusual 
intelligence. Amongst Shakespeare’s Romans, intellect is construed as a pathological 
feature, as an incurable disease that proliferates. In order to ward off what is widely 
perceived as a psychic dysfunction, the nobles tend to displace it onto other 
characters—this often happens in the mode of the return of the repressed. Caesar’s 
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branding of Cassius as a ‘dangerous’ thinker is spoken as an aside to Mark Antony; and 
Cassius himself (or any other character) clearly does not hear the cursing remark. 
However, when Cassius refers to a wandering poet as a ‘cynic’ later on in the play, it is 
as if he obeys a silent urge to pass on the mark; the same poet is summarily dismissed 
by Brutus as a ‘jigging fool’ (4.2.185-88). Although they view themselves as warriors, it 
is rather striking that Shakespeare’s Romans come across as overcautious, self-reflexive 
intellectuals (even the plebeians pun like crafty Elizabethan dramatists!). Ultimately, 
this crisis of identity can only be solved through the displacement of Rome’s 
overflowing intellectualism onto a straw man: the poet. The murder of Cinna the poet in 
Act III illustrates the extent to which the ‘intellectual’ is a highly symbolical figure in 
Shakespeare’s Rome: it has to be eradicated, torn to pieces, so that the city-state can 
extricate itself from its crippling conceptualism.78 
 In Julius Caesar, Rome is portrayed as a diseased entity. A close psychological 
analysis of the characters reveals a world that is riddled with mental illness. If Caesar 
wants men about him who are fat, it is because he knows that physical emaciation is an 
unmistakable sign of overthinking (and men, like Cassius, who think too much are 
dangerous). Like Caesar, most academics know from experience that overthinking 
typically leads to a vast array of psychological disorders including anxiety, depression 
and insomnia. While entirely focused on Cassius, Caesar overlooks those very 
symptoms in Brutus, the play’s arch-intellectual—and Caesar’s true mirror image.79 The 
generalised sense of mental distress that pervades Julius Caesar is crystallised in Brutus’ 
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compulsive exploration of interiority, which causes him to be ‘with himself at war,’ as 
he confesses to Cassius at the beginning of the play. 
If I have veiled my look, 
I turn the trouble of my countenance 
Merely upon myself. Vexèd I am 
Of late with passions of some difference, 
Conceptions only proper to myself. 
    (1.2.39-48) 
The unspecified ‘conceptions’ that Brutus talks about epitomise the psychic unrest that 
plagues Shakespeare’s Rome. In this sense, it is quite puzzling that Brutus does not get 
marked by Caesar as ‘pale-visaged and carrionlike’, as he does in Plutarch. On the other 
hand, this omission reinforces the pathos that arises from Caesar’s complete 
misevaluation of the psychology of Brutus at the crucial moment of the stabbing—‘Et tu, 
Bruté?’ (3.1.77). When he shares with Marc Antony his resolution to have only 
overweight ‘sleep a-nights’ around him, Caesar does not include Brutus in his ‘axis-of-
evil’ speech—although the latter is in blatant conversation with Cassius as ‘Caesar and 
his train’ parade blithely towards the Capitol (1.2.178). As an insomniac, Brutus 
embodies everything that Caesar is suspicious of in a (Ro)man. ‘Since Cassius first did 
whet me against Caesar / I have not slept,’ Brutus muses in his orchard (2.1.61-62). And 
when the conspirators make their entrance, he confirms that the remark was not meant 
to be a mere rhetorical turn of phrase: ‘I have been up this hour, awake all night’ (88). 
 
 C. ‘I THINK’: THE HALLUCINATORY DREAMTIME OF PHANTASMA 
What keeps Brutus awake at night is an ethical question: whether to kill or not to kill 
Julius Caesar. This fundamental misgiving about the necessity to ‘take arms’ is often 
considered to become fully-fledged in the character of Hamlet, who devotes a whole 
speech to ‘the question’: 
To be, or not to be; that is the question: 
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Whether ’tis nobler in the mind to suffer 
The slings and arrows of outrageous fortune 
Or to take arms against a sea of troubles, 
And, by opposing, end them. 
    (Hamlet, 3.1.58-62) 
This most famous of soliloquies encapsulates the Shakespearean psychological 
experience, whereby a character is trapped within the walls of their own psychological 
edifice (this is the very essence of the Shakespearean soliloquy). ‘Words, words, words’: 
fashioning himself as the prisoner of language, Hamlet loses grip on reality—a certain 
idea of it, at least (2.2.192). As many other characters illustrate, an excessive 
preoccupation with what is to come can lead to insanity; this is especially true when the 
subject of inquiry is death—‘The undiscovered country,’ as Hamlet calls it, ‘from 
whose bourn / No traveller returns’ (3.1.81-82). But whether the ‘question’ at hand is 
about killing a tyrant or killing oneself, the fundamentally unknown nature of ‘that sleep 
of death’ is the one thing that ‘Must give us pause,’ the prince of Denmark realises (68-
70). Although his mind is settled over the murder of Claudius early on in the play, 
Hamlet’s compulsive overthinking prevents him from acting throughout. For Brutus too, 
thinking turns out to be a paralysing process that hinders action; for what keeps him 
awake at night is the same ‘pause’ that cripples Hamlet. In Shakespeare and Impure 
Aesthetics, Hugh Grady points out that ‘Hamlet’s interior conflict throughout the play 
suspends him in an indeterminate, intermediate mental space up until his final moments.’ 
It is this very same indeterminate zone that preoccupies and ultimately overwhelms 
Brutus.80 
Between the acting of a dreadful thing 
And the first motion, all the interim is 
Like a phantasma or a hideous dream. 
      (Julius Caesar, 2.1.63-65) 
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While pondering over Caesar’s murder, Brutus acknowledges the maddening mental 
process—or ‘interim’—that divides action from within and therefore nullifies it. In The 
Vanishing, Christopher Pye writes: 
To recognize the phantasmatic nature of such an interim, and to feel its 
resonances with Hamlet’s more famously suspended act, one must read it not as 
the space between thought and action, as many an editor has, but as an undoing 
of the act as such.81 
In other words, thought negates presence—this is one of many ways in which 
Shakespearean drama can be said to challenge presence as an overarching concept (and, 
as the introduction to the thesis has made clear, the challenging of presence is a key 
effect of anachronism in Shakespearean drama). If the ‘interim’ that Brutus talks about 
can be seen as a psychic process that marks the erasure of the act, Royle also suggests 
that it opens up ‘a singularly nightmarish world of its own, rendering to itself a 
hallucinatory, hideous dreamtime.’82 More specifically, this dreamtime is crystallised in 
the word ‘phantasma’, Royle points out. For Brutus, ‘phantasma’ refers to a mental 
space that is filled with nightmarish visions like the ‘monstrous apparition’ of Caesar’s 
ghost (4.2.328). Induced by extreme sleep deprivation, the world of ‘phantasma’ erases 
the boundary between wakefulness and dream. As often, Shakespeare follows his 
historical source closely: ‘Brutus was a careful man and slept very little,’ Thomas North 
noted in his English translation of Plutarch.83 
As in Caesar’s description of Cassius, Shakespeare here picks on a minor detail 
from Plutarch’s account and develops it into a central psychological locus of his 
characterisation. Shakespeare’s Brutus is defined by his inability to sleep—a pattern 
that is inextricably bound up with his compulsive thinking. In his own account of Brutus, 
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Plutarch goes on to explain: ‘whilst he was in war and his head ever busily occupied to 
think of affairs, and what would happen, after he had slumbered a little after supper, he 
spent all the rest of the night in dispatching of his weightiest causes.’84 It is easy to see 
how this terse portrait lays the ground for Shakespeare’s characterisation of Brutus. If 
the Roman politician was kept awake at night, Plutarch observes, it is because he was 
‘ever busily occupied to think of affairs’, worrying about ‘what would happen’—about 
the à-venir, in other words. In Julius Caesar, Brutus’ intense brooding over what is to 
come turns into an obsessive psychological pattern. On the night before the final battle 
at Philippi, Plutarch specifies that, as ‘he saw a wonderful strange and monstruous 
shape of a body coming towards him,’ Brutus was ‘thinking of weighty matters.’85 The 
apparition of the ghost of Caesar is undoubtedly the most overwhelming phantasmal 
experience in the play. It is cued by a significant line which encapsulates Brutus’ 
ongoing mental state: ‘I think’—in fact, this line could be the motto of Julius Caesar 
(325). Brutus thinks too much; and, as he acknowledges, his psychological and 
physiological faculties are overstrained. His eyes are weak, or so he ‘thinks’ (the 
expression appears again two lines later): ‘I think it is the weakness of mine eyes / That 
shapes this monstrous apparition’ (327). As the ghost vanishes, Lucius too seems to be 
caught in the hideous dreamtime of phantasma: ‘He thinks he is still at his instrument,’ 
Brutus marvels—‘Lucius, awake!’ (343-44). In the psychic dimension of phantasma, 
poised between wakefulness and dream, thinking marks the subject’s drifting from its 
perceived ontological centre. In Julius Caesar, this split from within culminates in 
Brutus’ subjective experience of the interior interim. As Royle points out, 
there is a stressing of interiority in Shakespeare quite absent from North. We are 
consistently made aware of the inner world of Brutus’ thought, feeling and 
perception. This sense of interiority is there already in the apparently casual self-
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referring ‘Let me see, let me see’, and in the simple but inward-looking ‘I 
think’.86 
 Brutus’ compulsive introspection can be described in terms of what Charles 
Bernheimer calls ‘pathological interiority’—the standard definition of hysteria in 
psychoanalysis, he explains. Although it is made obvious in Brutus, this syndrome of 
pathological interiority extends to most characters in Julius Caesar. Insofar as ‘the 
concept of hysteria remains less descriptive than normative in our culture,’ searching for 
hysterical symptoms (especially in female characters) remains problematic, Cynthia 
Marshall argues—for ‘ascribing meaning to symptom in order to render the suspect 
interior of another person knowable, much as a decision as to character type allows 
comfortably summary conclusions about literature.’87 In spite of this obvious critical 
hazard, Marshall suggests that the character of Portia can be read as developing the 
motif of pathological interiority in Julius Caesar; her self-inflicted wound in the thigh, 
in particular, ‘directs attention inward, asserts an interior dimension to her character.’88 
At the beginning of Act II, Portia senses that her husband is hiding something from her. 
As evidence of her trustworthiness, she declares: 
I have made strong proof of my constancy, 
Giving myself a voluntary wound 
Here in the thigh. 
    (2.1.298-300) 
In her plea to Brutus, Portia is eager to challenge gender stereotypes. Not unlike Lady 
Macbeth, who asks the ‘spirits / That tend on mortal thoughts’ to ‘unsex’ her, Portia 
claims to be ‘stronger than [her] sex’ (Macbeth, 1.5.38-39; Julius Caesar, 2.1.295). As a 
result, Portia’s ‘voluntary wound’ is generally viewed as pertaining to a distinctly 
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masculine set of Roman values (virtūs). However, the wound has also a more symbolic 
function as it crystallises the drive towards interiorisation in Julius Caesar: 
When Portia wounds her thigh, she directs attention inward, toward the 
vulnerable interior of her bodily self. As with any theatrical wound, the surface 
of spectacle is pierced. The character’s body is presented as something that 
bleeds, feels pain, may die—something more ‘real’ than mere spectacle. One 
obvious place to turn in theorising about this interior dimension is 
psychoanalysis, which will see the wound and the dagger as, in various ways, 
symbolic. While psychoanalysis typically subsumes body to symbol, it will 
grant to Portia, in contrast to historicist criticism, an active (if unhealthy) inner 
life.89 
Reading Portia’s wound as ‘real’ implies that we see Portia as more than a mere 
theatrical character in a play. From a psychoanalytic point of view, such a wound is 
profoundly traumatic because it gestures towards ‘something more “real” than mere 
spectacle’: it guarantees that ‘the surface of spectacle is pierced’ by the humanity of 
Portia’s body. This notably implies that the degree of ‘realness’ with which Portia’s 
wound might be experienced by a specific audience during a given representation of the 
play becomes irrelevant (the human body here takes on the function of a theoretical 
tool). In this sense, the wound emblematises the exploration of what Goethe called the 
‘inner human costume’ in Shakespearean drama. This type of psychological reading 
reverses the historicist trend in which characters are generally used as mere pretexts for 
topical intrusions of history. Considering the contextual historicity of a work of art as a 
given fact that may be taken on board or not, such a reading moves inwards—that is, 
towards the inner psychological depth of character. This type of psychological 
perspective opens up the possibility for a post-historicist criticism, whose defining 
feature would be an awareness of new historicism’s strategies of objectification of 
literature. Underlying this approach is the sense that behind the surface of spectacle 
stand human beings called Portia or Brutus, reaching us in all their complexity: 
                                                
89 Ibid., p. 475. 
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‘whereas a traditional historicist approach produces a strong, unified Portia, 
psychoanalysis would see her wound as symptomatic of a character marked by 
fragmentation, brokenness, neurosis,’ Marshall points out.90 
 By setting a context-obsessed mode of criticism that sees Portia as a uniform, 
depthless character against a psychoanalytical approach which delves into her multi-
layered fragmented self, Marshall echoes Woolf—‘how serious a matter it is when the 
tools of one generation are useless for the next,’ the modernist author marvelled in her 
essay on character.91 As the writer explained on behalf of her own generation of writers, 
‘the Edwardian tools are the wrong ones for us to use’ and ‘they have laid an enormous 
stress upon the fabric of things.’92 In sharp contrast with an orderly Edwardian world 
picture, Woolf saw ‘the sound of breaking and falling, crashing and destruction’ as ‘the 
prevailing sound of the Georgian age’—an age that is essentially about ‘the spasmodic, 
the obscure, the fragmentary, the failure.’93 And this spasmodic, obscure, fragmentary 
dimension, this sense of failure, is reflected in Woolf’s characterisation. Thus, in Mrs 
Dalloway, there is ‘an indescribable pause; a suspense […] before Big Ben strikes.’94 
Like Shakespeare’s Brutus, Clarissa Dalloway cannot help but mark a mental pause 
preceding the clock’s ‘irrevocable hour’. This stretch of the mind or ‘suspense’ extends 
until the end of the novel in a ribbon-like stream of consciousness. If we can appreciate 
the accuracy or poignancy of Woolf’s or Shakespeare’s characterisation, it is often 
because we are able to relate to the characters and recognise their mental complexity. 
This is especially relevant in the case of staged violence, Marshall argues, insofar as it 
breaks the surface of spectacle; therefore, ‘we need to set the theatrical moment of 
                                                
90 Ibid., p. 479. 
91 Woolf, Mr Bennett and Mrs Brown, p. 331. 
92 Ibid., p. 332. 
93 Ibid., pp. 334 and 337. 
94 Woolf, Mrs Dalloway, p. 4. 
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physical violence against an exaggerated poststructuralist dictum that we have only 
language, and not each other, or even ourselves, in any preverbal way.’95 
 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has aimed at providing a practical demonstration of how Shakespearean 
drama can be experienced in terms of an aesthetics of untimeliness. Exploring what has 
been referred to as the psychic realm of Julius Caesar has allowed us to recognise the 
ways in which the characters are haunted by the sense that time is ‘strange-disposèd’. 
Instead of reading this untimeliness as the effect of an objective Elizabethan reality, as 
many critics have done, the chapter has approached the disjointed temporal dimension 
experienced by the characters as their own reality (as the time of their lives). The 
assignment to literary characters of an inner life—‘something more “real” than mere 
spectacle’, as Marshall puts it—implies that Julius Caesar possesses an inner core of 
truth. This is a problematic assumption in view of the thesis as whole, which 
fundamentally questions the existence of such an objective core of truth within literary 
works. While challenging the idea that there is an ‘in-itself’ to literature, the next 
chapter on Hamlet also values the inescapable subjectivity that marks every individual 
critical account. Perhaps the possibility for a post-historicism (and specifically for a 
post-new historicism) implies making peace with the notion that there can be no 
definitive, objective act of criticism. In this sense, the deliberate use, for specific critical 
aims, of essentialistic approaches might be seen to participate in such a post-historicist 
project. However, the next chapter adopts a very different critical strategy by suggesting 
that the aesthetics of untimeliness of Shakespearean drama can be read in view of the 
                                                
95 Marshall, ‘Portia’s Wound, Calphurnia’s Dream’, p. 480. 
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multiple critical operations that surround, and eventually supplant, the so-called 
‘original’ or ‘unmediated’ meaning of a work of art. 
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CHAPTER 3 – ‘IMPERFECT PERFORMANCES’: FRAGMENTED 
MEANINGS AND MEANINGFUL FRAGMENTS IN HAMLET 
 
 
 
‘That’s why I like to listen to Schubert while I’m driving. As I said, it’s because all the 
performances are imperfect. A dense, artistic impression stimulates your consciousness, keeps 
you alert. If I listen to some utterly perfect performance of an utterly perfect piece while I’m 
driving, I might want to close my eyes and die right then and there. But listening to the D major, 
I can feel the limits of what humans are capable of—that a certain type of perfection can only be 
realised through a limitless accumulation of the imperfect. And personally, I find that 
encouraging. Do you see what I’m getting at?’ 
‘Sort of…’ 
– Haruki Murakami, Kafka on the Shore1 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
What is Hamlet about? This question has baffled readers, critics and playgoers for a 
long time now. The meaning of Hamlet has proved characteristically elusive through the 
ages. As one of the central enigmas of modern literature, Shakespeare’s most famous 
drama has elicited an unprecedented variety of interpretations. In ‘Hamlet and the 
Present’, Hugh Grady writes: 
It still seems to be true that more has been written about this play than about any 
other work of literature. Hamlet thus remains a test-case of critical 
methodologies par excellence because it has been interpreted and re-interpreted 
for over three centuries without any sign of exhaustion. It is an ideal vehicle to 
illustrate the resistance of Shakespeare’s works—and ultimately, of all cultural 
productions worthy of the name ‘art’—to definitive interpretation. Instead, 
works like Hamlet are reinvigorated and re-interpreted from one age to the next 
as societies, culture and aesthetics change in an interconnected historical 
process.2 
Grady’s considerations on Hamlet provide the critical framework for this chapter, which 
examines the extent to which the play can be said to resist definitive interpretation. 
                                                
1 Haruki Murakami, Kafka on the Shore, translated from the Japanese by Philip Gabriel (London: Vintage, 
2005), pp. 119-20. 
2 Hugh Grady, ‘Hamlet and the Present’, Presentist Shakespeares, edited by Hugh Grady and Terence 
Hawkes (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), p. 142. 
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More than a play, Hamlet is a multi-faceted signifier that challenges traditional 
notions of presence—the tag ‘Hamlet’ conjures up very different realities. The 
overwhelming predominance of interpretation in the experiential field of the play 
undermines the idea of Shakespeare’s Hamlet as a complete literary object whose 
meaning is self-contained. Although the play’s self-presence is often taken for granted, 
its supposedly unified ontological core is put into question by the material conditions of 
existence of the work: both Hamlet’s complex textuality and its intricate relation to its 
sources impart a powerful defamiliarisation effect. The structural alienation that 
underwrites the play culminates in its fundamentally undetermined spatio-temporal 
setting. Although the story of Hamlet is generally understood to be set in pre-Christian 
Denmark, the profusion of so-called anachronisms in Shakespeare’s Hamlet has led 
critics and editors to read the play against more contemporary cultural backgrounds—
with a marked preference, perhaps unsurprisingly, for early modern England.3 
The interpretation of works of art through their moment of production is a 
characteristic feature of historicist criticism (which has seen a revival in the last thirty 
years or so). In the present chapter, Stephen Greenblatt’s Hamlet in Purgatory (2001) 
provides an instance of the critical exercise that consists in narrowing down Hamlet to 
an early modern plane of reality: the character of Hamlet, in particular, is treated as an 
autobiographical reflection of Shakespeare. There has been a growing unease around 
new historicist methods over the last decade; as explained in the introduction to this 
thesis, critics have started to point out that ‘it is becoming harder and harder to 
distinguish much recent historicist criticism from an earlier generation’s old 
                                                
3  See, for instance, Philip Edwards (editor), Hamlet, Prince of Denmark (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003). 
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historicism.’4 In order to illustrate this point, the chapter goes on to look at Carl 
Schmitt’s study of the play, Hamlet or Hecuba (1956), which claims that Hamlet is no 
less than King James himself. Together, Greenblatt’s and Schmitt’s accounts provide 
two graphic instances of historicism’s tendency to foreclose the meaning of Hamlet by 
assigning an historically-bound meaning to it. Ultimately, however, they illustrate the 
extent to which Shakespeare’s play resists being pinned down on a specific hermeneutic 
level. But while it frustrates categorical statements, Hamlet also leaves room for an 
infinite range of interpretations. Drawing on Walter Benjamin’s theory of allegory, the 
chapter eventually suggests that the interpretive field, in all its chaotic diversity, is 
precisely what shapes the aesthetics of the play. In this sense, Hamlet’s fragmented 
meanings epitomise Benjamin’s view of baroque drama as a ‘picturesque field of 
ruins.’5 And as Grady suggests, ‘Benjamin’s “presentist” proclivities’ can help us to ‘go 
beyond an almost exhausted New Historicism.’6 
 
I- THE MEANING OF HAMLET: THE GREATEST QUESTION MARK 
 A. HAMLET’S CRITICISM—CRITICISM’S HAMLET 
As anyone who has made the attempt knows, writing an essay on Hamlet is a veritable 
nightmare. Not only because Hamlet is such a dense and obscure play that it defies 
interpretation. But also because the play ‘in itself’ is indistinguishable from the 
superimposed layers of critical discourse that have shaped Hamlet’s meaning over time. 
On the one hand, there is little doubt that the play’s legendary impenetrability is 
                                                
4  Cary DiPietro and Hugh Grady, ‘Presentism, Anachronism and the Case of Titus Andronicus’, 
Shakespeare 8(1) (2012), 44-73, p. 49. 
5 Walter Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama [1928], translated from the German by John 
Osborne (London and New York: Verso, 2009), p. 178. Benjamin borrows Karl Borinski’s epxression in 
Die Antike in Poetik und Kunsttheorie von Ausgang des klassischen Altertums bis auf Goethe und 
Wilhelm von Humbolt, I (1914). 
6 Hugh Grady, ‘Hamlet as Mourning-Play: A Benjaminesque Interpretation’, Shakespeare Studies 36 
(2008), 135-65, p. 137. 
   126 
 
precisely what has made its meaning so contingent on added commentary. On the other 
hand, we should also bear in mind that this complexity has been fashioned by a 
maddening density and profligacy of critical discourses. The primacy of interpretation 
in the construction of meaning was emphasised by Fredric Jameson in The Political 
Unconscious: 
We never really confront a text immediately, in all its freshness as a thing-in-
itself. Rather, texts come before us as the always-already-read; we apprehend 
them through sedimented layers of previous interpretations, or—if the text is 
brand-new—through the sedimented reading habits and categories developed by 
those inherited interpretive traditions.7 
In other words, what has been said about Hamlet through the centuries has inexorably 
tainted our perception of the play—and it is clearly an understatement to suggest that a 
lot has been said. In 1964 already, Jan Kott made the compelling observation that ‘the 
bibliography of dissertations and studies devoted to Hamlet is twice the size of 
Warsaw’s telephone directory.’8 Against such a monumental interpretive backdrop, the 
contours of what some might like to call the ‘play-in-itself’ appear strikingly uncertain. 
The dazzling commentarial overflow imparts the odd feeling that the ‘original’, 
uncorrupted Hamlet has irremediably fallen in the bottomless pit of its own criticism 
(which is essentially the same thing as saying that there is no original, uncorrupted 
Hamlet). There is no safe place to be for critics when it comes to interpreting such a 
labyrinthine cultural object that has resisted totalising operations for over three centuries. 
The historical trajectory of Hamlet belies the assumption that the ultimate meaning of a 
literary work is self-contained—this would presuppose a core of immutable semantic 
presence within the work itself. From the outset, the idea of Hamlet as a meaningful, 
homogeneous literary object is challenged by an overflowing critical discourse that does 
                                                
7 Fredric Jameson, The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act (London: Methuen, 
1981), pp. ix-x. 
8 Jan Kott, ‘Hamlet of the Mid-Century’, in Shakespeare Our Contemporary, translated from the German 
by Boleslaw Taborski (London: Routledge, 1965), p. 47. 
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not merely surround the play but rather inherently defines how we make sense of it. In 
this sense, ‘Hamlet’s criticism’ can be said to function in the manner of a Trojan horse: 
it is always already within the walls of the fortress—that is, until we realise that it is the 
fortress itself (‘Shakespeare is already in the château,’ to use Nicholas Royle’s 
memorable formula).9 Through the inextricable relation between Hamlet and ‘its’ 
criticism, notions of primary and secondary textualities become blurred. A crucial 
implication of the established phrase ‘Hamlet’s criticism’ is that of a top-down relation 
dominated by a master text that gives rise to a multitude of affiliated or even 
subordinated discourses. But in the case of Hamlet, this relation seems to be reversed: 
what we have in effect is a fantasised original semantic core whose meaning is ascribed 
retroactively by the criticism (but whether or not we can still call it ‘criticism’ is another 
question). 
Before we even start thinking about ‘Hamlet’s criticism’, we must specify what 
we mean when we talk about ‘Hamlet’—a haunting/haunted signifier that gestures 
towards a disconcertingly multifarious reality. Not only a play or even a literary object, 
‘Hamlet’ is also fundamentally (and perhaps primarily) a cultural concept. If 
interpretive operations always precede and condition our experience of Hamlet, this 
crucially includes people who have never read the play or viewed it performed. 
Curiously, this all-inclusive dimension even seems to apply to people who have never 
heard of Hamlet or specifically know ‘it’ as a play by William Shakespeare. Hamlet’s 
overarching status in global culture allows the shockingly sweeping statement that most 
people in the so-called ‘developed world’ have experienced it in some way. It could 
well be true that ‘after Jesus, Hamlet is the most cited figure in Western consciousness,’ 
                                                
9 Nicholas Royle, ‘The Poet: Julius Caesar and the Democracy to Come’, In Memory of Jacques Derrida 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009), p. 3. 
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as Harold Bloom once asserted.10 Along the same lines, Richard Kearney claims that the 
play’s perennial ‘interlocking puzzles’ ensure that ‘Hamlet the play survives to this day 
and Hamlet the prince is the most written about person in Western culture after Jesus 
and Napoleon.’11 As a result of its pervasive quality, it is possible to experience Hamlet 
in various ways without ever interacting with a textual or theatrical manifestation of 
what is essentially an idea—rather than ‘just’ a play. For most people, it seems, Hamlet 
is a concept that is completely detachable from its literary or theatrical manifestations. It 
‘is’, for instance, the idea of a man (Shakespeare himself quite often) holding a skull 
and making a clever speech about the human condition; alternatively, it ‘is’ the frozen 
picture of a beautiful young girl drowning in a luscious floral whirlpool. As Ann 
Thompson points out, these ‘specific moments in the play appear over and over again as 
visual allusions in all kinds of contexts, serious, burlesque, or banal.’12 These images 
have become powerful, timeless archetypes as a direct consequence of the ceaseless 
(re)interpretation of the play by influential critics and artists. While Ophelia’s drowning 
was made famous by John Everett Millais’ ubiquitous Pre-Raphaelite painting, the 
focus on Hamlet as an introspective melancholic is very much the legacy of Romantic 
criticism.13 
 
B. DEFAMILIARISATION EFFECT: THE FRAGMENTED MATERIAL REALITY OF HAMLET 
If most latent ideas about Hamlet have been shaped by a dense and complex process of 
interpretive layering, our experience of the play (either on the page or the stage) is the 
                                                
10 Harold Bloom, Shakespeare: The Invention of the Human (London: Fourth Estate, 1999), p. xix. 
11 Richard Kearney, ‘Spectres of Hamlet’, in Spiritual Shakespeares, edited by Ewan Fernie (London and 
New York: Routledge, 2005), p. 161. 
12 Ann Thompson, ‘Hamlet and the Canon’, in Hamlet: New Critical Essays, edited by Arthur Kinney 
(New York and London: Routledge, 2002), p. 195. 
13 On the influence of Romantic criticism on Shakespeare, see Jonathan Bate, The Genius of Shakespeare 
[1997] (London: Picador, 2008). 
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result of a no less dense and complex editorial process. Prior to any critical operation (if 
such a thing is conceivable), the idea of a definitive, self-contained Hamlet is already 
questioned by the play’s material proprieties. There are currently no less than three 
different texts that editors address as Shakespeare’s Hamlet: they are known as the first 
quarto (1603), the second quarto (1604-5) and the first folio (1623). In their Arden 
edition of the play, Ann Thompson and Neil Taylor remark that ‘the textual history of 
Hamlet is full of questions and largely empty of clear answers’—indeed, ‘the only 
features that these three Hamlets have in common are the name and designation of the 
chief character, and the fact that they are plays.’14 To add another twist, the version of 
Hamlet that most people read today is a conflation of the second quarto and the folio 
texts. If we consider the conflated text as a version of the play in its own right (and there 
is no reason why we should not), that leaves us with four official Hamlets. Amidst this 
textual maelstrom, it seems legitimate to ask, as Ann Thompson does: ‘which words on 
which page of which text represent the true canonical Hamlet?’15 For the play’s 
complex textual history testifies to the vast editorial operation that underlies the tag 
‘Hamlet’ (when it is used to refer to a literary text written by Shakespeare). Specifically, 
the plurality of texts challenges the notion of a monolithic work that can be ascribed 
clear physical demarcations. ‘What we call Hamlet, then, will hardly stay still even as a 
text,’ David Bevington observes in his cultural history of ‘Hamlet Through the Ages’. 
This constitutive hybridity is mainly due to the fact that ‘from its inception as a play, the 
text of Hamlet interacted with a host of other shaping influences.’ 16  As far as 
Shakespeare’s drama is concerned, there is no consensus amongst scholars as to which 
                                                
14 Ann Thompson and Neil Taylor, ‘Introduction’, Hamlet: The Texts of 1603 and 1623, edited by Ann 
Thompson and Neil Taylor (London: Thomson Learning, 2006), p. 76. 
15 Thompson, ‘Hamlet and the Canon’, p. 201. 
16 David Bevington, Murder Most Foul: Hamlet Through the Ages (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2011), p. 1. 
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text should be the authoritative one—depending on the method of investigation, both 
the second quarto and the folio appear as legitimate candidates. By refusing to be 
restricted to a single material entity, Hamlet (as if endowed with an uncanny will of its 
own) casts a shadow over its own presence. This mesmerising presence-as-absence 
creates a distantiation effect that participates in (and perhaps, for many readers and 
playgoers, unconsciously defines) the play’s aesthetics. As Stephen Greenblatt writes in 
his introduction to the play in the Norton edition, ‘Hamlet is a monument of world 
literature, but it is a monument built on shifting sands.’17 The play’s characteristic self-
questioning is especially apparent in view of the first quarto—or ‘bad quarto’, as it is 
often called. Unlike the second quarto and the first folio texts, the first quarto is 
generally considered to be an unauthorised version of the play, possibly based on an 
actor’s account; it has stood in the shadow of the other texts for more than four hundred 
years. Although Hamlet often features as the canonical literary work par excellence, the 
first quarto challenges this supremacy from within. In this sense, reading the first quarto 
is an uncanny experience, Thompson and Taylor argue, as it ‘offers the opportunity for 
defamiliarizing ourselves with Hamlet and for undergoing a continuous sequence of 
alienation effects: it is Hamlet, but not as we know it.’18 
With regard to its sources, the play (in all its textual forms) seems to be toying 
with the very idea of Hamlet ‘as we know it’—an idea that applies not only to readers 
and playgoers in the twenty-first century but also to early modern audiences. There is 
substantial evidence that, in Shakespeare’s time, the story on which the play is based 
was already vastly popular. The oldest recorded source for the story of Hamlet is 
Historiae Danicae, written in Latin by a Dane called Saxo Grammaticus. Although 
                                                
17 Stephen Greenblatt, ‘Introduction to Hamlet’, The Norton Shakespeare, edited by Stephen Greenblatt, 
Walter Cohen, Jean Elizabeth Howard and Katharine Eisaman Maus (New York and London: Norton, 
1997), p. 1659. 
18 Thompson and Taylor, ‘Introduction’, p. 16. 
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written around 1200, Saxo’s work was first printed in Paris in 1514. ‘The legend of 
Hamlet comes down to us from prehistoric Denmark,’ Bevington notes; and ‘like most 
such legends, its own early history is obscured in the mists of time. The oral versions of 
the story that must have circulated are lost to us. […] We know nothing of Saxo’s 
sources, but the story itself is by this time fully developed.’19 François de Belleforest 
translated parts of Saxo into French in his Histoires Tragiques (1570), adding in some 
significant details.20 But Shakespeare’s Hamlet also has more direct antecedents on the 
Elizabethan stage, editors have argued. It was Edmund Malone who first suggested that 
there was a Hamlet on the stage in 1589—an idea based on Thomas Nashe’s much-
quoted prefatory epistle to Robert Greene’s Menaphon (‘English Seneca read by 
candlelight yields many good sentences, as Blood is a beggar and so forth, and if you 
entreat him fair in a frosty morning he will afford you whole Hamlets, I should say 
handfuls, of tragical speeches’).21 Because we do not know how much exactly—if 
anything at all—Shakespeare took from this ‘Ur-Hamlet’, scholars have pointed out the 
possibility that ‘a number of details found in his Hamlet and not in Saxo or Belleforest 
were available to him in the lost play.’22 In 1594, the theatrical entrepreneur Philip 
Henslowe recorded in his diary a performance of a play called Hamlet at Newington 
Butts.23 Two years later, the dramatist Thomas Lodge wrote in Wit’s Misery and the 
World’s Madness (1596) about ‘a ghost which cried so miserably in the theatre, like an 
oyster wife, “Hamlet, revenge!”’ Thomas Kyd’s play The Spanish Tragedy, probably 
                                                
19 Bevington, Hamlet Through the Ages, p. 7. 
20 For an account of the ‘prehistory’ of Shakespeare’s Hamlet and its exact relation to Saxo Grammaticus 
and François de Belleforest, see Bevington’s first chapter, ‘Prologue to Some Great Amiss: The 
Prehistory of Hamlet’, Ibid., pp. 7-24. 
21 Thomas Nashe, Works, volume 3, edited by Ronald Brunlees McKerrow, reprinted with corrections and 
supplementary notes by Frank Percy Wilson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 315. 
22 Bevington, Hamlet Through the Ages, p. 19. 
23 Philip Henslowe, Henslowe’s Diary, edited by Reginald Anthony Foakes, second edition (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 21. 
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written between 1582 and 1592, also incorporates several elements of the traditional 
Hamlet story—which has led many critics to believe that he might be the author of the 
supposedly lost Hamlet ridiculed by Nashe. As it has often been observed, the numerous 
similarities between Shakespeare’s play and Kyd’s play can hardly be fortuitous: they 
both feature a play within the play, a ghost, a close friend called Horatio, a female 
suicide and a brother who kills his sister’s lover. Thus, ‘perhaps Shakespeare’s play 
draws on Kyd’s play, but perhaps both plays draw on the Ur-Hamlet,’ editors are left to 
speculate.24 
 
C. ‘THE STRANGEST PLAY EVER WRITTEN’: ESTRANGEMENT AS CORE FEATURE OF 
HAMLET 
Those historical antecedents and references all testify to the fact that the story of Hamlet 
would have been familiar to playgoers and readers in the late sixteenth century. Because 
of the inevitable epistemological gap incurred by a supposedly lost Elizabethan Hamlet, 
the closest and potentially most direct historical source that we have access to for 
Shakespeare’s play is Belleforest’s Histoires Tragiques. Editors often seem to agree that 
a crucial difference between Shakespeare and Belleforest is that ‘Shakespeare updates 
the story to a Christian Renaissance Court’ (that is, ‘if Saxo/Belleforest is taken to be 
his major source,’ which is hard to ascertain).25 In his New Cambridge edition of 
Hamlet, Philip Edwards comments on what he calls a ‘general change of great 
significance’ initiated by Shakespeare: 
The setting of the story is moved from the pre-Christian times where Belleforest 
deliberately placed it to a courtly, modern-seeming period, in which, though 
England still pays tribute to Denmark, renaissance young men travel to and fro 
to complete their education in universities or in Paris.26 
                                                
24 Thompson and Taylor, ‘Introduction’, p. 70. 
25 Ibid., p. 69. 
26 Philip Edwards, ‘Introduction’, in Hamlet, Prince of Denmark, p. 2. 
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Punctilious critics often like to point out that Shakespeare’s treatment of the story 
features myriad chronological inconsistencies: from the perspective of a pedantic, self-
effacing observer, Hamlet’s intention to go ‘back to school in Wittenberg’ may come 
across as an anachronism (1.2.113). The reference to a modern German university 
founded in 1502 in a story supposedly set in prehistorical Denmark puzzles rational 
minds. Throughout the history of Shakespeare criticism, this type of occurrence has 
been presented as a typically Shakespearean blunder.27 However, Bevington recently 
pointed out that the ‘updating’ of the story of Hamlet to a Christian Renaissance court is 
already a characteristic feature in Belleforest’s account: 
His setting is, anachronistically, more a court of Renaissance Europe, replete 
with palace, courtiers, and pages, than the abode of an ancient Scandinavian 
chieftain. By translating the Latin stramentum, straw, as the French equivalent 
of ‘quilt,’ he provides an elegant flooring in the Queen’s chambers more suited 
to the French sixteenth century than to the Danish twelfth or thirteenth centuries. 
Belleforest provides a Christian justification for Hamlet’s killing of his uncle, in 
that Fengon is guilty of ‘an abominable guilt and twofold impiety,’ his 
‘incestuous adultery and parricide murder.’28 
A close examination of Belleforest’s account contradicts the generally accepted view 
that the distinctly ‘modern’ setting of Hamlet—as well as the introduction of a Christian 
dimension—is Shakespeare’s own original contribution to the age-old story. The 
modernisation of the story of Hamlet is already ongoing in Belleforest, whose setting 
clearly evokes ‘a court of Renaissance Europe’. Bevington goes on to argue that 
Shakespeare is more interested in providing a plausible sixteenth-century Danish 
setting than are Saxo and Belleforest; Saxo’s Denmark is of course that of an 
earlier era. The names of Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, not in Shakespeare’s 
sources, are those of aristocratic sixteenth-century Denmark.29 
One might consider the spatio-temporal setting of an early modern play as an obvious, 
given fact that does not need to be discussed at great length—after all, some might 
                                                
27 For a history of the treatment of anachronism by critics and editors in view of Shakespeare’s dramas, 
see Chapter 1 of this thesis, ‘“Violator of Chronology”: Shakespeare’s Anachronisms in Con-text(s)’. 
28 Bevington, Hamlet Through the Ages, p. 12. 
29 Ibid., p. 15. 
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wonder, we are not dealing with a novel by Virginia Woolf, William Faulkner or James 
Joyce. Yet, it seems impossible for critics to come to an agreement regarding the ‘actual’ 
geographical setting of Shakespeare’s Hamlet. In his Oxford edition of the play, George 
Richard Hibbard rehearses the widespread opinion that ‘the court where Hamlet unfolds 
is a Renaissance court, the seat of a centralized personal government.’ But when it 
comes to locating this supposed Renaissance court, Hibbard’s intricate elaboration 
shows how difficult it is to make even the simplest statement about Hamlet. 
Indubitably Danish in its explicit references to Elsinore, in its close relations 
with Norway, and in its conformity to the popular notion of the Danes, current in 
the England of the later sixteenth century, as a nation much given to drinking, it 
is, simultaneously, in its preoccupation with statecraft, intrigue, assassination, 
poisoning, and lechery, decidedly in keeping with the mental picture that many 
in the original audience of the play appear to have had of Italy.30 
There is often an implicit assumption that Hamlet is set in pre-Christian Denmark: while 
Bevington believes that Shakespeare’s intention was to provide ‘a plausible sixteenth-
century Danish setting’, Hibbard suggests that the play’s setting is both ‘indubitably 
Danish’ and Italian at the same time. Through the twentieth century, there has also been 
a tendency to read sixteenth-century England as the play’s main subtext. While the 
anachronisms used to be seen chiefly as errors that depart from the play’s formal setting, 
historicist critics have tended to read them as signposts that point towards an underlying 
core of early modern reality. Set against one another, these contradicting approaches 
illustrate the extent to which the play frustrates categorical statements. But although it 
inherently elicits contradiction, Hamlet also leaves room for an infinity of 
interpretations. Rather than subscribing to a particular time period and place (and 
perhaps a particular ideology), Hamlet often seems to embrace all time periods and all 
places (and perhaps all ideologies) at once. If ‘Hamlet is like a sponge,’ as Jan Kott 
                                                
30 George Richard Hibbard, ‘General Introduction’, Hamlet, edited by George Richard Hibbard (Oxford: 
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once remarked, it is because ‘it immediately absorbs all the problems of our time.’ This 
is perhaps why critics of all generations have invariably failed to ascribe a definitive 
spatio-temporal setting (let alone a meaning) to what Kott thought was ‘the strangest 
play ever written.’31 
 
II- NEW HISTORICIST HAMLET: STEPHEN GREENBLATT’S HAMLET IN PURGATORY 
 A. A PROTESTANT PLAYWRIGHT HAUNTED BY THE SPIRIT OF HIS CATHOLIC FATHER 
Hamlet is both strange and estranging. It estranges readers, audiences and critics by 
systematically baffling their readings or theories. As Stephen Greenblatt remarks in 
Hamlet in Purgatory, ‘Hamlet is a play of contagious, almost universal self-
estrangement.’32 More than anywhere else, this self-estrangement can be sensed in the 
play’s narrative, which is riddled with internal contradictions. For the father of new 
historicism, these inconsistencies are anything but fortuitous: rather, they are a 
manifestation of Shakespeare’s deliberate inclusion of an early modern dimension in his 
drama. Greenblatt’s characteristic preoccupation with the authorial intention concealed 
behind literary characters is crystallised in the following passage from Hamlet in 
Purgatory: 
The issue is not, I think, simply random inconsistency. There is, rather, a 
pervasive pattern, a deliberate forcing together of radically incompatible 
accounts of almost everything that matters in Hamlet. Is Hamlet mad or only 
feigning madness? Does he delay in the pursuit of revenge or only berate 
himself for delaying? Is Gertrude innocent or was she complicit in the murder of 
her husband? Is the strange account of the old king’s murder accurate or 
distorted? Does the ghost come from Purgatory or from Hell?—for many 
generations now audiences and readers have risen to the challenge and found 
that each of the questions may be powerfully and convincingly answered on 
both sides. What is at stake is more than a multiplicity of answers. The opposing 
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212. 
   136 
 
positions challenge each other, clashing and sending shock waves through the 
play.33 
As Greenblatt points out, there are fundamental questions in Hamlet that have baffled 
many generations of readers, audiences and critics. These questions about madness, 
revenge and murder arise from a systematic sense of contradiction that suffuses the 
play’s narrative. Thus, there is a ‘pervasive pattern’ that guarantees that we are 
presented with ‘radically incompatible accounts of almost everything that matters in 
Hamlet’. One might assume that the literary purpose of these incompatible accounts is 
to establish a backdrop of confusion that is in keeping with the climate of intrigue as 
well as the main protagonist’s state of mind. However, when he argues that diegetic 
inconsistency in Hamlet is not gratuitous but ‘a deliberate forcing together’ of 
incompatible accounts, Greenblatt hints at something underlying pure literary effect. 
His sensation that there is more to the play than a mere ‘multiplicity of answers’ 
conjures up a an idea of authorial intention that is distinctly historicist. Thus, he argues 
that the pattern of contradiction that pervades the narrative of Hamlet points to a topical 
early modern reality that would be embedded in the ghost’s ambivalence regarding its 
provenance: does it come from purgatory or from hell? As Greenblatt points out, this is 
one of the fundamental questions in Hamlet ‘that may be powerfully and convincingly 
answered on both sides’: 
In the ingenious attempt to determine whether the apparition is ‘Catholic’ or 
‘Protestant’, whether it is a spirit of health or a goblin damned, whether it comes 
from Purgatory or from Hell—as if these were questions that could be decisively 
answered if only we were somehow clever enough—the many players in the 
long-standing critical game have usefully called attention to the bewildering 
array of hints that the play generates. Perhaps most striking is how much 
evidence on all sides there is in the play.34 
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In spite of the ‘bewildering array of hints’ that invite the critic to take a stand and speak 
for the ghost’s confession, the question remains open. There is as much evidence to 
label the ghost as Catholic or Protestant, as coming from Purgatory or from Hell—as 
Hibbard notes in the Oxford edition of the play, this character is ‘a masterpiece of 
ambiguity.’35 Although he alludes to the ghost’s apparent undecidability, Greenblatt 
nonetheless provides his own personal elucidation of Hamlet: a play where ‘a young 
man from Wittenberg, with a distinctly Protestant temperament, is haunted by a 
distinctly Catholic ghost.’36 The chiasmic relation between Hamlet and his father’s 
ghost is rooted in Shakespeare’s own family story, the new historicist critic argues. In 
April 1757, the owner of Shakespeare’s birthplace in Stratford-upon-Avon decided to 
have the roof retiled. While at work, one of the builders found an old document 
underneath the tiling. The document, a ‘spiritual testament’ in fourteen articles, 
supposedly belonged to the playwright’s father John Shakespeare. Catholic in content, 
the testament makes explicit reference to purgatory. The signer also declares his firm 
intention to receive at his death the sacraments of confession, Mass, and extreme 
unction—for fear of an ‘accident’ or to be ‘surprised upon a sudden,’ the testament 
reads.37 ‘There is a clear implication to be drawn from this document,’ Greenblatt 
believes: ‘the playwright was probably brought up in a Roman Catholic household in a 
time of official suspicion and persecution of recusancy.’ As far as the writing of Hamlet 
is concerned, the death of John Shakespeare meant that ‘in 1601 the Protestant 
playwright was haunted by the spirit of his Catholic father pleading for suffrages to 
relieve his soul from the pains of Purgatory.’38 The culminating point of this narrative is 
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the revelation that the Protestant young man from Wittenberg is none but Shakespeare 
and that the Catholic ghost is none but his father. 
 
 B. ‘HEAVY HINTS’—OR WHY THE GHOST (SUPPOSEDLY) COMES FROM PURGATORY 
In his account of the play, Greenblatt argues that Hamlet contains ‘heavy hints that the 
Ghost is in or has come from Purgatory.’39 Although it warns that it is ‘forbid / To tell 
the secrets of [its] prison-house,’ the ghost admits to being ‘Doomed for a certain term 
[…], / Till the foul crimes done in [its] days of nature / Are burnt and purged away’ 
(1.4.10-14). Against an early modern backdrop of confessional struggles, the Ghost’s 
revelation that it needs to ‘purge’ its crimes is, in Greenblatt’s view, an unmistakable 
topical allusion. In the same speech, the Ghost laments the unholy conditions in which 
its death took place. 
Thus was I, sleeping, by a brother’s hand 
Of life, of crown, of queen at once dispatched, 
Cut off even in the blossoms of my sin, 
Unhouseled, dis-appointed, unaneled, 
No reck’ning made, but sent to my account 
With all my imperfections on my head. 
O horrible, O horrible, most horrible! 
     (1.5.74-80) 
In his report to Hamlet, the ghost deplores the fact that it was summarily ‘dispatched’ in 
the absence of proper religious rituals: ‘unhouseled, dis-appointed, unaneled’—namely 
‘without the sacrament of the Eucharist, without death-bed confession and absolution, 
and without the ritual anointing of extreme unction.’40 The Ghost is explicit about its 
sentiment of having met its death in a state of ‘sin’, ‘with all [its] imperfections on [its] 
head’ and ‘no reck’ning made’: it was sent to the Last Judgement without having atoned 
                                                
39 Ibid., p. 235. 
40 Greenblatt, Cohen, Howard and Maus, The Norton Shakespeare, p. 1685. 
   139 
 
for its sins. From a traditional Catholic perspective, this is indeed ‘most horrible’, 
Greenblatt observes: 
Old Hamlet’s condition is a grievous one—the term of his sufferings or their 
intensity vastly increased—because of the way he was dispatched, unprepared 
for death. […] That he can speak of ‘imperfections’ presumably means that his 
sins were not mortal; after all, he will eventually burn and purge away his crimes. 
But his inability to make a proper reckoning and his failure to receive the 
Catholic last rites weigh heavily against him.41 
The seemingly ‘grievous’ post-mortem condition of Old Hamlet is rehearsed by his 
princely son later on in the play. In Act III, Hamlet stages a play that confounds 
Claudius and exposes him as a usurper. Halfway through the performance, the king 
‘rises’ and storms out of the theatre as Polonius orders to ‘Give o’er the play’ (3.2.243-
46). Walking in on Claudius at prayer in the next scene, Hamlet delivers an incredibly 
dense speech that rehearses the ghost’s preoccupations in Act I of the play: 
Now might I do it pat, now a is praying, 
And now I’ll do’t, 
 [He draws his sword] 
  and so a goes to heaven, 
And so am I revenged. That would be scanned. 
A villain kills my father, and for that 
I, his sole son, do this same villain send 
To heaven. 
O, this is hire and salary, not revenge! 
A took my father grossly, full of bread, 
With all his crimes broad blown, as flush as May; 
And how his audit stands, who knows save heaven? 
But in our circumstance and course of thought 
’Tis heavy with him. And am I then revenged 
To take him in the purging of his soul, 
When he is fit and seasoned for his passage? 
No. 
 [He sheathes his sword] 
Up, sword, and know thou a more horrid hint. 
When he is drunk asleep, or in his rage, 
Or in th’incestuous pleasure of his bed, 
At gaming, swearing or about some act 
That has no relish of salvation in’t, 
Then trip him that his heels may kick at heaven, 
And that his soul may be as damned and black 
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As hell whereto it goes. My mother stays. 
This physic but prolongs thy sickly days. 
     (3.3.73-96) 
Echoing the Ghost, Hamlet here voices his own concerns about the ‘audit’ or spiritual 
account of his father, whose untimely death at the hands of Claudius left him in a state 
of sin: ‘A took my father grossly, full of bread, / With all his crimes broad blown, as 
flush as May.’ In the context of a theological meditation on the state of the soul, the 
expression ‘full of bread’ is intriguing and rather incongruous. But, as Malone pointed 
out, ‘fullness of bread’ is listed as a state of sin in Ezekiel 16:49: ‘Behold, this was the 
iniquity of thy sister Sodom, pride, fullness of bread, and abundance of idleness.’42 By 
contrast, Claudius is ‘fit and seasoned for his passage’ as Hamlet is about to kill him. 
This sudden realisation causes the prince to change his mind: unwilling to ‘take’ the 
‘villain’ ‘in the purging of his soul’, he ‘sheathes his sword’. Here again, Greenblatt 
argues that ‘the word “purging” is striking, since it links prayer in this world (and the 
preparation or seasoning of soul for the “passage” to the other world) to the purgation 
that may or may not follow.’43 Although Claudius has already sinned beyond help, 
killing ‘this same villain’ at prayer would ‘send [him] to heaven’, Hamlet believes. Thus, 
the prince would rather wait until Claudius is ‘about some act / That has no relish of 
salvation in’t’; this will ensure that when the usurper dies ‘his soul may be as damned 
and black / As hell whereto it goes’. 
If the Ghost is ‘doomed’ only ‘for a certain term’ to endure the pains of 
purgatory, Hamlet wants his uncle’s pains to be endless: in other words, Claudius must 
go to hell. Comparing traditional theological perceptions of hell and purgatory, 
Greenblatt remarks: 
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In church teachings, the excruciating pains of Purgatory and of Hell were […] 
identical; the only difference was that the former were only for a certain term. 
That one difference, of course, was crucial, but the Catholic Church laid a heavy 
emphasis upon the horrors of purgatorial torments, so that the faithful would be 
as anxious as possible to reduce the term they would have to endure.44 
In order to illustrate this idea, Greenblatt refers to the fifteenth-century morality play 
Everyman, which provides a vivid example of a ‘last-minute attempt to alter the 
“reckoning” by substituting penitential pain in this life for the far more terrible pain that 
lies ahead.’45 The medieval play dramatises the last moments of the life of Everyman: 
requiring ‘a sure reckoning / Without delay or any tarrying,’ God sends Death to 
summon the hero to give account of his life.46  Taken by surprise, with all his 
imperfections on his head, Everyman only has a very brief respite to alter the 
‘reckoning’. In order to do so, he begs God for forgiveness, repents his sins and starts 
scourging himself frantically: ‘Now of penance I will wade the water clear / To save me 
from purgatory, that sharp fire’ (618-19). With Good Deeds at his side, Everyman 
climbs into his grave, dies and eventually ascends to heaven. ‘Everyman has thus 
narrowly escaped one of the worst medieval nightmares, a sudden death,’ Greenblatt 
concludes—and ‘this nightmare, of course, is the fate that befalls Hamlet’s father.’47 
 
C. THE MEDIEVAL EMPHASIS ON THE STATE OF THE SOUL AT THE MOMENT OF 
DEATH 
Greenblatt’s interest lies in Hamlet’s early modern topicality and more specifically in 
the extent to which the play can be said to mirror the confessional situation of 
Shakespeare’s family. Echoing John Shakespeare’s testament, the Ghost’s complaint is 
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supposed to voice a very peculiar kind of anxiety that would have developed at the end 
of the sixteenth century. Greenblatt talks about a ‘fifty-year effect,’ which describes 
a time in the wake of the great, charismatic ideological struggle in which the 
revolutionary generation that made the decisive break with the past is all dying 
out and the survivors hear only hypocrisy in the sermons and look back with 
longing at the world they have lost.48 
Perhaps Shakespeare’s father was one of those ‘survivors’ who looked back at the old 
pre-reformed world with nostalgia, Greenblatt implies. And ‘perhaps, too, 
Shakespeare’s sensitivity to the status of the dead was intensified by the death in 1596 
of his son Hamnet […] and still more perhaps by the death of his father, John, in 
1601.’49 As these passages from Hamlet in Purgatory illustrate, Greenblatt has his eyes 
riveted on Shakespeare’s historical moment, which provides the epistemological 
framework for his criticism. In this sense, it is rather striking that all the examples he 
uses to establish a theological connection between Hamlet and Shakespeare’s life are 
from medieval sources and not early modern. His emphasis on the relevance of the state 
of the soul at the moment of death, in particular, is indebted to medieval theologians 
like William of Auvergne, a thirteenth-century regent and master of theology from Paris. 
In his writings, Auvergne justifies the need for purgatory on the grounds that ‘those who 
die suddenly or without warning, for example, “by the sword, suffocation or excess of 
suffering”, those whom death takes unaware before they have had time to complete their 
penance, must have a place where they do so.’50 Greenblatt’s justification of the 
theological positions of Hamlet and the Ghost is based on this type of medieval account, 
which also serves to justify the same beliefs attributed to Shakespeare and his father 
(since, apparently, Hamlet is William Shakespeare and the Ghost is John Shakespeare). 
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 In that sense, Greenblatt reads the topicality of Hamlet with regard to what he 
sees as an important issue in Shakespeare’s time: the state of the soul at the moment of 
death. Viewed in parallel, both Hamlet and (what is supposed to be) John Shakespeare’s 
testament bring the new historicist critic to the conclusion that Shakespeare and his 
father cared a lot about this question. In addition, the recurrence of this idea in medieval 
theological tracts leads Greenblatt to posit its relevance in Shakespeare’s time. But 
although the concern with the state of the soul at the moment of death was certainly 
relevant until the late Middle Ages, it was no longer topical in the sixteenth century, 
historians have pointed out. In his landmark historical survey, The Hour of Our Death, 
the French medievalist Philippe Ariès examines Western attitudes to death and how 
they evolved over the last thousand years. Ariès remarks that the preoccupation with the 
dying man’s spiritual account was the result of a propaganda-led set of ideas that 
emerged during the late Middle Ages and soon died down: 
Moralists, the religious, and mendicant friars exploited the new anxiety for 
purposes of conversion. A literature of edification, distributed by means of the 
new printing techniques, enlarged on the pain and delirium of the death agony, 
presenting the moment of death as a struggle of spiritual powers in which the 
individual was in a position to gain or lose everything.51 
However, this extreme approach to dying was short-lived and, by the early sixteenth 
century, the idea that ‘everything is spread out over the whole span of a lifetime and 
affects every day of that life’ was firmly established in England and most continental 
countries.52 This new discourse, Ariès convincingly demonstrates, was fostered by 
influential humanist thinkers like Desiderius Erasmus. More significantly perhaps, the 
recognition of the relevance of the whole span of a lifetime to salvation was the result of 
a joint effort by Catholic and Protestant theologians. ‘On this point, there is unanimity 
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among the Christian elite,’ Ariès explains: ‘the French Protestant and the Anglican 
theologian speak like the Roman cardinal.’ Thus, from the early sixteenth-century, 
there is a conviction, even among traditionalist and conservative Catholics, for 
whom the testimony of the medieval monks is still valid, that barring the 
intervention—which can never be ruled out in advance—of an exceptional act of 
grace, it is not the moment of death that will give the individual’s past life its 
true worth or determine his fate in the other world. By then it will be too late, or 
in any case the risk is not worth running. The illumination of the last moment is 
not going to save from damnation a life completely given over to evil. One 
cannot count on it.53 
Voicing a predominant view at the beginning of the sixteenth century, the humanist 
theologian Jean de Vauzelles observed that ‘it is neither reasonable nor just that we 
should commit so many sins all our lives and then allow only a day or an hour to repent 
of them.’54 Thus, humanist and Christian teachers were univocal in their criticism of the 
previous age’s obsession with the disposition of the soul at the moment of death and 
emphasised the relevance of an individual’s entire life to their salvation. From this 
moment onwards, Ariès points out, ‘the reformist elite of the Catholic and Protestant 
churches, following the example of the humanists, continued to mistrust last-minute 
repentances extracted by the fear of the dying.’55 
 This historical reality has far-reaching implications with regard to theological 
readings of Hamlet as it severely weakens claims that the play rehearses topical 
religious concerns. Indeed, and as Hugh Grady notes in Shakespeare and Impure 
Aesthetics, ‘Hamlet’s and the Ghost’s preoccupation with the state of the soul at the 
moment of death was medieval and anachronistic’; such a recognition inevitably throws 
a shadow over the notion that Hamlet’s family story is directly relevant to 
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Shakespeare’s own family story.56 In this sense, Hamlet’s remarkable distantiation from 
the religious politics of its early modern moment of production brands a huge question 
mark on Greenblatt’s theological interpretation and on historicist ‘elucidations’ of the 
play in general. Although it has been consistently referred to as a ‘new’ kind of 
historicism, there is nothing new about what Greenblatt does in Hamlet in Purgatory. 
The reading of Hamlet as an encrypted reflection of a topical early modern figure has 
become a landmark of the criticism of Hamlet since the early twentieth century. Critics 
before Greenblatt tended to focus on the prince’s political dimension (rather than 
theological), often associating it with powerful noblemen like the Earl of Essex. Thus, 
for John Dover Wilson, Hamlet is nothing but ‘a really detailed reflection of the inner 
Essex’; for ‘the more one studies the character of the ill-starred Essex, the more 
remarkable Shakespeare’s portraiture becomes. Everything is there.’57 Acknowledging 
similarities with Essex, the Welsh critic Lilian Winstanley makes a case for Hamlet as a 
replication of King James. At the beginning of Hamlet and the Scottish Succession 
(1921), she announces that her purpose is to ‘study the play of Hamlet from a somewhat 
fresh point of view by endeavouring to show its relation or possible relation to 
contemporary history.’58 Ironically, what could still be viewed as a ‘fresh point of view’ 
in the early twentieth century has now become a complete commonplace. 
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III- ‘A LIMITLESS ACCUMULATION OF THE IMPERFECT’: IN SEARCH OF HAMLET’S 
OBJECTIVE TRUTH CONTENT 
A. HISTORICISING HAMLET IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: LILIAN WINSTANLEY AND 
CARL SCHMITT 
Whether it is pre-Christian or contemporary Denmark, Elizabethan England or 
Renaissance Italy, the question of the ‘actual’ setting of Hamlet has always elicited 
much debate (see discussion above). For Winstanley, however, it is clear: the historical 
source of inspiration for Shakespeare’s play is obviously sixteenth-century Scotland. 
An Elizabethan audience would almost certainly have thought Denmark a real 
country, and they would have believed it to be contemporary Scotland. The 
peculiar combination of circumstances and the peculiar type of manners depicted 
in Shakespeare’s Denmark are, in the highest degree, distinctive and strange; but 
they can every one be paralleled in the case of sixteenth-century Scotland.59 
Thus, if ‘Shakespeare’s Denmark is a place where the king has been murdered and his 
wife has married the murderer,’ Winstanley insists that ‘this also happened in sixteenth-
century Scotland.’60 She is here referring to a topical event that directly touches on the 
personal story of King James: the murder of his father. The official story is generally 
recounted as follows. In 1565, Mary Stuart married her distant cousin Lord Darnley 
(Henry Stewart) and gave birth to James the next year. Soon taking up with the sinister 
Earl of Bothwell, Mary conspired with him to murder Darnley. In 1567, Darnley’s body 
was found strangled and lying next to a naked attendant. Although Bothwell’s guilt has 
hardly ever been questioned, Mary’s part in the murder remains unclear. Three months 
after Darnley’s death, the infernal couple married. Within a year of the assassination, 
James’ paternal grandparents, the Countess and Earl of Lennox, had laid the duty of 
revenge squarely on the young king. In 1567-68, they commissioned a painting, to be 
realised by the Dutchman Livinius de Vogelaare: known as The Darnley Memorial, the 
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picture offers a thorough visual record of the whole scandalous story. 61  At the 
background of the painting, a wall plaque directly addresses the incumbent ‘King of 
Scots,’ pleading that ‘he shut not out of his memory the recent atrocious murder of the 
King his father, until God should avenge it through him.’62 
 Winstanley was probably one of the first contemporary critics to establish an 
explicit link between Shakespeare’s characterisation of Hamlet and King James’ 
personal story. Drawing on John Hill Burton’s History of Scotland (1867-70), she 
identifies troubling parallels between Darnley’s murder and that of Hamlet’s father: 
Darnley was seized with a sudden and acute illness which broke out cutaneously. 
Poison was at first naturally suspected. The disease was speedily pronounced to 
be small-pox; but it was conjectured that it may have been one of those forms of 
contamination which had then begun to make their silent and mysterious 
visitation in this country, while the immediate cause by which they were 
communicated was yet unknown. From what occurred afterwards, it became a 
current belief that he had been poisoned. 
According to the nineteenth-century Scottish historian, another attempt was made at 
killing Darnley, with gunpowder this time—although it does not appear that he died as a 
result of the explosion: 
It seems that the intended victim with his page […] attempted to escape and 
even got over a wall into a garden when they were seized and strangled. They 
were found without any marks from the explosion but with marks of other 
violence.63 
Commenting on Burton Hill’s historical account, Winstanley concludes: 
Now here we surely have remarkable correspondences with the Shakespearian 
murder: we have the body of the victim covered with a ‘loathsome tetter’ which 
is ascribed to the malign influence of poison; we have the secret character of the 
murder itself, and we have the body of the victim found in an ‘orchard’.64 
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A scathing exposure of Mary’s relation to Darnley and the circumstances leading up to 
his death, George Buchanan’s Detection (1571) also features in Winstanley’s study of 
the plot of Hamlet seen through the lens of Stuart intrigue. In his examination of 
Darnley’s later life, Buchanan explicitly refers to ‘certain black pimples’ that ‘broke out 
all over his whole body with so great ache and such pain throughout his limbs, that he 
lingered out his life with very small hope of escape.’65 ‘It is certainly known that he was 
poisoned,’ Buchanan writes somewhere else; for ‘the kind of Disease, strange, unknown 
to the People, unacquainted with Physicians […] disclosed it’—‘black Pimples breaking 
out all over his body, grievous aches in all his limbs and intolerable stink’ were also 
recognised as ‘the Cause of his Deformity.’66 Winstanley points out that Buchanan’s 
factual description of Darnley’s disease 
agree[s] closely with the murder of Hamlet’s father, and, what is especially 
significant, not one of these details is to be found in either of the prose versions 
[i.e. Grammaticus and Belleforest]. In the so-called literary source, the murder is 
not secret, the victim is not alone, poison is not used, deformity is not caused.67 
In its description, in Shakespeare’s play, of Old Hamlet’s violent death, the ghost 
explains that, as the poison entered the king’s blood, ‘a most instant tetter barked about’ 
‘All [his] smooth body,’ ‘Most lazar-like, with vile and loathsome crust’ (1.5.71-3). 
Winstanley finds many other parallels between Hamlet and Scottish history, which she 
develops at great length in her book. 
 In his foreword to the German edition of Winstanley’s book (1952), the Nazi 
German jurist Carl Schmitt makes a rather radical assertion: 
Following the astounding findings outlined in the book by Lilian Winstanley, 
there is no longer any question that in Shakespeare’s Hamlet there reappear, 
down to the finest detail, the concrete situations, events, and people of the 
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historical moment contemporary with the life of James I and his mother Mary 
Stuart.68 
In total agreement with Winstanley, Schmitt claims that ‘the great dramatic work of art 
that bears the name Hamlet is, in the core of its action and the main character, nothing 
other than the dramatized story of a real king named James, James Stuart, son of Mary 
Stuart and her husband.’69 Winstanley’s research paved the way for Schmitt’s own 
study of the play, Hamlet or Hecuba: The Intrusion of the Time into the Play, first 
published in 1956. Following in the footsteps of Winstanley, Schmitt argues that 
Hamlet does not merely mirror contemporary events: rather, ‘the involvement of Mary 
Stuart in the murder of James’ father and the transformation of the figure of the avenger 
in view of King James’ constitute what he calls ‘genuine intrusions’ of history into the 
play.70 For Schmitt, Hamlet’s ambiguous presentation of the Queen’s involvement in 
the murder of Hamlet’s father represses a powerful historical taboo—an ambiguity that 
is as deliberate as it is firmly rooted in early-seventeenth-century Stuart politics: 
Out of consideration for James, the son of Mary Stuart, the expected successor 
to the throne, it was impossible to insinuate the guilt of the mother in the murder 
of the father. On the other hand, the audience for Hamlet, as well as all of 
Protestant England and particularly of course London, was convinced of Mary 
Stuart’s guilt. Out of consideration for this English audience, it was absolutely 
impossible to insinuate the innocence of the mother.71 
In order to back his theory, Schmitt elaborates a dubious chronology based on the three 
official texts of Hamlet. In the first quarto text, the Queen explicitly denies having any 
knowledge of the non-accidental character of Hamlet’s father’s death: ‘as I have a soul, 
I swear by heaven / I never knew of this most horrid murder,’ she protests against her 
                                                
68 Carl Schmitt, ‘Foreword to the German Edition of Lilian Winstanley’s Hamlet and the Scottish 
Succession’, Telos 153 (2010), ‘Special Issue on Carl Schmitt’s Hamlet or Hecuba’, 164-77, pp. 164-65. 
69 Ibid., p. 164. 
70 Carl Schmitt, Hamlet or Hecuba: The Intrusion of the Time into the Play, translated from the German 
by David Pan and Jennifer Rust (New York: Telos, 2009), p. 25. 
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son’s accusations (11.85-86).72 Schmitt is eager to point out that these lines do not 
appear in the second quarto, which is much more ambiguous with regard to the Queen’s 
involvement in the killing of the king. Thus, ‘the taboo of the queen is a powerful 
intrusion [Einbruch] of historical reality into Shakespeare’s Hamlet.’73 
 
B. WHEN HISTORICISM TURNS TO MYTH-MAKING: THE CASES OF HAMLET OR 
HECUBA AND HAMLET IN PURGATORY 
In Hamlet or Hecuba, Schmitt relies on the double postulate that the first quarto was 
written before the second quarto and that it was indeed authored by Shakespeare. While 
these assumptions remain unexamined by the German lawyer, they have been 
consistently undermined in Shakespeare scholarship—‘the majority of twentieth-
century scholars have argued that, despite its being printed after Q1, Q2 records a text 
which pre-dates the text of Q1,’ the Arden editors of Hamlet point out.74 Schmitt’s 
questionable chronology reveals the limits of his historical narrative, which is based on 
the unfounded idea that the playwright deliberately altered the text of ‘his’ play (from 
Q1 to Q2) in order to make it more topical. In Hamlet or Hecuba, the accession of 
James VI of Scotland to the English throne in 1603 figures as a key historical event. If 
the first ‘genuine intrusion’ concerns ‘the taboo of a queen’, the second one is explored 
in view of ‘the figure of the avenger’—and specifically ‘the distortion of the avenger 
that leads to the Hamletization of the hero.’75 In Schmitt’s bombastic rhetoric, the 
‘distortion of the avenger’ and the ‘Hamletization of the hero’ refer to the intrusion of a 
                                                
72 Ann Thompson and Neil Taylor (editors), ‘The Tragical History of Hamlet, Prince of Denmark: The 
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(London: Thomson Learning, 2006), p. 81. 
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‘real’ historical figure into the aesthetic framework of Hamlet—that of King James. 
Thus, for the Nazi critic, ‘aesthetics and politics are not merely linked but become two 
aspects of a single process of representation,’ David Pan notes in his afterword to the 
recently published English edition of Hamlet or Hecuba (2009).76 In light of this 
process, Hamlet does not merely mirror King James: he is King James. Drawing on 
various examples from the play (often the same ones used by Winstanley), Schmitt 
maintains that ‘James-Hamlet remains the key figure’ in Hamlet.77 In Q1, Laertes begs 
Claudius to let him go back to France, ‘Now that the funeral rites are all performed’ 
(2.16). His reasons are significantly different in Q2, where he explicitly states: ‘I came 
to Denmark / To show my duty in your coronation’ (1.2.51-2). For Schmitt, this line is a 
‘genuine’ reference to James’ own coronation; as such, it illustrates the notion that ‘an 
objective reality penetrates into the play from the outside.’78 In his über-historical 
reading of the play, the infamous German lawyer seeks to distantiate himself from 
‘Shakespeare’s seemingly anti-historical arbitrariness,’ which he denounces as a typical 
fault of Romantic criticism. 79  Schmitt’s rash historicisation of Shakespeare is 
problematic on many levels, and especially in view of his significant role in framing the 
ethnic politics of Adolf Hitler’s regime, critics have suggested recently.80 Richard 
Wilson, for instance, notes that ‘Schmitt’s Hamlet is the work of a literary poseur who 
liked to refer his life to the classics’ and who ‘use[d] Shakespeare to allegorize his own 
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outlaw condition after World War II.’81 This idea was originally developed by Victoria 
Kahn, who addresses Schmitt’s historicisation of Hamlet as a way for the outcast jurist 
to rewrite his own past: thus, the Nazi lawyer ‘uses the aesthetic power of Shakespeare 
to allegorize his own situation in World War II as genuinely—classically—tragic,’ 
Kahn proposes.82 From this perspective, the aestheticisation of Hamlet through Stuart 
politics appears as a stratagem for Schmitt to present his involvement with the Nazis in 
a more favourable light. 
Schmitt’s interpretation of Hamlet is a kind of apologia pro vita sua, one in 
which the most modern of early modern tragedies serves as an allegory for 
Schmitt’s own ‘tragic’ decisions. […] If Hamlet’s indecisiveness can be recast 
as Hamlet’s decisiveness […], then perhaps, Schmitt may imply, his own 
modern tragedy can be read as heroic rather than romantic.83 
Throughout his essay, Schmitt appears desperate to establish straightforward parallels 
between Hamlet and early modern politics; in applying his decisionistic theories to the 
play, he challenges the established view of Hamlet as the epitome of indecision. From 
the lawyer’s own historical moment, Hamlet or Hecuba may be taken as an extended 
autobiographical note through which Schmitt’s unrepentant involvement with the Nazis 
attains the tragic status of a classical myth. 
 Although the following parallel might come across to some as incongruous or 
even inappropriate, it must be emphasised that the historicist methodology used by 
Greenblatt in Hamlet in Purgatory bears unmistakable similarities to that of Schmitt in 
Hamlet or Hecuba. It should go without saying that pointing out similarities between 
the two critics does not mean accusing Greenblatt of being a Nazi (this would be 
nonsensical, considering Greenblatt’s Jewish cultural background)—and even less does 
it mean overlooking Schmitt’s obnoxious political affiliations. The most obvious 
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analogy lies in the way both critics more or less consciously superimpose their own 
troubled past on their reading of Hamlet. In his prologue to Hamlet in Purgatory, 
Greenblatt admits that his study of the play is rooted in his personal family story and, to 
a certain extent, constitutes an attempt to come to terms with his father’s death and 
Jewish legacy. Schmitt, on the other hand, seems to repress any direct connection with 
his Nazi involvement—although the connection has been repeatedly suggested by 
Shakespeare and Schmitt scholars. There is no arguing that the intention that drives 
Greenblatt’s criticism is more honourable (some might say ‘ethical’) than Schmitt’s. 
One could hardly think of more opposed critical personalities, in fact: Greenblatt’s 
measured, lucid and often inspired literary sensitivity is only matched by the decadence 
and rashness of Schmitt’s obtuse rhetoric. By way of example, the latter’s infamous 
trivialisation of poison gas in one of his political tracts bears witness to an abysmal 
moral rift between the two critics that few people would sensibly dare to put into 
question.84 In light of these significant moral considerations, recognising that there is a 
shared methodological kernel in both Hamlet or Hecuba and Hamlet in Purgatory 
might be seen as courting controversy. But it may also be helpful if we are to start 
reflecting on our own critical moment, which is the direct result of widely influential 
historicist readings of major literary texts—Hamlet in Purgatory being one of them. 
Acknowledging what Greenblatt’s and Schmitt’s methodologies have in common can 
help us comprehend how historicism has become established as a critical practice par 
défaut in the academic field of early modern literary studies, and more specifically that 
of Shakespeare studies. Moreover, examining those relatively recent acts of criticism 
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can give us a clearer idea of their impact on how meaning is produced through literary 
texts in our own moment. This, in turn, can help us recognise the implicit and specific 
ways in which ‘we’ are encouraged to approach literary texts and, more generally, 
works of art. Although this ‘we’ most obviously concerns the sphere of academia, it 
also applies to non-students, non-academics as well as non-specialists, as will become 
obvious shortly. 
 In their introduction to Hamlet or Hecuba, Jennifer Rust and Julia Lupton 
emphasise the extent to which Schmitt’s ‘staging of the relationship between literature 
and history anticipates later developments in literary criticism,’ and specifically ‘the 
new historicism.’85 Each in their own way, Hamlet or Hecuba and Hamlet in Purgatory 
rely on a process of myth-making in order to establish a coherent narrative linking 
Hamlet and the historical context in which it was produced. While Schmitt rewrites 
Hamlet into a decisionist avenger to suit his view of early modern history (and possibly 
his view of himself as a tragic hero), Greenblatt’s leniency towards some important 
historical facts crucially underwrites his thesis that Shakespeare and his family were 
Catholic. In its silent appropriation of a work of art in order to justify extreme political 
positions, Schmitt’s decisionistic foreclosure of Hamlet presents obvious dangers. On 
the other hand, Greenblatt’s account of the play may appear as a role model of literary 
criticism. Equally didactic and entertaining, scholarly and popular, historical and 
literary, Hamlet in Purgatory ticks all the boxes—in this sense, its popularity is 
certainly no accident. However, the overarching status of Greenblatt’s study should not 
make us blind to its shortcomings. Considering how influential it has been over the last 
decade or so, there is all the more reason to examine the wide claims it makes. One of 
the most disturbing aspects of Hamlet in Purgatory lies in its use of historical 
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approximation in order to consolidate the author’s confessional narrative about 
Shakespeare and his family. The fact that a work of fiction (along with a dubious 
‘spiritual testament’) figures as a central piece of evidence to determine the religious 
orientation of an early modern family is problematic. Like Schmitt, Greenblatt indulges 
in wild speculation about the play’s historical object. For the German jurist, the play 
follows Stuart genealogy to the letter—on a basic level, Gertrude is Mary Stuart, 
Claudius is Bothwell and Hamlet is King James. For the American new historicist, it is 
Shakespeare’s own family that is allegorised in the play—Hamlet is Shakespeare and 
the ghost is the spirit of John Shakespeare. 
 
C. ‘DISSONANT UNITY’: GATHERING THE FRAGMENTED MEANINGS OF HAMLET 
THROUGH WALTER BENJAMIN’S THEORY OF ALLEGORY 
Read in parallel, Hamlet or Hecuba and Hamlet in Purgatory illustrate a general 
tendency of historicist criticism to foreclose Hamlet by assigning a specific, 
historically-bound, meaning to it. As the present chapter has documented, historicist 
critics have been particularly keen to impose an ultimate meaning on the character of 
Hamlet (which is not to say that non-historicist critics have not done the same). In the 
twentieth century alone, Hamlet has been variously identified as Essex (Dover Wilson, 
Winstanley), as King James (Winstanley, Schmitt) and as Shakespeare himself 
(Greenblatt). However, the nagging sensation that this most famous of literary 
characters ‘will never be an integrated person’ and that ‘he remains a catalogue of 
qualities which have never been added up’ has been around the critical field for a long 
time now.86 As early as 1780, the novelist and essayist Henry Mackenzie wrote: ‘Of all 
the characters of Shakespeare that of Hamlet has been generally thought the most 
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difficult to be reduced to any fixed or settled principle.’87 The idea that the criticism is 
the ultimate repository of the meaning of Hamlet (which might or might not be the case) 
opens up at least two possibilities: 
1- Hamlet has no comprehensible ultimate meaning. 
2- The meaning of Hamlet lies in the sum of all the individual theories. 
The first statement conjures up a typically postmodern impasse: all the theories about 
the play are self-cancelling and ultimately only emphasise the absence of an overarching 
truth that would transcend each individual account. Thus, Lionel Charles Knights notes 
that ‘this play contains within itself widely different levels of experience and insight 
which, since they cannot be assimilated into a whole, create a total effect of 
ambiguity.’88 It has also been suggested that ‘Hamlet is an astonishingly rich play […] 
but its richness is the result of its incoherence’; and as a result, ‘the various points of 
view are never comprehended from one central synoptic point of view.’89 These 
comments illustrate an idea that has been prevalent throughout the late twentieth century: 
that of Hamlet as the epitome of postmodernity. In its cumulation of ‘widely different 
levels of experience and insight’ that ‘cannot be assimilated into a whole’, the play 
becomes a locus of disconnectedness, an emblem of the poststructuralist notion that 
meaning is an effect of difference. Ultimately, such a constitutive disjunction pervading 
the hermeneutic field guarantees that Hamlet produces nothing but ‘ambiguity’ and 
‘incoherence’. 
 However, this type of conclusion has been challenged repeatedly, notably by 
German thinkers associated with the Frankfurt School of criticism. In Aesthetic Theory, 
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Theodor Adorno writes: ‘no message is to be squeezed out of Hamlet; this in no way 
impinges on its truth content.’90 Far from asserting a unique and timeless meaning, the 
‘truth content’ of a work of art, for Adorno, corresponds to that which must be 
reinterpreted from generation to generation, in the light of the perpetual transformation 
of cultural and linguistic assumptions. In his essay ‘Hamlet and the Present’, Hugh 
Grady develops this idea: 
We can never […] abstract a ‘timeless’ meaning of the text underneath the 
changing play of historical interpretations, but we can and must posit an 
objectivity of the text which, however, is not directly and unproblematically 
available to us, but which reveals itself negatively, in the text’s resistance to 
certain interpretive schemas.91 
In contrast with most historicist practices (old or new), this type of approach reaffirms 
the value of multiple interpretations. Thus, it is the text’s ‘resistance to certain 
interpretive schemas’ that allows us to ‘posit’ its ‘objectivity’. But, as Grady 
emphasises, the objectivity of the text is not directly available to us: rather, it ‘reveals 
itself negatively’. Ultimately, the truth content emerges through the complex interplay 
of a multiplicity of critical positions in different time periods and cultures that both 
contradict and complement one another. From this perspective, looking at a wide array 
of critical interpretations of Hamlet can allow us to comprehend how it resists certain 
interpretive schemas—and there is a very real possibility that it resists all of them. 
One of the conclusions that can be drawn from this chapter, though, is that the 
play is particularly resilient to historical foreclosure: this can be inferred from the 
countless attempts at identifying Hamlet with a specific early modern figure. Piled up 
together, all the historical elucidations of Hamlet help us make out what we might call 
the text’s hermeneutic ‘field of resistance’—which might very well be total. However, 
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the aim is not to posit an umpteenth explanation of Hamlet presenting itself as definitive, 
as opposed to previous interpretations having ‘missed the point’. Instead, we might 
want to recognise the extent to which the multiplicity of interpretations inherently 
participates in the aesthetic tableau of a work of art. This is especially relevant to 
Hamlet, in the light of the interpretive ocean which not only surrounds it but in fact 
constitutes its hermeneutic essence. The overwhelming predominance of 
interpretation—over, say, authorial intention—in the experiential field of the play 
guarantees that virtually anything is possible. This idea was theorised by Walter 
Benjamin in The Origin of German Tragic Drama (1928)—a study of a particular form 
of tragic drama from the seventeenth century, the Trauerspiel (which is often translated 
as ‘tragic drama’). This landmark theoretical work defines the Trauerspiel with regard 
to a specific aesthetic technique referred to as ‘allegory’. In Benjamin’s sense, allegory 
has wider implications than the literary trope it is traditionally known as: in his own 
words, allegory constructs a form in which ‘any person, any object, any relationship can 
mean anything else.’92 This is strikingly relevant to the hermeneutic field of Hamlet, 
where anything can indeed mean anything else (as more than three centuries of more or 
less arbitrary interpretation clearly testify). In this sense, it does not really come as a 
surprise that Hamlet is acknowledged as the proto-Trauerspiel in The Origin of Tragic 
Drama—although Benjamin deliberately focuses on more obscure German plays for the 
purposes of his study. 
However, Benjaminian allegory has more subtle implications that reach beyond 
sheer arbitrariness. In The Arcades Project (a later, unfinished project), Benjamin noted: 
Allegory has to do, precisely in its destructive furor, with dispelling the illusion 
that proceeds from all ‘given order’, whether of art or of life: the illusion of 
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totality or of organic wholeness which transfigures that order and makes it seem 
endurable. And this is the progressive tendency of allegory.93 
At odds with the Romantic idea of organic unity, allegory emphasises the absence of 
‘given order’; it implies that the aesthetic space of a work of art is filled up through the 
accumulation of a series of fragments. Fragmentation is the key notion to understanding 
how allegory works for Benjamin: in The Origin of German Tragic Drama, he observes 
that ‘it is common practice in the literature of the baroque to pile up fragments 
ceaselessly, without any strict idea of a goal.’94 In the end, allegory involves both 
fragmentation and a resistance to totalisation. As Grady remarks in Shakespeare and 
Impure Aesthetics: 
The term refers both to the overall non-organic unity created by this poetic trope 
as well as the individual units—the ‘fragmented allegories’—which are 
‘amalgamated’ into a dissonant unity. An emptied world creative of a profligacy 
of signification and a rejection of organic unity in favour of a (dis-)unity of 
accumulated fragments—these are the two negative principles which make up 
the most original and most enabling aspects of Benjamin’s singular theory of the 
baroque allegory.95 
Although allegory is characterised by fragmentation and chaos, it also allows a 
multiplicity of meanings, which become ‘amalgamated into a dissonant unity’. Thus, 
allegory leaves room for ‘layered, multiple meanings, meanings which overlay each 
other, are not identical with each other nor capable of being organically unified with 
each other, but which do not cancel each other out,’ Grady and Cary DiPietro remark.96 
In their own way, the multiple meanings produced by the countless critical 
interpretations of Hamlet obey an allegorical logic: while never organically unified with 
one another, they are also incapable of cancelling one another out; this is particularly 
obvious in the attempts at identifying Hamlet with a single historical figure. The reason 
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that no one interpretation of Hamlet can prevail is that they are all imperfect—the 
semantic core which they invoke is irretrievable or perhaps even inexistent. Ultimately, 
this absence of a positive, directly identifiable truth content is precisely what comes to 
define the artwork’s aesthetics. Taken together, all the interpretations of Hamlet acquire 
an aesthetic value through their very imperfection. In this sense, Hamlet’s meaning does 
not extend beyond an infinite series of imperfect re-presentations—critical, but also 
textual and theatrical. In spite of their mediating function (like the witches in Macbeth, 
they are ‘imperfect speakers’) those manifestations, seen as a whole, can be said to 
convey a perfection of their own (1.3.68). This paradox is alluded to by a character in 
Haruki Murakami’s novel Kafka on the Shore. Listening to Franz Schubert’s D major 
piano sonata while driving his car, Oshima recognises that ‘a certain type of perfection 
can only be realised through a limitless accumulation of the imperfect.’ As there is no 
perfect rendition of Schubert’s D major, there is no perfect rendition of Shakespeare’s 
Hamlet. But the ‘imperfect performances’, as Oshima calls them, do not need to be 
completed: together, they create a dissonant symphony, perfect in its own idiosyncratic 
way. 
 
CONCLUSION 
In one of her diary entries, Susan Sontag noted that ‘Benjamin is neither a literary critic 
nor philosopher but an atheist theologian practicing his hermeneutical skills on 
culture.’97 Benjamin’s distinct critical stance, referred to by Sontag as that of an ‘atheist 
theologian’, works miracles on literature: through his theory of allegory, the fragmented 
meanings of Hamlet ultimately turn out to be meaningful fragments. Viewed together, 
those isolated fragments form a radically unhomogenisable whole that posits an 
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aesthetics of division. As suggested throughout the chapter, this fragmentation should 
not be seen as a mere effect of the criticism. Not a secondary operation, the criticism of 
Hamlet rather seems to define the meaning of the play negatively. The possibility of an 
overarching, positively-invested meaning is forever deferred through the perpetual 
semantic reactualisation of Hamlet in the moving present of criticism. From a 
psychoanalytical point of view, ‘Hamlet lacks “organic unity” because it is never 
complete, because it shares the structures of interminable desiring,’ Grady points out.98 
In his seminar on Hamlet, Jacques Lacan posits the endless deferral of desire as the 
intrinsic diegetic framework of the play. This structure is identified through the notion 
of the ‘phallus’, first developed by Sigmund Freud. The phallus, as it figures in 
Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalytical discourses, should not be confused with an 
anatomical organ—as ‘the image of the penis,’ the phallus is ‘negativity in its place in 
the specular image,’ Lacan points out in his Écrits.99 Thus, the phallus is a symbolic 
signifier that refers to that which cannot be held: it is ‘the signifier of the desire of the 
Other.’100 Lacan specifies that subjects are defined through their symbolic function of 
either being or having the phallus: ‘one may, simply by reference to the function of the 
phallus, indicate the structures that will govern the relations between the sexes. Let us 
say that these relations will turn around a “to be” and a “to have”.’101 Men, he goes on 
to explain, are positioned as men insofar as they are seen to have the phallus; and 
women, not having the phallus, are seen to be the phallus—‘it is the absence of the 
penis that turns [them] into the phallus, the object of desire.’102 And ‘it is not by being 
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foreclosed to the penis, but by having to be the phallus that the patient is doomed to 
become a woman.’103 
In ‘Desire and the Interpretation of Desire in Hamlet’, Lacan explores the 
function of the phallus in Shakespeare’s play. At the beginning of the seminar, Ophelia 
(‘that piece of bait’) is identified as a desired object—‘The Object Ophelia.’ 104 
Significantly, Lacan points out that the name Ophelia encrypts the word ‘phallus’: 
‘Ophelia is O phallus.’105 But in his analysis of the play, and as Grady notes, ‘Ophelia is 
only the first term in an extended series of objects of desire, expressing the concept of 
the phallus.’ Thus, Lacan’s seminar on Hamlet 
traces a chain of such desired objects throughout the play, defining a structure of 
continual deferment, as Hamlet attempts through a series of ineffectual activities 
(pretending madness, commissioning a drama, killing the wrong man) to find the 
missing phallus, the object of desire—which we know is in some sense ‘really’ 
embodied in Claudius.106 
But if the phallus is ‘really’ embodied in Claudius, as Lacan suggests, it is precisely to 
the extent that Hamlet does not recognise it as such. Unacknowledged by the central 
protagonist (and this is the key), ‘Claudius’s real phallus is always somewhere in the 
picture,’ Lacan observes. If ‘the phallus to be struck at is real indeed,’ this explains why 
‘Hamlet always stops’ before striking the man who killed his father—as exemplified in 
the prayer scene, examined earlier in this chapter. Lacan concludes his seminar on 
Hamlet by pointing out that ‘one cannot strike the phallus, because the phallus, even the 
real phallus, is a ghost.’107 This comment reveals the most important feature of the 
phallus, namely the fact that it cannot be grasped (such ungraspability is precisely what 
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makes it the phallus). The concept of the phallus theorises the constitutive displacement 
that characterises the subjective dynamics of Lacanian psychoanalysis. Lacan’s famous 
(and equally misunderstood) axiom that ‘desire is always the desire of the Other’ 
implies that desire is the expression of a fundamental lack in the subject, which can only 
enjoy through a figure of ‘the Other’ (with a capital ‘O’).108 The Other stands for the 
sense that there is no direct, unmediated relation between subjects and jouissance—
often translated in English as ‘enjoyment’, for lack of a better term. The idea that 
enjoyment is by essence mediated, taken care of by a figure of the Other is explored in 
the next two chapters. As the thesis goes on to demonstrate, the systematic deferral of 
enjoyment on to another instance, and more importantly the dramatisation of this 
structure, constitutes the heart and soul of the untimely aesthetics of Shakespearean 
drama. In the next chapter, the staging of the Other is presented as a major dramatic 
locus of Henry V. 
                                                
108 Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-analysis, edited by Jacques-Alain Miller, 
translated from the French by Alan Sheridan (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1977), p. 235. 
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INTRODUCTORY NOTE 
The last two chapters explored the untimely aesthetics of Shakespearean drama through 
antagonistic subjective modes. By considering ‘us’ (qua undifferentiated perceiving 
mass) as the subjects of Julius Caesar, Chapter 2 deployed an essentialistic critical 
strategy that paved the way for an investigation of the theme of untimeliness within the 
psychic realm of the play. Chapter 3 suggested that this perceived psychological 
dimension cannot be located within the play ‘in itself’ for the reason that the very idea 
of a play ‘in itself’ remains ultimately an ungraspable fantasy. Through the example of 
Hamlet, the chapter implied that the subjectivity we invest in literary characters is an 
effect of interpretation in the perpetually moving present of criticism. In his seminar on 
the play (addressed at the end of the previous chapter), Jacques Lacan remarked that the 
meaning of Hamlet relies on a structure of endless deferral of desire. Lacan articulates 
this aesthetically significant non-presence through the notion of the ‘phallus’. As 
pointed out earlier, the phallus is pure negativity in that it represents that which cannot 
be held—as such, it testifies to Lacan’s key axiom that desire is always the desire of the 
Other.1 
 Closely related to the phallus, Lacan’s notion of the ‘big Other’ provides the 
central theoretical framework for the next two chapters. First of all, the big Other should 
not be mistaken for a fixed, human-like entity; rather, it is the symbolic instance that 
regulates intersubjective relations and therefore constitutes the unwritten rules of every 
social order. Following the same logic as the phallus, the big Other remains by essence 
elusive, beyond language, thus testifying to the constitutive displacement that underlies 
subjectivity: the ‘true Others’ or ‘true subjects,’ as Lacan calls them, ‘are on the other 
                                                
1 For a more thorough examination of the concept of the phallus as Lacan understands it, see the 
conclusion to the previous chapter, ‘“Imperfect Performances”: Fragmented Meanings and Meaningful 
Fragments in Hamlet’. 
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side of the wall of language, there where in principle I never reach them.’2 With a large 
focus on Henry V, Chapter 4 examines the intersubjective relation that binds the Chorus 
with the inscrutable audience it attempts to contact throughout the play. The chapter 
challenges the almost systematic identification in the criticism of the play, on the plane 
of subjectivity, with this audience. In order to emphasise the phantasmatic core that 
shapes the audience haunting the Chorus, the chapter treats the latter as the main subject 
of discourse in Henry V. Through a strategic use of linguistic markers of presence, the 
Chorus attempts to circumscribe its audience in space and time. However, this specific 
audience—along with the spatio-temporal location that is assigned to it—remains 
fundamentally unstable. At the same time, the chapter argues, this ghostly audience 
occupies a crucial position in the symbolic reality that the Chorus navigates: that of the 
big Other. Ultimately, such an insubstantial construct (precisely insofar as it stands for 
Lacan’s ‘true Others’ or ‘true subjects’) appears as the key instance upholding the 
Chorus’s fantasy of historical presence. This idea of a fantasy of historical presence 
underlying the Chorus’s symbolic picture is developed and thoroughly examined in 
Chapter 4. 
 In contrast to the subjectivity adopted in Chapter 4, Chapter 5 returns to what 
might perhaps be viewed as a more traditional subjective mode by considering ‘us’ 
(what critics generally refer to as ‘the audience’) as the subjects of representation. It 
should be noted that the ‘we’ that is used in Chapter 5 differs from the all-encompassing 
‘we’ that featured in the chapter on Julius Caesar. Instead, it is self-consciously 
determined by a specific historical bias—that of early twenty-first century 
technologically advanced societies. Following the chapter on Henry V, this shift in 
                                                
2 Jacques Lacan, ‘Introduction of the Big Other’ (1955), The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book II, The Ego 
in Freud’s Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis, 1954-1955 [1978], edited by Jacques-Alain 
Miller, translated from the French by Sylvana Tomaselli (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 
235-47, p. 244. 
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subjectivity allows Lacan’s big Other to be examined from a different angle. Such a 
shift, in itself, also illustrates the elusive quality of this instance, which cannot be 
confined to a single or definitive subjective context—in fact, and because of its ever-
shifting nature, the concept of the big Other can only be comprehended through a 
systematic recasting of the subjective context of interpretation. The displacement of the 
subjective focus back onto ‘us’ demonstrates that, from our perspective as viewing 
subjects, the big Other is the instance that looks at ‘us’ precisely from the point we are 
looking at. This scrutinising instance reveals the ghostly presence of a gaze that 
circumscribes us within the space of representation. In Shakespeare’s plays, such a 
shifting, ‘subjectifying’ gaze can be located in the Ghost in Hamlet, in the witches in 
Macbeth and in the Chorus in Henry V. Accordingly, Chapter 5 examines these three 
instances through the theoretical lens of the big Other.3 The example of Henry V is 
particularly significant in this context as it shows that the Chorus can be viewed either 
as the subject of representation or as the big Other, depending on the subjective bias we 
choose to adopt. 
In many ways, Chapter 5 is a response to the conflicting subjectivities explored 
in previous chapters. While Chapter 2 undermined exclusively historical approaches, 
Chapter 4 shows the intrinsic limitations of a ‘strictly textual’ literary criticism. The 
ultimate aim of this ‘double refusal’ is to suggest that the established gap between those 
two radical modes of experience is essentially a ‘false alternative,’ to use Slavoj Žižek’s 
phrase. In The Plague of Fantasies (1997), Žižek writes about what he calls ‘the false 
alternative between “naïve historicist realism” and “discursive idealism”.’ This artificial 
split, Žižek notes, is articulated around the notion of fetishism: ‘for historicist realists, 
discursive idealism fetishizes the “prison-house of language”, while for discursivists, 
                                                
3 The concept of ‘subjectification’, coined by Michel Foucault, is addressed in Chapter 4, ‘“O my 
Democratic Friends”: Henry V and the Performance of Presence’. 
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every notion of pre-discursive reality is to be denounced as a “fetish”.’ Thus, at first 
glance, ‘it may seem that this split simply indicates the opposition between materialism 
[…] and idealism’; but ‘on closer inspection, however, these two opposed poles reveal a 
profound hidden solidarity, a shared conceptual matrix or framework.’ What underlies 
this shared conceptual matrix is the notion of fetishism, invoked by proponents of 
radical discursivism and radical historicism alike in order to antagonise one another. 
Eventually, Žižek wonders: ‘how are we to conceive of some “immediacy” which 
would not act as a “reified” fetishistic screen, obfuscating the process which generates 
it?’ Firstly, we have to recognise that ‘our access to [what we refer to as] “reality” is 
always-already “mediated” by the symbolic process’—this recognition lies at the heart 
of Chapter 5. Secondly, Žižek observes that ‘it is crucial to bear in mind the distinction 
between reality and the Real.’ Lacanian psychoanalysis is articulated around three 
psychic structures: the orders of the Imaginary, the Symbolic and the Real. The Real is 
to be understood in direct opposition to what we experience as ‘real’ (and is in fact 
invariably mediated)—what we call ‘reality’ in everyday life corresponds to the 
Symbolic order. The Real is impossible because it is impossible to imagine, impossible 
to integrate into the Symbolic order. In this sense, the only way of experiencing the Real 
is through traumatic gaps in the Symbolic order. Thus, Žižek remarks: 
The Real as ‘impossible’ is precisely the excess of ‘immediacy’ which cannot be 
‘reified’ in a fetish, the unfathomable X which, although nowhere present, 
curves/distorts any space of symbolic representation and condemns it to ultimate 
failure. If we are to discern the contours of this Real, we cannot avoid the 
meanderings of the notion of fetishism.4 
Chapter 5 engages substantially with Žižek’s theories, which build on Lacan’s 
insights by connecting them with specific instances of contemporary popular culture. 
Žižek repeatedly emphasises the key function of the big Other in the process of 
                                                
4 Slavoj Žižek, The Plague of Fantasies (London and New York: Verso, 2008), pp. 123-24. 
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enjoyment: what the big Other stands for, in the context of staged entertainment, is the 
inherently mediated quality of enjoyment. From a theoretical perspective, the chapter 
investigates the notion that enjoyment is not an intrinsic feature of the subject, that it 
does not take place on its own. Rather, and as Žižek notes, it is taken charge of by an 
exterior instance—the big Other is ‘the agency that decides instead of us, in our place.’5 
In recent theoretical debates, the core of deferral that underlies the process of enjoyment 
has been addressed through the notion of ‘interpassivity’. Interpassivity specifically 
deals with how the subject’s own self or emotions can be transferred onto another 
instance. Henry V provides a powerful example of interpassivity: through repeated 
injunctions, the Chorus literally enjoys the play for us—in other words, our own 
emotions are projected onto the Chorus. In this final chapter, Shakespearean drama 
figures as a crucial example of interpassivity. Henry V, in particular, illustrates the 
extent to which mass entertainment (which obviously includes theatre) is always and 
inherently mediated. In this sense, the untimely aesthetics of Shakespearean drama can 
help us identify and reflect on the politics of extreme mediation that underlies the 
contemporary entertainment industry. And, conversely, examples drawn from our own 
present can illustrate the notion of untimely aesthetics, which the thesis has identified as 
a central feature of Shakespeare’s works. 
                                                
5 Slavoj Žižek, Looking Awry: An Introduction to Jacques Lacan through Popular Culture (Cambridge 
MA, London: MIT Press, 1991), p. 77. 
 170 
CHAPTER 4 – ‘O MY DEMOCRATIC FRIENDS’: HENRY V AND THE 
PERFORMANCE OF PRESENCE 
 
 
 
‘“I embrace ALL,” says Whitman. “I weave all things into myself.”’ 
[…] 
‘Who is he that demands petty definition? Let him behold me sitting in a kayak.’ 
‘I behold no such thing. I behold a rather fat old man full of a rather senile, self-conscious 
sensuosity.’ 
‘DEMOCRACY. EN MASSE. ONE IDENTITY.’ 
   – David Herbert Lawrence, ‘Whitman, the American Teacher’1 
 
 
‘O my democratic friends…’ 
– Jacques Derrida, The Politics of Friendship2 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 2 addressed the quaint idea that, underlying literary texts, there is a universal 
demand that we willingly suspend our disbelief so that the world of fiction can become 
‘real’. As pointed out already, this idea is often acknowledged in Shakespeare’s plays 
themselves—for the magic to operate, ‘It is required / You do awake your faith,’ 
Paulina warns her audiences at the end of The Winter’s Tale (5.3.94-95). For the 
purposes of the analysis, the chapter deliberately adopted what might be considered a 
naïve approach by treating the characters of Julius Caesar as ‘real’ human beings (as 
opposed to the fictional constructs literary characters are generally understood to be in 
most contemporary criticism). This self-imposed critical bias elicited a recognition that 
the psychic world of the play is haunted by a core of untimeliness, the main effect of 
which is to negate presence. 
                                                
1 David Herbert Lawrence, ‘Whitman, the American Teacher’, The Americanness of Walt Whitman 
(Lexington MA: Daniel Collamore Heath and Company, 1960), p. 91. 
2 Jacques Derrida, The Politics of Friendship [1994], translated from the French by George Collins 
(London and New York: Verso, 2005), p. 306. 
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 In Henry V, the Chorus asks potential viewers of the play to ‘piece out our 
imperfections with [their] thoughts’ (Prologue.23). This is another striking instance, in 
Shakespearean drama, of a character requiring a hypothetical audience to bridge the gap, 
through intellectual effort, between (so-called) fiction and (so-called) reality. The 
critical method adopted in the present chapter contrasts sharply with the one used in the 
chapter on Julius Caesar. The analysis of Henry V that is here deployed is characterised 
by what might be referred to as a ‘radical’ shift in subjectivity—although such a shift 
can only be said to be radical in view of the early modern historical bias that saturates 
the play’s interpretive field. Generally relying on a fixed subjective grid, historicist 
criticism typically identifies with the experimental audience posited by the Chorus. In 
his widely influential essay on Henry IV and Henry V, ‘Invisible Bullets’, Stephen 
Greenblatt writes: 
Again and again […] we are tantalised by the possibility of an escape from 
theatricality and hence from the constant pressure of improvisational power, but 
we are, after all, in the theatre, and our pleasure depends upon the fact that there 
is no escape, and our applause ratifies the triumph of our confinement.3 
By identifying with a specific audience (‘we’) that is presented as confined ‘in the 
theatre’, Greenblatt essentially rehearses the Chorus’s claims in Henry V. Confining its 
audience ‘within the girdle of these walls’ (the walls of an imaginary playhouse), the 
Chorus repeatedly implies that there is no escape from theatricality (Prologue.19). As 
the chapter sets out to demonstrate, the ‘we’ used by many critics, along with the phrase 
‘the audience’, can be problematic because it collapses fact and fiction within a fixed, 
homogeneous spatio-temporal continuum. 
Accordingly, one of the key aims here is to challenge the assumption that there 
can be such a thing as a stable audience. The Chorus is considered as the main subject 
                                                
3 Stephen Greenblatt, ‘Invisible Bullets: Renaissance Authority and its Subversion, Henry IV and Henry 
V’, in Political Shakespeare: Essays in Cultural Materialism [1985], second edition, edited by Jonathan 
Dollimore and Alan Sinfield (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1994), p. 34. 
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of the play, as opposed to ‘us’ qua always already identified audience—the subject par 
défaut in the vast majority of the criticism of Henry V (and of Shakespeare criticism at 
large). Being on the side of the Chorus, it is here assumed, can throw a new light on the 
‘audience’ phenomenon that is repeatedly taken for granted in its speeches. Keeping this 
idea in mind, the chapter pays close attention to the linguistic markers contained within 
the Chorus’s utterances. The main function of these markers, it is suggested, is to 
conjure up a specific historical narrative: that of a geographically and temporally fixed 
theatrical performance. While asserting a core of historical presence, the linguistic 
markers also reveal the elusive nature of the anchoring point posited in the Chorus’s 
narrative. In this sense, Henry V can be said to question its own presence; as such, the 
play provides another instance of the aesthetics of untimeliness that are explored in this 
thesis as a key feature of Shakespearean drama. Ultimately, the sense of dramatic 
alienation that can be experienced in the play opens up a theoretical reflection on 
presence and subjectivity. Viewed in the light of the intersubjective relation that binds 
the Chorus with its fantasised audience, Jacques Lacan’s concept of the big Other 
illustrates the extent to which literary subjectivity is always, and fundamentally, 
displaced. 
 
I- CHORUS: THE GREAT PERFORMER OF PRESENCE 
A. HISTORICIST HENRY V AND THE ‘STRICTLY TEXTUAL’ ALTERNATIVE 
In early March 1599, Queen Elizabeth appointed the Earl of Essex as Lord Lieutenant 
of Ireland. Later that month, Essex set off for Ireland with orders to crush the rebellion 
led by the Earl of Tyrone.4 Editors generally agree that 1599 was also the year 
                                                
4 With unusual precision, English chronicles record Essex’s departure from London on 27th March amidst 
scenes of triumphal celebration: ‘He took in Seeding Lane, and from thence being accompanied with 
divers noblemen and many others, himself very plainly attired, rode through Grace-church Street, 
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Shakespeare wrote the draft of Henry V that became the first folio text.5 Underlying the 
dating of the play is the widely accepted idea that it mirrors topical Elizabethan events.6 
Because of its English historical background, Henry V often constitutes a privileged pre-
text for the untimely intrusion of Elizabethan politics into the play. Although it does not 
feature in The Famous Victories of Henry V (Shakespeare’s main literary source for 
Henry V), ‘Ireland […] haunts Shakespeare’s play,’ where it ‘seeps […] at the most 
unexpected and sometimes unintended moments,’ James Shapiro notes in 1599: A Year 
in the Life of William Shakespeare.7 For Shapiro, Ireland intrudes into the play in the 
mode of the return of the repressed. In Act III, for instance, the English captain Gower 
speaks of a soldier who wears ‘a beard of the General’s cut’—a line that is customarily 
glossed as an allusion to Essex’s distinctive square-cut beard (3.6.71).8 At the end of the 
play, the Queen of France greets Henry by calling him ‘brother Ireland’—‘a revealing 
textual error,’ Gary Taylor remarks in the Oxford edition of the play (5.2.12).9 
Following Taylor, Shapiro argues that ‘the mistake is not the nervous Queen’s but 
                                                                                                                                          
Cornhill, Cheapside, and other high streets, in all which places and in the fields, the people pressed 
exceedingly to behold him, especially in the highway, for more than four miles’ space crying and saying, 
“God bless your Lordship, God preserve your honour”, etc.; and some followed him till the evening, only 
to behold him’ (The Annals or General Chronicles of England, begun first by Master John Stow, and 
after him continued and augmented […] until the end of this present year 1614, by Edmund Howes (1615), 
cited in Gary Taylor, ‘Introduction’, Henry V, edited by Gary Taylor (New York: Oxford, 1982), p. 5). 
5 Andrew Gurr, ‘Introduction’, King Henry V, second edition, edited by Andrew Gurr (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 1-6. Gurr also thinks that the play was staged by the 
Chamberlain’s Men at the Globe theatre in the same year—although this is based solely on intra-textual 
evidence. Only two references to performances of Henry V in Shakespeare’s time survive: one of them is 
the statement, on the title-page of the quarto, that the play ‘hath bene sundry times playd’ by the Lord 
Chamberlain’s men; the other is an entry in the Revels Account recording one performance at court on 7th 
January 1605 (for a copy of the quarto title-page, see Gurr, ‘Textual Analysis’, p. 226). 
6 Taylor, ‘Introduction’, pp. 4-5. 
7 James Shapiro, 1599: A Year in the Life of William Shakespeare (London: Faber, 2005), p. 100. 
8 In his footnote to the line, Gurr notes that ‘the Essex expedition to Cadiz in 1596 created a fashion for 
“Cadiz beards”, square instead of the usual pointed shape, in imitation of Essex’ (King Henry V, p. 145n). 
For a comprehensive account of all the references to Ireland in the play and their alleged topicality, see 
Ann Kaegi, ‘Introduction’, Henry V, edited by Arthur Raleigh Humphreys [1968], revised by Ann Kaegi 
(London: Penguin, 2010), pp. xxxi-xxxiii. 
9 Taylor, ‘Introduction’, p. 7. The First Folio’s ‘brother Ireland’ is amended to ‘brother England’ from the 
Second Folio onwards (1632). 
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Shakespeare’s, who slipped when intending to write “brother England” (and whose 
error modern editors silently correct).’10 In the light of Elizabethan history, Henry’s 
anachronistic pledge to Katherine in the same scene—‘Ireland is thine’—does impart 
the feeling that the Irish conflict is boiling under the medieval surface of the play 
(5.2.222). In their essay on ‘History and Ideology’ in Henry V, Jonathan Dollimore and 
Alan Sinfield specifically see ‘the attempt to conquer France at the end of the play as re-
presentation of the attempt to conquer Ireland and the hoped-for unity for Britain.’ Thus, 
for cultural materialists, ‘the play is fascinating precisely to the extent that it is 
implicated in and can be read to disclose both the struggles of its own historical moment 
and their ideological representation.’11 
At the beginning of Act V, the Chorus invokes a monumental vision of 
the General of our gracious Empress, 
[…] from Ireland coming, 
Bringing rebellion broachèd on his sword. 
(5.0.30-2) 
This passage is unanimously considered as one of Shakespeare’s most topical references 
to Elizabethan politics. The New Cambridge edition of Henry V is based on the premise 
that it is ‘almost certainly a reference to the Earl of Essex’s campaign in Ireland’; as 
such, it features as a central piece of evidence for the dating of the play.12 Even more 
striking is the core postulate in the Oxford edition that ‘the allusion to the Irish 
expedition […] is the only explicit, extra-dramatic, incontestable reference to a 
contemporary event anywhere in the canon.’13 The intrusion of Essex’s Irish campaign 
                                                
10 Shapiro, 1599, p. 100. 
11 Jonathan Dollimore and Alan Sinfield, ‘History and Ideology: The Instance of Henry V’, in Alternative 
Shakespeares, second edition, edited by John Drakakis (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), p. 229. 
See also Philip Edwards, Threshold of a Nation: A Study in English and Irish Drama (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 74-86. 
12 Gurr, ‘Introduction’, p. 1. 
13 Taylor, ‘Introduction’, p. 7. 
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in the Chorus’s narrative is the characteristic cynosure of most recent editions of Henry 
V. The fact that a single historical episode can provide the hermeneutic framework of 
entire editorial projects has crucial implications. From a critical point of view, this 
particular bias testifies to the overarching status of new historicism in Shakespeare 
studies. As demonstrated in previous chapters, the intrinsic limitation of strictly 
historical accounts of literary works is history itself: once we step out of their historical 
point of reference, such accounts inevitably lose their relevance. A good example would 
be Taylor’s introduction to his edition of the play, which opens with the sweeping 
statement that ‘no one bored by war will be interested in Henry V.’14 The widespread 
but clearly questionable assumption that Henry V is fundamentally a ‘war play’ has 
been conditioned by a steady process of historical saturation—whose founding act is 
probably the assignment of the play to the category of the ‘Histories’ in the first folio’s 
‘Catalogue’ section.15 It is easy to forget that most of the ‘war’ going on in the play is 
crammed within the Chorus’s speeches and does not extend beyond them. In fact, and 
as Ann Kaegi points out concisely in her introduction to the Penguin edition, there is 
hardly any ‘war’ at all in Henry V: 
If we believe we have witnessed the re-enactment of an epic conflict, that is 
either because the Chorus has conjured up a vivid impression of the clash of 
armies in our minds or because elaborate battle scenes have been devised for 
performance. That Henry V should be known as Shakespeare’s war play when it 
contains relatively few scenes of combat, and those few are at odds with the 
stuff of legend and the Chorus’s rousing account of an epic struggle, is one of 
many paradoxes that mark the play’s reception.16 
For most contemporary editors, the Chorus of Henry V constitutes a landmark 
intrusion of Elizabethan history within the literary framework of Shakespearean drama. 
                                                
14 Ibid., p. 1. 
15 See The Norton Facsimile: The First Folio of Shakespeare (Based on Folios in the Folger Shakespeare 
Library Collection), second edition, prepared by Charlton Hinman, with a new introduction by Peter 
Blayney (New York and London: Norton, 1996), p. 13. 
16 Kaegi, ‘Introduction’, p. xxiii. 
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Presenting the play in such a historically-tinted light can only have a tremendous impact 
on readers and audiences and how they make sense of the work—the Chorus becomes a 
transcendental entity that seemingly provides unimpeded access to Shakespeare’s 
historical moment. Considering the historical figure of the Earl of Essex, Andrew Gurr 
argues that ‘the Chorus was written for his time and only for his time’ and that it ‘relates 
uniquely to the period when the play was first composed.’17 Such a narrow historical 
bias severely limits the potential for meaning of Henry V. In order to challenge some of 
the historicist assumptions that have framed the interpretive field of the play so far, the 
Chorus’s speeches are here approached from a ‘strictly textual’ perspective (if such a 
thing really exists). Far from asserting the supremacy of textuality over historicity, such 
a deliberate, self-imposed critical grid aims at questioning some of the ‘facts’ that are 
often taken for granted with regard to the relation between literature and history—in 
fact, a key implication of the chapter is the recognition that ‘strictly textual’ approaches 
to literature are bound by the very same limitations as ‘strictly historical’ accounts.18  
Literary objects always come to life through the medium of various cultural discourses, 
which not only shape their literariness but also impose their ideological biases on 
them.19 Like many other Shakespeare plays, Henry V is mired in a historicist discourse 
that makes its ultimate meaning contingent on late Elizabethan politics. However, and 
as this chapter sets out to demonstrate, the linguistic content of the Chorus’s utterances 
manifests an unbridgeable gap that is inherent to theatricality: the inexorable 
                                                
17 Gurr, ‘Introduction’, p. 6. Hamlet himself has been repeatedly identified by critics as a reflection of 
Essex, as made clear in the previous chapter on Hamlet, ‘“Imperfect Performances”: Fragmented 
Meanings and Meaningful Fragments in Hamlet’. 
18 In The Plague of Fantasies (1997), Slavoj Žižek refers to the alleged gap between ‘naïve historicist 
realism’ and ‘discursive idealism’ as a ‘false alternative’ (London and New York: Verso, 2008), p. 123). 
For a more detailed discussion of this notion, see the introductory note to this section of the thesis. 
19 Through the example of Hamlet, Chapter 3 explored the intrinsic ideological bias through which 
literature comes into being. A central concern in the present thesis is the sense that literary works only 
begin to exist through the activity of interpretation—which includes their representation in popular 
culture (i.e. not only on the stage or the page, strictly speaking). 
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disjointedness between a so-called original event and its representation. In spite of all its 
apparent efforts at conjuring up the past, the Chorus compulsively emphasises the 
failure of historical presence—and, in parallel, the same thing can be said about much 
historicist criticism of Henry V. 
 
 B. MEDIATED PRESENCE AND LOSS OF ORIGIN: HENRY V’S ALIENATION EFFECT 
Hamlet’s recommendation to the actors in Elsinore to ‘Suit the action to the word, the 
word to the action’ voices theatricality’s pivotal fantasy: perfect synchrony between 
word and action (Hamlet, 3.2.16-7). But conversely, what the remark implicitly 
formulates is the disjointedness inherent to all theatrical representation. As a general 
rule, the imperative mood points to an absence, a gap to be filled; it aims at bringing 
about something that is supposedly not here. Through its very utterance, Hamlet’s 
direction reveals that there is no such thing as absolute simultaneity between word and 
action: immediacy remains a characteristically elusive concept in the world of 
representation. However, pesence needs to be invoked by a specific instance so that 
potential audiences can enter theatre’s game of make-believe. Hamlet’s remark thus 
acknowledges a tacit rule of theatricality: the often unexamined idea that presence is 
always mediated. It is a characteristic feature of Shakespearean drama to draw attention 
to the processes through which it comes into existence. Theatre’s meditation on its 
asynchronous nature can be described in terms of what Bertolt Brecht called 
Verfremdungseffekt—often translated into English as ‘estrangement effect’ or 
‘alienation effect’.20 Brecht himself recognised the extent to which Shakespeare’s is ‘a 
                                                
20 See John Willett (editor and translator), Brecht on Theater (New York: Hill and Wang, 
1964), p. 91. 
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theatre full of alienation effects.’21 In Henry V, the Chorus elicits one of those typically 
Shakespearean alienation effects by repeatedly directing our attention towards the inside 
workings of the ‘history play’. Its emphatic rhetoric often conveys the opposite message 
of what it overtly purports to do. Its insistence on presence (i.e. the ‘actual’, or even 
factual, presence of what is invoked in its utterances), in particular, indicates the extent 
to which historical drama (but also literature) is haunted by the absence of the subject it 
purports to conjure up. As Brian Walsh notes, 
the Chorus troubles dramatic historiography through a devastating exposure of 
the theater’s representational inadequacy. Here and elsewhere the choral voice in 
Henry V crystallizes the tension between the desire to act out the past and the 
difficulty—even, perhaps, the absurdity—of doing so.22 
The difficulty or the absurdity of acting out the past in a so-called history play arises 
from what Walsh calls the ‘performative present,’ which corresponds to the registration 
of ‘the temporality of the theatrical event’ by an instance within the play or from the 
perspective of a contemporary audience.23 The term ‘contemporary’ here should be 
understood as referring to the moment of performance of the play—a moment that is by 
essence differential as it is anchored in the unstable now of performance (which, of 
course, includes reading as one of several different possible performative modes). Thus, 
what ruins the whole project of dramatic historiography is the recognition of the 
moment of performance as the point of origin from which the past is invoked. 
In Henry V, the registration of the performative present is effected by the Chorus, 
whose dramatic function can be described in terms of a systematic undermining of its 
own project of historical recuperation. Specifically, the failure of presence is epitomised 
                                                
21 Bertolt Brecht, Messingkauf Dialogues, translated from the German by John Willett (London: Methuen, 
1977), pp. 57-64. 
22 Brian Walsh, ‘“Unkind Division”: The Double Absence of Performing History in 1 Henry VI’, 
Shakespeare Quarterly 55(2) (2004), 119-47, p. 123. 
23 Ibid., pp. 120-21. Walsh notably suggests that, in Shakespeare’s so-called history plays, ‘history and 
performance are characterized […] as fraught, mutually destabilizing concepts.’ 
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in the endless slippage that takes place within the limits of the play’s semiotic chain. 
Through a compulsive use of linguistic markers of presence, the Chorus calls attention 
to its own incapacity to conjure up the past unmediated. The intrinsic disjointedness of 
representation is conveyed through deixis—a linguistic phenomenon whereby the 
meaning of certain words or phrases in an utterance is dependent on contextual 
information. Thus, words or phrases are deictic if their semantic meaning is fixed but 
their denotational meaning varies depending on time and/or place.24 Deictics do not 
mean anything on their own; rather, their meaning relies on anterior context. In Henry V, 
the deferral of denotational meaning culminates in the Chorus’s utterances. This deferral 
is crystallised in a particular line at the beginning of Act II, crucial for the purposes of 
the present chapter: ‘There is the playhouse now, there must you sit’ (2.0.36). In order 
to determine the denotational meaning of each individual sign in this line, it is 
imperative first to locate their point of reference within the textual boundaries of Henry 
V. However, it soon becomes clear that such an operation is impossible because these 
signs all refer to an absent context: in other words, their point of origin remains 
untraceable. The phrase ‘the playhouse’, for instance, points to an extra-textual context 
that is simply not available. Syntactically, the definite article ‘the’ has an anaphoric 
function—closely related to deixis, ‘an anaphor is a linguistic entity which indicates a 
referential tie to some other linguistic entity in the same text.’25 The Prologue (spoken 
by the Chorus) contains three phrases that could potentially provide the original 
referential tie of ‘the playhouse’: ‘this unworthy scaffold,’ ‘this cock-pit’, ‘this wooden 
O’ (10; 11; 12). Like the article ‘the’, the demonstrative article ‘this’ is anaphoric, 
which implies further anterior context. However, once we have worked our way from 
                                                
24 John Lyons, ‘Deixis, Space and Time’, Semantics, volume 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1977), pp. 636–724. 
25 Elena Tognini-Bonelli, Corpus Linguistics at Work (Amsterdam and Phildelphia PA: John Benjamins, 
2001), p. 68. 
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Act II back to the Prologue, we have reached the textual boundaries of the play and 
there is no more anterior context to examine. Rather than solving the ontological 
mystery of ‘the playhouse’, the three phrases in the Prologue defer it to a before that is 
unavailable. Through its crafty use of anaphora, the Chorus creates an illusion of 
presence. Indeed, shifters such as ‘this’ and ‘the’ typically drift beyond the text’s 
material reality—and there is virtually no measurable limit to their shifting. For the 
origin that should allow us to anchor their meaning cannot be located. 
 
C. GHOSTLY SEMIOSIS: THE INEXORABLE DRIFTING OF MEANING WITHIN THE TEXT 
AND BEYOND 
In linguistics, semiosis describes any process that involves signs, including the 
production of meaning. A close grammatological examination of the textual content of 
Henry V reveals that the play’s semiosis is characterised by a phenomenon of 
ghostliness—this is notably illustrated in the systematic drifting of the denotational 
meaning of the play’s anaphoric pronouns. The non-congruence between signifier and 
signified in the play also gestures towards a more general phenomenon of ghostliness 
haunting literature. Because of the inherent emphasis on the process of representation 
that underlies theatre, this asynchrony is particularly apparent in a play like Henry V. 
More than a dramatic technique, ‘in medias res’ describes the universal fate of anything 
that undergoes a process of representation. Representation is by essence incomplete 
because it necessarily falls short of a (supposedly) missing ‘original’ that can only be 
imitated or alluded to. Ultimately, what the ‘re’ of representation acknowledges is the 
secondary function of theatricality—its intrinsic ‘farcicality’, to put it in Marxian 
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terms.26 In Shakespearean theatrics, the structural alienation inherent in representation is 
integrated within the aesthetic form of the drama; this aestheticisation of untimeliness 
precisely culminates in metadramatic figures like that of the Chorus of Henry V. The 
first scene of Hamlet provides a graphic instance of theatre’s capacity to meditate on its 
own ghostliness. Before anything has ‘actually’ started (in the linguistic sense, at least), 
the sense of self-reflexivity culminates in the very first line of the play. ‘Who’s 
there?’—the sentinel’s question encapsulates the ontological trembling that haunts the 
semiotics of literature (Hamlet, 1.1.1). This much-quoted line encapsulates the 
reflection on representation and its possibility that is inherent in the experience of 
Hamlet: as such, the line stands for the aestheticisation of the asynchrony of 
representation in Shakespeare’s drama. Syntactically, the deictic adverb ‘there’ has no 
referential tie to an earlier linguistic entity; its appearance in the play’s very first line 
makes its drifting even more obvious. A possible (and perfectly sensible) response to 
the line would be: ‘Hang on, who’s where?’. From the beginning, there is a pervasive 
sense of confusion regarding identity and location. The first scene of Hamlet provides a 
meta-commentary on the disjointedness of representation by implying that there is 
always a gap between what is said and what actually happens in a play. This 
constitutive lack of simultaneity climaxes in a line spoken by Marcellus: ‘What, has this 
thing appeared again tonight?’ (1.1.19). By referring to something, or more precisely 
some thing, that has not appeared yet in the play, this line integrates the untimely as part 
of the dramatic structure of the play. Thus, the invoked ‘thing’, in its very absence, 
becomes a fascinating theatrical locus. For Jacques Derrida, Marcellus’ line testifies to 
the sensation that Hamlet is a play where ‘everything begins in the imminence of a re-
                                                
26 Karl Marx’s celebrated reference to the perennial repetition of history, ‘the first time as tragedy, the 
second as farce’ appears in The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte [1852] (Rockville MD: Wildside Press, 
2008), p. 15. 
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apparition, but a reapparition of the spectre as reapparition for the first time in the 
play.’27 The paradox of a ghost that comes back for the first time illustrates the 
perpetual slippage that takes place in the semiotic chain of Hamlet. Like the Chorus in 
Henry V, Hamlet’s ghost is a powerful metadramatic figure that symbolises the 
destabilisation of presence that underlies the experience of literature. 
The first scene (and often the very first line) of a Shakespeare play generally 
provides a good starting point to investigate the intrinsic disjointedness of theatre. This 
is certainly relevant in the case of Henry V. Preceding the ‘official’ first scene (1.1), the 
Chorus’s first intervention (Prologue) in the play epitomises the uncanny sense that the 
beginning is always already haunted. Every subsequent act is spooked in the same 
manner by a choric speech that breaks the play’s formal structure—interestingly, most 
editions categorise the speeches as ‘2.0’, ‘3.0’, ‘4.0’ and ‘5.0’. Crucially, the first scene 
of Henry V also features the first reference to the mysterious ‘playhouse’ that haunts the 
play. It is implied that the audience addressed by the Chorus in the Prologue—‘gentles 
all’—is in the know as to the precise nature of ‘this wooden O’ (8). In the particular 
context of theatrical performance, the ‘wooden O’ could perhaps be interpreted as a 
reference to whatever space the play is performed in—in this sense, the performance 
anchors the performative present. However, a strictly textual analysis of the play has to 
be more rigorous. As editors have emphasised, Shakespeare may well have been 
thinking about a specific London theatre when he included the reference to the ‘wooden 
O’—the recently revised Penguin edition formulates the historicist consensus that 
‘Shakespeare may refer to the existing Curtain Theatre or to the Globe, which was 
                                                
27 Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New 
International, translated from the French by Peggy Kamuf (New York and London: Routledge, 1994), 
p. 4. 
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under construction while he was writing the play.’28 However, from a discursive point 
of view, such a suggestion is problematic because it posits an artificial shortcut between 
literature and history without solving the mystery of the play’s ghostly semiotic chain. 
A systematic strategy of historicisation of literature can lead us to create facts from 
mere speculation. The most famous example is probably that of Macbeth, whose 
controversial critical history illustrates the inherent danger of historicising Shakespeare 
at any cost. It has often been argued that Macbeth was written on King James’ demand 
and that it was performed in front of the royal court in 1606 as a way of celebrating his 
sovereignty.29 Although there is no evidence for such claims, they are often taken for 
granted: editorial speculation has led to the creation of artificial gateways between text 
and historical facts. If the historicisation of literary texts has proven so appealing in 
recent times, it is perhaps because of the profound sense of cohesion it brings—
cohesion between a certain historical period and its literature, or between a certain 
literature and its historical period. But can literature and history ever be said to belong 
to one another or to coincide perfectly? 
                                                
28 Kaegi, p. 136n. 
29 In the late eighteenth century, Edmund Malone suggested that Macbeth might have been one of three 
plays performed at court in 1606 in the presence of King Christian of Denmark (Edmund Kerchever 
Chambers, The Elizabethan Stage, volume 4 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1923), p. 173). This hypothesis 
was revived in 1950 by Henry Neill Paul (The Royal Play of “Macbeth”: When, Why and How It Was 
Written by Shakespeare (New York: Octagon, 1971)). The Arden second series edition of the play (first 
published in 1951) provides a good example of the noxious impact of the ‘royal Macbeth’ theory on 
Shakespeare studies: the introduction refers to ‘the version performed at court in 1606’ as if it was an 
established fact (Kenneth Muir, ‘Introduction’, Macbeth, edited by Kenneth Muir (London: Arden, 1962), 
p. xiv). Contradicting Paul’s mid-century account, the more recent Oxford edition provides a timely 
reminder of what is known and what is not known about Macbeth: ‘for his central thesis, that the play was 
written by James’s command for performance at Hampton Court in August 1606, he had no evidence 
whatsoever’ (Nicholas Brooke, ‘Introduction’, Macbeth, edited by Nicholas Brooke (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1990), p. 72). In spite of the recognised lack of evidence, historicist critics still base 
whole narratives on the assumption that, on the 7th August 1606, ‘the King’s Men arrived with a play, 
probably Macbeth, designed to display their patron’s greatness to his fellow king’ (Alvin Kernan, 
Shakespeare, the King’s Playwright: Theater in the Stuart Court, 1603-1613, New Haven and London: 
Yale University Press, 1995), p. 75). 
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In Henry V, the possibility of synchronising history and its representation is 
questioned by the Chorus itself (despite the fact that its self-appointed job is precisely to 
convey such synchrony): 
Can this cock-pit hold 
The vasty fields of France? Or may we cram 
Within this wooden O the very casques 
That did affright the air at Agincourt? 
      (Prologue.11-14) 
This passage throws a shadow over the notion that an historical episode such as the 
fifteenth-century French campaigns of the English king Henry V (‘So great an object’) 
can be conjured up as a convincing theatrical event (11). The tone is grand and 
overblown; but the Chorus fails to conceal a deep-seated anxiety about the claims it 
makes. In Act IV, for instance, it describes its own representation of history as a 
‘mock’r[y]’—asking its audience to imagine ‘true things by what their mock’ries be’ 
(4.0.53). The Chorus also makes amends for the play’s supposedly poor rendition of 
what should be an epic moment of martial glory and apologises for the inadequate 
representation of ‘the battle,’ 
Where O for pity, we shall much disgrace, 
With four or five most vile and ragged foils 
Right ill-disposed in brawl ridiculous, 
The name of Agincourt. 
(48-52) 
Apologising for the ‘ridiculous’ battlefield confrontations it invokes, the Chorus 
emphasises the inherent distance between historical events and ‘their’ theatrical 
representation. It is rather significant that, with the exception of the ‘brawl ridiculous’ 
between Pistol and the Frenchman Le Fer (4.4), the play does not feature a single 
battlefield confrontation. In order to account for such omissions, the Chorus invokes 
th’excuse 
Of time, of numbers and due course of things 
Which cannot in their huge and proper life 
Be here presented. 
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(5.0.3-6) 
Once again, the occurrence of the shifter ‘here’, as the Chorus explains how difficult it 
is to ‘present’ historical feats ‘in their huge and proper life’, is hardly a coincidence: for 
indeed, they can only be re-presented. And such a re-presentation of history can only be 
achieved from a certain perspective in space and time. In the first folio of Henry V, the 
story is represented through the perspective of the Chorus, who, in spite of its 
apologetic tone, constantly tries to lure its audience into a fantasy of historical 
presence—it is worth noting here that there exists a less renowned version of the play, 
the first quarto, which does not feature a Chorus (the parallactic system formed by the 
first quarto and the first folio of Henry V is addressed later on in this chapter). In this 
sense, the main linguistic tool used by the Chorus to deploy its strategy is performativity. 
 
II- THE FAILURE OF PRESENCE IN HENRY V AND BEYOND 
 A. THE CHORUS’S ‘NOW’: PROBLEMATISING PRESENCE 
The English philosopher of language John Langshaw Austin describes performativity as 
a linguistic phenomenon whereby ‘the issuing of the utterance is the performing of an 
action.’ 30  In Henry V, the Chorus’s utterances provide a powerful example of 
performativity—in theory, at least. In theory then (that is, from the perspective of the 
Chorus), those utterances initiate the action by voicing events that are supposed to take 
place. However, such dream-like performativity is haunted by the self-defeating quality 
of the Chorus’s narrative. The performative sense culminates in the temporal deictic 
‘now’, which features no less than sixteen times over the six brief choruses. The 
repeated occurrence of this adverb in the Chorus’s second intervention—six times in the 
                                                
30 John Langshaw Austin, How to Do Things with Words [1962], second edition, edited by James Opie 
Urmson and Marina Sbisà (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1975), p. 6. 
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space of 42 lines—imparts a seeming sense of immediacy, as the following passage 
illustrates: 
Now all the youth of England are on fire, 
And silken dalliance in the wardrobe lies; 
Now thrive the armourers, and honour’s thought 
Reigns solely in the breast of every man. 
They sell the pasture now to buy the horse, 
Following the mirror of all Christian kings 
With wingèd heels, as English Mercuries. 
For now sits expectation in the air. 
     (2.0.1-8) 
On the level of narrative, the repetition of the adverb ‘now’, coupled with an assertive 
use of the present tense, imparts a strong sense of urgency. The accumulation of 
markers of presence suggests that everything the Chorus says is happening ‘right now’, 
in the performative present. The Chorus relies on the potential of words to instigate 
actions in order to convey authority over an audience. Thus, in the case of Henry V, 
performativity figures as a linguistic tool, the effect of which is to claim control over the 
representational process; this narrative strategy culminates at the end of the Chorus’s 
second speech, which takes a very abrupt turn: 
The sum is paid, the traitors are agreed, 
The King is set from London, and the scene 
Is now transported, gentles, to Southampton. 
There is the playhouse now, there must you sit. 
      (2.0.33-36) 
This passage contracts the historical narrative into an absurdly short and factual 
description; and once again, the repetitive syntax emphasises the ghostly semiosis that 
pervades the Chorus’s utterances. The repetition of the definite article ‘the’ and of the 
copula ‘to be’ creates an effect of immediacy (or ‘reality effect’), which becomes 
critical in the last line of the extract quoted above.31 
                                                
31 See Roland Barthes, ‘The Reality Effect’ (1968), in The Rustle of Language, translated from the French 
by Richard Howard (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), 141-48. 
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‘There is the playhouse now, there must you sit’. This particular line, mentioned 
earlier, cumulates an unusual number of markers of presence—space shifter ‘there’ 
(twice), copula ‘to be’, definite article ‘the’, temporal shifter ‘now’ and personal 
pronoun ‘you’. The line is crucial to the ongoing analysis insofar as it reveals the 
intrinsic limitations of the Chorus’s strategy of invocation of presence. Specifically, it 
illustrates the extent to which the fantasy of proximity underlying the choric syntax is 
inevitably flawed. First of all, the Chorus’s commanding ‘now’ falls short of being a 
universal ‘now’ that applies to all audiences, in all contexts, at all times (as Georg 
Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel writes in his Phenomenology of Spirit, ‘the Now that is, is 
another Now than the one pointed to’).32 The fact that potential readers of Henry V are 
not taken into consideration makes the failure of presence all the more powerful in the 
Chorus’s rhetoric. Indeed, the ‘gentles’ under address are placed in ‘the playhouse’, and 
nowhere else: they are playgoers (so has the Chorus decided, at least). It seems timely, 
at this point in the chapter, to emphasise that the practice that consists in reading 
Shakespeare’s dramatic intentions through his characters—especially in the case of 
metadramatic instances like the Chorus of Henry V—presents inherent dangers. James 
Bednarz’s article, ‘Dekker’s Response to the Chorus of Henry V in 1599’, provides a 
recent example of this widespread tendency: ‘In the Prologue and Choruses of Henry V, 
Shakespeare defines his art as a way of magnifying the limited resources of theatre by 
means of the capacious imaginations of playgoers.’33 Such a claim is problematic in that 
it reproduces a ‘central methodological error,’ in the phrase of proto-cultural materialist 
Raymond Williams: such an error consists in ‘reading dramatic speech as authorial 
                                                
32 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, translated from the German by Arnold 
Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 63. 
33 James Bednarz, ‘Dekker’s Response to the Chorus of Henry V in 1599’, Notes and Queries [online] 
59(1) (2012), 63-68, http://nq.oxfordjournals.org/content/59/1/63.full.pdf+html, p. 65. 
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confession or assertion.’34 If the Chorus seems to be addressing playgoers, this address 
cannot be elucidated on the plane of a specific type of audience (readers or playgoers) 
that Shakespeare might have had in mind when he wrote the play. The well-worn notion 
that the dramatist wrote his plays for the stage only and that he had no intention to 
publish them has been questioned extensively in the last decade. In Shakespeare as 
Literary Dramatist, Lukas Erne argues that Shakespeare was aware that many of his 
plays were making their way into print as he wrote them: 
When Shakespeare’s sonnets were published, the majority of the plays 
Shakespeare had written up to that date were available in print. Consequently, 
Shakespeare did not only expect that at some point in the future people would 
‘read-and-re-read’ his plays. He could not help knowing that his plays were 
being read and reread, printed and reprinted, excerpted and anthologized as he 
was writing more plays. Shakespeare’s friends and fellow actors John Heminge 
and Henry Condell recommended that we ‘Reade him, therefore; and againe, 
and againe’.35 
As Erne points out, reading Shakespeare’s plays (along with seeing them performed in 
theatres) was already a well-established cultural practice in the author’s own time. 
Significant to this chapter’s concerns is Erne’s claim that the long and short texts of 
Henry V ‘represent “literary” and “theatrical” versions whose respective distinctiveness 
allows us important insights into Shakespeare’s theatrical and literary art.’36 While the 
quarto text might have been a copy of the play as it was performed by the Lord 
Chamberlain’s Men, Erne argues that the folio version of Henry V would have been 
                                                
34 Raymond Williams, ‘Afterword’, in Political Shakespeare, p. 281. 
35 Lukas Erne, Shakespeare as Literary Dramatist (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 25. 
See also, by the same author, Shakespeare and the Book Trade (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2013). In this book, Erne examines ‘the publication, constitution, dissemination and reception of 
Shakespeare’s printed plays and poems in his own time’ and argues that ‘their popularity in the book 
trade has been greatly underestimated.’ Erne notably uses evidence from Shakespeare’s publishers and 
the printed works to show that ‘in the final years of the sixteenth century and the early part of the 
seventeenth century, “Shakespeare” became a name from which money could be made, a book trade 
commodity in which publishers had significant investments and an author who was bought, read, 
excerpted and collected on a surprising scale’ (backmatter). See also Richard Meek, Jane Richard and 
Richard Wilson (editors), Shakespeare’s Book: Essays in Reading, Writing and Reception (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2008). 
36 Erne, Shakespeare as Literary Dramatist, p. 27. 
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intended for publication only. The idea of the folio of Henry V as an exclusively 
‘literary’ object (Erne uses the term ‘literary’ in opposition to ‘theatrical’) troubles the 
standard approach to the Chorus as a figure that is only relevant to the play in 
performance. This notion also challenges the almost systematic assumption—mainly 
based on the ‘live effect’ imparted by the Chorus’s addresses—that the folio version of 
the play was specifically designed for the stage. As such, it undermines Gurr’s argument, 
quoted early on in the chapter, that the Chorus ‘relates uniquely to the period when the 
play was first composed.’ According to Erne, the version of the play that was performed 
in Shakespeare’s time is precisely the one that does not feature a chorus (the quarto 
text).37 
From a theoretical point of view, Erne’s approach to the two texts of Henry V 
implies a fascinating parallax view that guarantees that whenever there is a chorus there 
is no audience—and, conversely, whenever there is an audience there is no chorus. In 
other words, this parallactic system would imply that there cannot be a chorus and an 
audience within the same spatio-temporal continuum. Following this line of thought, the 
staging of the first folio in contemporary productions of the play might be seen as an 
aberration as it contravenes the parallax view that underlies the textuality of Henry V. If 
the first folio must necessarily exclude theatrical audiences, as Erne argues, the Chorus 
itself seems keenly aware of this cause/effect mechanism. Underlying the bombastic 
imperative urging a specific audience to be in ‘the playhouse’ ‘now’, there is palpable 
anxiety. ‘There must you sit’, the Chorus eructates. If the audience in question was 
indeed securely circumscribed within the playhouse, there should be no need for the 
Chorus to make such a request. And it knows it. The Chorus’s awareness of the 
                                                
37 For a recent reflection on ‘the idea of Shakespeare as a literary dramatist who arranges his work for 
publication’, see Johann Gregory’s inspired essay, which considers ‘the ways in which Troilus and 
Cressida as a stage-play is already literary to begin with’ (Johann Gregory, ‘The “Author’s Drift” in 
Shakespeare’s Troilus and Cressida: A Poetics of Reflection’, Medieval and Early Modern Authorship, 
edited by Guillemette Bolens and Lukas Erne (Tübingen: Narr Verlag, 2011), p. 95). 
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paradoxical quality of its narrative is epitomised in a single phrase, worth quoting once 
again: ‘There is the playhouse now, there must you sit’. This self-defeating imperative 
inevitably prompts the following questions: ‘Where is what, and when? Where must 
who sit where?’ 
 
 
 
B. ‘THOUGHT IS FREE’, OR SHAKESPEARE’S ‘CONTRADICTORY APPROACH TO 
LANGUAGE’ 
The numerous injunctions throughout Henry V betray the Chorus’s fundamental 
uncertainty as to the play’s capacity to conjure up presence. In the Prologue, the Chorus 
asks its audience to ‘make imaginary puissance,’ begging it to ‘Piece out our 
imperfections with your thoughts’ (Prologue.25; 23). Towards the end of the play, it 
admits that King Henry’s epic campaign against France can only be conveyed ‘In the 
quick forge and working-house of thought,’ namely in an audience’s mind (5.0.23). The 
dramatic locus of a choric voice that asks its audience to ‘work’ on their ‘imaginary 
forces’ is a recurring Shakespearean motif (Prologue.18). In The Winter’s Tale, for 
instance, Time (another chorus) makes a similar demand on its audience: 
imagine me, 
Gentle spectators, that I now may be 
 In fair Bohemia. 
     (4.1.19-21) 
Here again, the temporal deictic ‘now’ aims at conveying immediacy. The signifier 
‘Bohemia’ is also marked by deixis as it refers to anterior context in the play: on 
reaching land, in the previous scene, Antigonus enquires whether ‘our ship hath touched 
upon / The deserts of Bohemia’ (3.3.1-2). In the light of Time’s demand in the 
following scene, this famous Shakespearean anachorism (generally defined as a 
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geographical misplacement, as explained in Chapter 1) takes on an ironic dimension. 
Time’s request to be placed on the shores of Bohemia—a geographical impossibility—
only emphasises the gap between representation and its supposedly ‘real’ point of 
reference. Eventually, by asking potential audiences to ‘imagine me’, namely to produce 
a mental construct, Time questions its own existence. As Sean Gaston suggests, ‘the 
arrival of TIME in The Winter’s Tale can be taken as a wonderful conceit, an 
impossible gathering, an amazing act of theatrical bravado.’38 Such ontological paradox 
is typical of Shakespeare’s dramas, which often stage (and perhaps also call for) 
meditations on the power of thought. Works like Henry V or The Winter’s Tale 
specifically challenge the common literary assumption that thought is boundless and 
that there is nothing that it cannot envision—whether it be medieval warfare or distant, 
unknown countries. The phrase ‘thought is free’ (recurring twice in the canon) provides 
a good example of the ambivalent treatment of imagination as a concept in 
Shakespearean drama (Twelfth Night, 1.3.58; The Tempest, 3.2.118). Spoken by 
characters (as opposed to Shakespeare qua author) the phrase contains a powerful 
metadramatic potential that suggests that the plays’ stance towards their own dramatic 
content is resolutely undecided—neither do they seem to endorse nor refute what the 
characters say. For Terry Eagleton, such undecidability is the direct result of 
‘Shakespeare’s contradictory approach to language.’39 Although the plays might value 
‘a stability of signs’ (conveyed through ‘settled meanings, shared definitions and 
regularities of grammar’), Eagleton remarks that ‘Shakespeare’s flamboyant punning, 
                                                
38 Sean Gaston, ‘Enter TIME’, Starting With Derrida: Plato, Aristotle and Hegel (London and New York: 
Continuum, 2007), p. 61. 
39 The phrase was coined by Jonathan Gil Harris in Shakespeare and Literary Theory ((Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010), p. 162), where it is used to summarise Eagleton’s discussion of Macbeth in 
William Shakespeare (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), pp. 1-8. 
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troping and riddling threaten to put into question’ this very stability.40 Critics have 
emphasised the extent to which Shakespearean drama seems to refuse to assume any 
ideological responsibility for what it presents or represents. Richard Wilson notably 
argues that this is evidence of ‘Shakespeare’s very reluctance to present himself as an 
author.’41 Along the same lines, Patrick Cheney notes that Shakespeare’s works offer 
various ‘fictions of authorship,’ all participating in a general strategy of ‘self-concealing 
authorship.’42 The idea that a work of art might not reflect the author’s personal views is 
addressed in the introductory words of the Prologue in Troilus and Cressida (another 
Shakespearean chorus), which claims to speak ‘not in confidence / Of author’s pen or 
actor’s voice’ (Prologue.23-24). For Johann Gregory, these lines are to be read in the 
context of a major theatrical controversy in the early seventeenth century, generally 
referred to as the ‘poets’ war’. Thus, the Prologue in Troilus and Cressida specifically 
documents the extent to which ‘Shakespeare responds to [Ben] Jonson’s construction of 
an author,’ Gregory suggests.43 In Shakespeare and the Poets’ War, Bednarz argues that 
the two playwrights developed their authorial strategies against each other: 
The Poets’ War—the most important theatrical controversy of the late 
Elizabethan stage—commenced when Jonson, the younger playwright, became 
‘Jonson’, the poet, by resisting Shakespeare’s influence through the invention of 
a new critical drama that he called ‘comical satire’. The war continued with 
added momentum when Shakespeare, in response, molded his comedies to 
accommodate Jonson’s satiric perspective while eschewing its self-confident 
didacticism. And the battle ended only after Shakespeare, having been stung by 
Jonson’s attack on the Lord Chamberlain’s Men in Poetaster, ‘purged’ his rival 
in the guise of Ajax in Troilus and Cressida.44 
                                                
40 Ibid., p. 1. 
41 Richard Wilson, ‘“Our Bending Author”: Shakespeare Takes a Bow’, Shakespeare Studies 36 (2008), 
67-79, p. 72. 
42 Patrick Cheney, Shakespeare’s Literary Authorship (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 
pp. 147 and 14. 
43 Gregory, ‘The “Author’s Drift” in Troilus and Cressida’, p. 93. 
44 James Bednarz, Shakespeare and the Poets’ War (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), p. 1. 
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In his essay on the ‘author’s drift’, Gregory explores the extent to which the two 
playwrights might be said to have built their authorship through such dramatic rivalry—
Shakespeare’s Prologue, in particular, could have been a direct allusion to Jonson’s 
construction of his own authorship in the induction to Poetaster, which also features an 
‘armèd Prologue’ (Induction.67). 45  In Troilus and Cressida, ‘the Prologue speaks 
without confidence of the author’s pen, in contrast to Jonson’s Prologue who speaks for 
the author,’ Gregory argues. This illustrates the notion that, in Shakespeare’s play, ‘the 
author remains elusive—mentioned, only to be hidden.’46 Gregory’s reflection on 
authorship in Troilus and Cressida provides a convincing instance of the idea that 
Shakespeare’s theatre avoids assuming responsibility for what it stages. So when a 
statement as sweeping as ‘thought is free’ appears in the dramas, one might want to 
‘think’ twice before labelling it as a personal belief of the author’s. One might also want 
to recognise the extent to which Shakespeare’s plays present a multitude of 
contradictory beliefs (rather than a distinct belief or set of beliefs)—‘in presenting, so 
often powerfully, so many incompatible beliefs, Shakespeare was saying something 
about belief itself,’ Williams suggests.47 
‘Thought is free’—rather than making a univocal ideological declaration, the 
phrase, as it appears in the dramas, essentially rehearses a buzzword in Shakespeare’s 
time. In fact, the phrase can be traced back to King James, whose literary aspirations 
started early in his life. At the age of fifteen, the young King of Scotland wrote his first 
poem (simply entitled ‘Song’ in the royal manuscript copy); the first stanza, reproduced 
below, opens with the phrase in question: 
Song. The first verses that ever the king made 
                                                
45 Ben Jonson, Poetaster, edited by Tom Cain (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995). 
46 Gregory, ‘The “Author’s Drift” in Troilus and Cressida’, pp. 97 and 96. 
47 Williams, ‘Afterword’, p. 281. 
 194 
 Since thought is free, think what thou will 
 O troubled hart to ease they paine 
 Thought unrevealed can do no evill 
 But wordes past out cummes not againe 
 Be cairefull aye for to invent 
 The waye to get they owen intent…48 
Through the medium of King James’ juvenile poem, the expression ‘thought is free’ 
entered everyday language, becoming a linguistic idiosyncrasy of the Jacobean cultural 
moment. In this sense, it is probably no accident that the phrase appears in a proverbial 
fashion in Twelfth Night—‘the customary retort to “Do you think I am a fool?”,’ the 
Norton edition points out.49 Likewise, its occurrence in the middle of a song in The 
Tempest (possibly a reference to King James’ own ‘Song’) emphasises the phrase’s 
quotational status, namely the fact that it is always to be read in inverted commas. When 
the drunken butler Stefano sings the line, Caliban interrupts him sharply, remarking that 
‘That’s not the tune’—an intervention that could be used to illustrate Eagleton’s idea of 
Shakespeare’s ‘contradictory attitude’ towards language (119). Indeed, within the 
diegetic realm of the play, not all characters seem willing to accept the essentialist 
proposition that ‘thought is free’—Caliban is particularly eager to voice his 
disagreement, for obvious reasons.50 Along the same lines, Henry V might be said to 
call for a meditation on thought as well as its limitations. In fact, the dramatic structure 
of the play can be viewed as a test case of the limits of thought and representation. Can 
human thought really encompass the grandiose historical visions invoked by the Chorus? 
This is precisely what the Chorus itself wonders at the beginning of the play when it 
muses: ‘Can this cock-pit hold / The vasty fields of France?’. Editors generally explain 
the Chorus’s ‘cockpit’ or ‘wooden O’ as a metaphor for the physical theatre. In the 
                                                
48 Reproduced in Helena Mennie Shire, Song, Dance & Poetry of the Court of Scotland Under King 
James VI (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), p. 86. 
49 Greenblatt, Cohen, Howard and Maus, The Norton Shakespeare, p. 1772n. 
50  Greenblatt suggests that The Tempest is ‘a kind of echo chamber of Shakespearean motifs’ 
(‘Introduction to The Tempest’, in The Norton Shakespeare, p. 3047). 
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Oxford edition, the ‘wooden O’ is elucidated as ‘the theatre itself’ and the New 
Cambridge edition defines ‘cockpit’ as a ‘ring, arena, a deliberate diminutive’—on the 
grounds that, in Shakespeare’s time, ‘pits for cock-fighting were far smaller than 
amphitheatres such as the Curtain and the Globe.’51 On a more basic level, the ‘cockpit’ 
can also be understood as a reference to the head and its link with the human capacity to 
think, to envision—it is the very same ‘distracted globe’ in which ‘memory holds a seat’ 
that Hamlet talks about (Hamlet, 1.5.96-97). In Henry V, the Chorus’s apparent 
glorification of thought and its infinite potential is at once undermined by the language 
that is used (as when the failure to conjure up the ‘original’ historical scene of Henry 
V’s victory at Agincourt is acknowledged). The Chorus’s rhetoric also reveals 
uncertainty regarding the play that is repeatedly alluded to, and in particular with 
respect to its alleged location (‘the playhouse’) and its temporality (‘now’)—this play is, 
in effect, a play within the play. If we briefly shift the focus back to ‘ourselves’ qua 
audience (a problematic notion in the context of this chapter, though), we might say that 
such spatio-temporal insecurity alienates ‘us’ (the ever-changing audience in the 
unstable, constantly shifting present of performance) from the Chorus’s fantasised play, 
which is bound to be different from the play ‘we’ (whoever we are) are, in effect, 
reading or watching (at any time, in any place). But (and this cannot be stressed enough) 
this type of approach is irrelevant to the critical framework that is adopted here, which 
focuses on the Chorus as the main subject of discourse. 
 
C. ‘WITHIN THE GIRDLE OF THESE WALLS’: AN IMAGINARY AUDIENCE IN AN 
IMAGINARY PLAYHOUSE 
The failure of presence in Henry V manifests itself perhaps most crucially in the absence 
of a specific audience. While the Chorus seems to take it for granted that there are 
                                                
51 Taylor, Henry V, p. 92n; Gurr, King Henry V, p. 29n. 
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‘gentles’ sitting in ‘the playhouse’, the repeated injunctions to those ‘gentles’ reveal a 
potential anxiety about the existence of such an audience. Underlying the Chorus’s 
artificial deference to its addressees is a nagging sensation that there might not be 
anyone sitting in ‘the playhouse’ after all—thus, it pleads for their ‘humble patience’ 
and begs them to ‘Admit me Chorus to this history’ (Prologue.32-33). The insistence 
throughout on the necessity to ‘make imaginary puissance’ overshadows a crucial 
ontological problem in the play: the uncertainty about the presence of an audience. In its 
very attempt at concealing non-presence, the Chorus’s compulsive invocation of the 
now of performance reveals that the audience supposedly watching the play in ‘the 
playhouse’ is virtual. 
‘There is the playhouse now, there must you sit’. More than anything perhaps, 
this fascinating postmodern line epitomises the ontological crisis that pervades the play. 
Like a fading echo, the Chorus’s ‘you’ shifts inexorably because it fails to fix a specific 
audience within the linguistic boundaries of the play. The very idea of audience is by 
essence vague and indeterminate as it refers to an amorphous mass that is constantly 
moving in space and time. In this sense, the Chorus’s attempt at foreclosing a specific 
audience is doomed from the outset. On the other hand, the Chorus also fails to 
formulate a universal account that would address all audiences at all times, in all 
possible representational spaces. Such failure is especially apparent in its exclusion of 
potential readers of the play from its pleas (and, as we know, many people did read 
Shakespeare’s plays in the playwright’s time). In order to bypass the obstacles that 
undermine its invocation of presence, the Chorus uses linguistic force. The modal 
auxiliary verb ‘must’ suggests a forceful attempt at containing the imagined audience 
‘within the girdle of these walls’—those of the mysterious ‘playhouse’ (Prologue.19). In 
linguistic terms, this ‘must’ expresses deontic modality, which deals with necessity in 
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relation to freedom to act. In the context of Henry V, it aims at curbing audience 
freedom by imposing a duty: ‘sit’ ‘there’ ‘now’. However, we should keep in mind the 
fact that this scenario of absolute control remains fundamentally a fantasy, rooted in the 
Chorus’s perverted little mind (and why exactly the Chorus is a pervert will become 
clear very soon). Ultimately, the main function of the modal verb ‘must’ is to bridge the 
ontological gap between the Chorus’s fantasy of presence and the distinct elusiveness of 
the audience under address. 
The systematic use of the imperative mood testifies to the Chorus’s attempt at 
confining its audience within a linguistic prison, thereby asserting its monopoly over 
thought. Towards the end of the Prologue, the Chorus embarks on an epic tirade 
extolling the power of thought: ‘Think, when we talk of horses, that you see them, […] / 
For ’tis your thoughts that now must deck our kings’ (26-28). The imperative ‘think’, it 
seems, aims at invading the audience’s most intimate space: that of the mind. In Stages 
of History, Phyllis Rackin argues that 
any invocation of the present in a history play tends to create radical dislocations: 
it invades the time-frame of the audience, and its effect is no less striking than 
that of a character stepping off the stage to invade the audience’s physical space 
or addressing them directly to invade their psychological space.52 
By bombarding its audience with imperative injunctions, the Chorus does seem to 
invade their psychological space. But if ‘the audience’, as Rackin calls it, is absent from 
the outset, how can its invocation create ‘radical dislocations’ for (supposedly) real 
human audiences? If the Chorus stepped off the stage during a performance of Henry V 
these days, it might find no one at all in the playhouse—for ‘they’ (the expected 
audience in question) might all be busy reading the play at home with a cup of tea at 
their side. 
                                                
52 Phyllis Rackin, Stages of History: Shakespeare’s English Chronicles (Ithaca and New York: Cornell 
University Press, 1990), p. 94. 
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As the repeated injunctions to ‘behold’ and to ‘see’ indicate, the Chorus’s use of 
the imperative mood is dominated by the lexical field of vision—the two verbs recur ten 
and five times respectively over the six short choric episodes. In Act IV for instance, the 
audience is required to ‘sit and see’; the act of looking is thus associated with sitting in 
the playhouse (4.0.52). More significantly, the pressing demands on potential viewers 
that they should ‘think’ are almost systematically expressed through the lexical field of 
vision, as in Act III: ‘Work, work your thoughts, and therein see a siege’ (3.0.25). This 
pattern is also manifest when the Chorus pleads: ‘Think, when we talk of horses, that 
you see them, […] / For ’tis your thoughts that now must deck our kings.’ Before it can 
actually see the ‘siege’ or the ‘horses’, the addressed audience first needs to abide to the 
Chorus’s overarching directive to ‘make imaginary puissance’. The fact that this 
audience’s ‘thoughts’ ‘must deck’ historical ‘kings’ suggests that the Chorus’s favourite 
topic (History) can only come to life through a substantial imaginative effort. From the 
beginning, the Chorus itself makes it clear that a willing suspension of disbelief is the 
crucial prerequisite to enjoy the play—its audience must ‘think’ that it can see the 
visions invoked. Throughout Henry V, the Chorus plays around with the different 
meanings of ‘think’; in the following passage, for instance, it is used in the sense of 
‘suppose’ or ‘pretend’: 
O do but think 
You stand upon the rivage and behold 
A city on th’inconstant billows dancing— 
For so appears this fleet majestical, 
Holding due course to Harfleur. 
     (3.0.13-17) 
These lines provide a good example of the Chorus’s systematic association of thought 
with vision—a strategic pairing that conveys the underlying message that thinking is 
seeing. Here again, if we are to ‘behold’ the ‘fleet majestical,’ it is first required that we 
‘think’ that we ‘stand upon the rivage’. Through the equation of seeing with thinking, 
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the Chorus invites its audience to set aside their ontological misgivings; for the simple 
act of looking with the mind’s eye, it is implied, can conjure up real happenings. By 
enticing its audience to collapse vision and imagination, the Chorus develops what 
might be called a strategy of visualisation. 
 
 D. ‘PLAY WITH YOUR FANCIES’: CHORUS AS HISTORICAL PERVERT 
Hamlet’s confidence to his friend Horatio that he can see his father in his ‘mind’s eye’ 
prompts Horatio’s own confidence that he has seen the ghost of Hamlet’s father. In its 
uncanny anticipation of Horatio’s revelation, Hamlet’s vision is properly visionary—it 
posits a direct correlation between thinking and being. 
HAMLET My father—methinks I see my father. 
HORATIO Where, my lord? 
HAMLET   In my mind’s eye, Horatio. 
(Hamlet, 1.2.183-85) 
However, the performative power of Hamlet’s uncanny vision is at once undermined by 
Horatio’s report of having encountered ‘A figure like your father’—‘My lord, I think I 
saw him yesternight’ (1.2.199; 188). The ‘portentous figure’ described by Horatio 
provides a poor rendition of Hamlet’s mental image of his real father (1.1.109). 
Following his friend’s revelation, Hamlet is determined to ‘watch tonight’ for the figure 
to appear again and ‘assume my noble father’s person’ (1.3.244-45). His formulation 
sets a sharp contrast between a ‘noble father’ and his ghostly reflection. Significantly, 
Gertrude uses the same expression to refer to her dead husband in the previous scene: 
‘Do not for ever with thy vailèd lids / Seek for thy noble father in the dust’ (1.2.70-71). 
The ‘guilty thing’ from Horatio’s account manifestly clashes with the royal family’s 
dignified memories of the dead king (1.1.129). What is shared in all accounts, though, is 
a characteristic uncertainty: both Hamlet and Horatio ‘think’ they see (or have seen) the 
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dead king (or something like the dead king). Unlike the Chorus’s authoritarian ‘think’ in 
Henry V, this ‘think’ implies a fundamental misgiving. ‘Methinks I see my father’, 
Hamlet ventures (in other words, ‘it almost feels like I can see my father in my mind’s 
eye—but I am not sure’). ‘I think I saw him yesternight,’ Horatio confides tentatively 
(in other words, ‘I might have seen your father last night—but now I am starting to 
doubt it’). Why not simply: ‘I saw him yesternight’? This baffled conversation 
illustrates the intrinsic disjointedness between so-called ‘real’ or original events and 
their afterthoughts. More generally, the exchange also dramatises the fundamental core 
of absence that haunts representation. 
In Henry V, the main function of the Chorus is precisely to emphasise the 
paradox of representation. Its audience is asked to ‘suppose’ that the invoked visions are 
real and that they can indeed be seen—for they are faithful representations of an 
original historical reality, the Chorus maintains, almost perfunctorily (‘Suppose that you 
have seen / The well-appointed king at Dover Pier,’ ‘Suppose th’ambassador from the 
French comes back’ (3.0.3-4; 28)). The Chorus’s addresses become more assertive 
when it enjoins its audience to ‘behold’ the English army landing in France—‘For so 
appears this fleet majestical,’ it insists (16). The formal order to ‘Grapple your minds to 
sternage of this navy’ literally attaches this audience’s thoughts to the physical structure 
of the English fleet when it reaches the French shore in Harfleur (18). Such a clumsy 
ocularcentric strategy relies on the sensation that theatricality provides an unmediated 
connection between being and seeing. But this implied correlation remains 
fundamentally uncertain, as the play itself illustrates. 
The Chorus’s third intervention ends on the grandiose appeal to its audience to 
‘eke out our performance with your mind’ (3.0.35). On the surface, the invitation 
evokes an all-inclusive and democratic theatrical process; however, this idealised vision 
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is belied by the Chorus’s immutably set narrative as well as its uncompromising rhetoric. 
Underneath the formal varnish of dramatic politeness (‘pardon,’ ‘Oh, pardon,’ ‘admit 
me…’, etc.), the Chorus remains in total control of the performance—‘our performance,’ 
as it calls it (1.0.8; 15; 32). Its advocacy of a democratic mode of representation is 
supported by a clever use of the personal pronoun ‘our’, which supposedly refers to the 
Chorus as well as its audience. Relying on the notion that Henry V is primarily (if not 
exclusively) relevant to Shakespeare’s time, many historicist critics would argue that 
this ‘we’ is that of Shakespeare’s company (the Lord Chamberlain’s Men), directly 
addressing their spectators at the Globe theatre or at the Curtain theatre. Beside being 
reductive, this narrow Elizabethan framework is also irrelevant to the approach adopted 
in this chapter, which treats the Chorus as the central linguistic subject of the play. From 
this perspective, the Chorus’s ‘we’ can only refer to itself and itself alone—it is the 
regal ‘we’. ‘Our performance’ is to be read in opposition with ‘your mind’ (i.e. the 
Chorus’s performance versus the audience’s mind). While sustaining an illusion of 
histrionic democracy, the expression ‘eke out’ also gestures towards the Chorus’s 
dystopian representational plot. From the Old English ēacian, ‘eke out’ means to 
increase or to supplement: thus, the audience is asked to complement a ‘performance’ 
that is already fixed from the beginning and devised by a control-obsessed Chorus. 
However, the Chorus is aware that the intended performativity of its utterances can only 
be made effective through the inclusion of an exterior gaze. In the absence of such a 
validating gaze, the ‘performance’ is nothing but an insubstantial pageant. The Anglo-
Norman French root parfourmer means alteration, suggesting the transformative 
function of performance. Profoundly aware of the mind-altering function of 
performance, the Chorus aims at affecting the emotional makeup of its audience. From a 
psychoanalytical perspective, the Chorus of Henry V is the archetypical pervert. As 
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Slavoj Žižek points out, ‘the pervert does not pursue his activity for his own pleasure, 
but for the enjoyment of the Other—he finds enjoyment precisely in this 
instrumentalisation, in working for the enjoyment of the Other.’ 53  However, the 
displacement of enjoyment onto another instance is not a mere attribute of the pervert; 
rather, it is a defining characteristic of desire that can be observed on an everyday basis. 
As an example, Žižek mentions ‘the deep satisfaction a subject (a parent, for example) 
can derive from the awareness that his or her beloved daughter or son is really enjoying 
something; a loving parent can literally enjoy through the Other’s enjoyment.’54 
Throughout the play, the Chorus is working for the enjoyment of an audience: the 
repeated appeals to that audience reveal the need for the Chorus to ensure that the 
process of enjoyment is taking place. In its sadomasochistic fantasy, the audience-object 
figures as the essential hinge of the process of enjoyment. As Žižek notes: 
When the sadomasochistic pervert stages the scene in which he participates he 
‘remains in control’ at all times, maintains a distance, gives directions like a 
stage director, but his enjoyment is none the less much more intense than that of 
immediate passionate immersion.55 
In other words, the Chorus’s display of passionate immersion into its historical subject 
is only a façade: its own enjoyment depends on its capacity to remain in control of the 
little scenario which entails the deferral of enjoyment to an exterior instance. History 
(whether it is medieval, Elizabethan or contemporary) is a mere cover for this scenario: 
ultimately, audience enjoyment remains the fundamental locus of the Chorus’s 
fantasy—and the fact that the audience in question only exists in the Chorus’s mind 
                                                
53 Slavoj Žižek, Looking Awry: An Introduction to Jacques Lacan Through Popular Culture (Cambridge 
MA and London: MIT Press, 1992), p. 109. Through the medium of Lacanian psychoanalysis, Žižek 
explains that perversion is defined by opposition to neurotic or psychotic obsessions. Thus, ‘both the 
pervert and the obsessional are caught in frenetic activity in service of the big Other; the difference is, 
however, that the aim of the obsessional’s activity is to prevent the big Other from enjoying […], whereas 
the pervert works precisely to ensure that the big Other’s “will to enjoyment” will be satisfied’ (p. 179n). 
54 Žižek, The Plague of Fantasies, p. 147. 
55 Ibid. 
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reinforces the pathological character of its fantasy. In the end, such a malleable and 
docile audience (precisely because it does not exist) allows the Chorus to act out its 
fantasy of absolute control unimpeded. 
 
III- MAPPING OUT THE BIG OTHER: WHO IS BEING INTERPELLATED? 
 A. ‘A LARGESS UNIVERSAL, LIKE THE SUN’: THE CHORUS’S CULT OF PERSONALITY 
It is perhaps worth noting once again that the critical strategy deployed in this chapter is 
defined by a deliberate subjective bias which entails that the Chorus figures as the 
subject of a linguistic investigation. By presenting the Chorus (rather than the construct 
known as ‘the audience’) as the main subject of discourse, such an approach aims at 
questioning common assumptions about subjectivity—not only in Henry V but also in 
Shakespeare’s plays, in literature and in ‘life’ at large (but whether what is called ‘life’ 
can be said to be ‘larger’ than ‘literature’ remains fundamentally undecidable). This bias 
does not allow the choric speeches to be viewed as mere interludes punctuating what 
may be considered as the ‘real’ play (i.e. ‘everything else’, ‘the rest’, etc.). The lack of 
popularity of the chorus-less version of the play (first quarto) testifies to the 
fundamental function of those speeches within the experiential framework of Henry V: 
they provide a crucial perspective to apprehend the play. Generally speaking, the 
Chorus stands for the sense that there can be no history without historical perspective—
this is especially relevant in the case of a play that thematises history self-reflexively. 
The Chorus brings a crucial sense of ideological cohesion to the narrative; it evidently 
considers itself to be on a mission to bring order to a meaningless and chaotic world. 
However, inconsistencies have often been noted between the Chorus’s speeches and 
what might be viewed as ‘the rest’ of the play—thus highlighting the infinite potential 
for self-subversion of Henry V (a direct effect of deconstruction as that which always 
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already happens everywhere).56 As implied earlier, the Chorus seems eager to fashion 
itself as an interactive platform fostering democratic exchange with its audience. But 
ultimately, this gay interactivity conceals a more sinister fantasy of absolute control 
through which the Chorus fashions itself as the universal voice of History. In this sense, 
the choric speeches can be said to foster a real cult of personality. As an anonymous 
contributor puts it on Wikipedia, ‘a cult of personality arises when an individual uses 
mass media, propaganda, or other methods, to create an idealized, heroic, and, at times 
god-like public image, often through unquestioning flattery and praise.’57 
The Chorus’s self-worshipping cult of personality transpires through its 
descriptions of King Henry. In the following example, the historical king figures as a 
mere puppet, giving the Chorus a pretext to congratulate itself on its alleged 
omniscience: ‘A largess universal, like the sun, / His liberal eye doth give to everyone’ 
(4.0.43-44). In the Chorus’s overblown rhetoric, Henry is characterised as an all-
encompassing eye that not only sees everything but is also the source of everything. 
Here, the Chorus is playing with the different semantic layers of the adjective ‘liberal’. 
The line can be read as praising the king’s fair, generous and noble character (thus 
rehearsing a common popular perception of the historical Henry V). On another level, 
‘liberal’ conveys a sense of indiscretion, of intrusion even—Henry’s all-seeing ‘eye’ is 
said to be large ‘like the sun’. This particular aspect of his sovereignty is illustrated in 
the next scene, which builds up to the magnificently elided battle of Agincourt. The 
                                                
56 For Jacques Derrida, deconstruction essentially refers to ‘what happens’ or what ‘is the case’ (‘Some 
Statements and Truisms About Neo-Logismss, Newisms, Postisms, Parasitisms, and Other Small 
Seismisms’, translated from the French by Anne Tomiche, in The State of ‘Theory’: History, Art and 
Critical Discourse, edited by David Carroll (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 63-95, p. 85). 
57  Wikipedia contributors, ‘Cult of personality’, Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Cult_of_personality&oldid=522333631 (accessed 13 
November 2012). The term was made famous by Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev in his so-called ‘Secret 
Speech’ from 1956. See The Internet Modern History Sourcebook, ‘Nikita S. Khrushchev: The Secret 
Speech—On the Cult of Personality, 1956’, http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1956khrushchev-
secret1.html (accessed 6 September 2011). 
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night before the battle, the king wanders around the English camp in disguise, hidden 
underneath a cloak of anonymity in order to spy on his soldiers with complete impunity 
(4.1.24.1). In this scene, Henry’s disturbing eavesdropping gives a rather sinister twist 
to the sovereign’s sun-sized and liberal eye. By presenting its narrative as all-inclusive, 
the Chorus subtly reassigns onto itself the ‘liberal’ and ‘universal’ attributes it ascribes 
to Henry. Editors have often pointed out the extent to which this implied universality is 
challenged by inner discrepancies within the play. Gurr, for instance, remarks that ‘the 
events of each act belie the claims made by the Chorus that introduces it’—in fact, ‘one 
of the most peculiar features of [its] appearances is how frequently and consistently [it] 
whips up enthusiasm for [its] misrepresentation of what follows.’58 This sensation is 
based on what is generally perceived as a lack of consistency between the Chorus’s 
announcements and what ‘actually’ happens in ‘the play’. It should be noted now that a 
crucial ontological problem arises when it comes to addressing what supposedly 
constitutes the ‘real’ dramatic root of ‘the play’ Henry V. Is it accurate to say that the 
Chorus’s claims are belied by the other scenes in the play, or are those ‘other’ scenes 
untrue to the Chorus’s original account? Opening with a Prologue (spoken by the 
Chorus), the first folio version of Henry V seems to silently nominate the Chorus as the 
genuine, steady and reliable informational instance within the play. But this suggestion 
is consistently undermined by the fact that the quarto version of the play does not 
feature a chorus. What, then, constitutes the original semantic core of Henry V? 
Although fundamental, this question cannot be considered extensively here, mainly for 
the reason that it would require the sustained attention of an entire essay. For our 
purposes, suffice it to say that the play’s semantics is haunted by a generic 
                                                
58 Gurr, ‘Introduction’, pp. 7-9. 
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ungroundedness, which participates in the more general crisis of presence that pervades 
Henry V. 
 
B. SUBJECTIFICATION AND INTERPELLATION: HENRY V VIA FOUCAULT AND 
ALTHUSSER 
By implying that the perspective it provides is that of a ‘liberal eye’ that provides ‘to 
everyone’ ‘a largess universal, like the sun’, the Chorus endows its audience with a 
false sense of empowerment—the demands to ‘make imaginary puissance’ and to ‘eke 
out our performance with your mind’ seemingly open up a strong sense of possibility 
for potential viewers. The Chorus here toys with the fashionable notion of theatrical 
interactivity, whereby an audience is allegedly given a degree of command over the 
‘performance’. However, what it actually does throughout is deploy a strategy of 
performative subjection by staging a show of dēmokratía. At odds with the free agency 
supposedly granted to the viewers of the play, the Chorus’s historical account severely 
limits the potential for free thought: after all, the audience under address is required to 
‘Gently […] hear’ and ‘be kind’ (Prologue.34; 3.0.34). The Chorus’s subjection of its 
audience is to be understood quite literally: from anonymous individuals, they are 
turned into subjects. Michel Foucault coined the term subjectivation, translated into 
English as ‘subjectification’, to refer to one of ‘three modes of objectification which 
transform human beings into subjects.’59 
                                                
59 The first mode of objectification spelt out by Foucault encompasses ‘the modes of inquiry which try to 
give themselves the status of sciences; for example the objectivizing of the speaking subject in grammaire 
générale, philology and linguistics.’ Secondly, Foucault talks about what he calls ‘dividing practices,’ 
which describe how ‘the subject is either divided inside himself or divided from others. This process 
objectivizes him.’ Finally, Foucault explains how he has sought, in his later work, to study ‘the way a 
human being turns himself into a subject’—the most basic definition of subjectification. A study of 
subjectification through the domain of sexuality, for instance, would examine ‘how men [i.e. human 
beings] have learned to recognize themselves as subjects of “sexuality”.’ See Michel Foucault, ‘The 
Subject and Power’, Critical Inquiry 8(4) (1982), 777-95, pp. 777-78. The essay originally appeared as an 
afterword to Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics by Hubert Lederer Dreyfus and 
Paul Rabinow (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1982). 
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This form of power applies itself to immediate everyday life which categorizes 
the individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to his own 
identity, imposes a law of truth on him which he must recognize and which 
others have to recognize in him. It is a form of power that makes individuals 
subjects. There are two meanings of the word ‘subject’: subject to someone else 
by control and dependence; and tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-
knowledge. Both meanings suggest a form of power which subjugates and 
makes subject to.60 
As Foucault points out, the term ‘subject’ can be read in two different ways: one can be 
subjected to the control of an external instance or subjected to one’s own identity. 
Although they might seem contradictory at first glance, these two definitions in fact 
represent two sides of the same coin. This double-edged effect of subjectivity is 
illustrated in the power dynamics of Henry V, where the Chorus’s control over its 
audience is conveyed through a specific, ready-made identity—which includes a radical 
definition of this audience’s location in space and time. In theory, subjectification 
becomes effective when ‘the individual recognizes him or herself (an object of 
discourse) as the subject of discourse.’61 
For Louis Althusser, the process of self-recognition of the individual as the 
subject of discourse is a direct effect of ideology. In his influential essay, ‘Ideology and 
Ideological State Apparatuses’ (1970), the French philosopher claims that ‘all ideology 
hails or interpellates concrete individuals as concrete subjects, by the functioning of the 
category of the subject.’62 In Althusser’s Marxist theory of the state, ideology is 
imposed on the individual through ‘Ideological State Apparatuses’ (ISAs)—‘a certain 
number of realities which present themselves to the immediate observer in the form of 
distinct and specialized institutions.’ The main categories of ISAs mentioned in the 
                                                
60 Foucault, ‘The Subject and Power’, p. 781. 
61 Kevin Durrheim, ‘Peace Talk and Violence: An Analysis of the Power of “Peace”’, in Culture, Power 
& Difference: Discourse Analysis in South Africa, edited by Ann Levett, Amanda Kottler, Erica Burman 
and Ian Parker (London and Atlantic Highlands NJ: Zed Books, 1997), pp. 35-36. 
62 Louis Althusser, ‘Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses’, On Ideology (London and New York: 
Verso, 2008), p. 47. 
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essay are the following: ‘the religious ISA,’ ‘the educational ISA,’ ‘the family ISA,’ 
‘the legal ISA,’ ‘the political ISA,’ ‘the trade-union ISA,’ ‘the communications ISA’ 
and ‘the cultural ISA.’63 Althusser emphasises the extent to which ‘the Ideological State 
Apparatuses function “by ideology”’—as opposed to the ‘Repressive State Apparatus,’ 
which ‘functions “by violence”’ (and includes ‘the Government, the Administration, the 
Army, the Police, the Courts [and] the Prisons’).64 One of the key strategies of the ISAs, 
Althusser explains, is to ‘subject individuals to the political State ideology,’ namely 
‘“democratic” ideology.’ The communications apparatus (‘press, radio and television, 
etc.’) and the cultural apparatus (‘Literature, the Arts, sports, etc.’), in particular, 
hammer democratic ideology by ‘cramming every “citizen” with daily doses of 
nationalism, chauvinism, liberalism, moralism, etc, by means of the press, the radio and 
television.’65 Seen through the lens of Althusser’s theory of the state, the Chorus of 
Henry V could be categorised within the communication and cultural apparatuses. Such 
a categorisation helps us recognise the extent to which the Chorus enforces pseudo-
democratic ideology by interpellating its audience—‘the existence of ideology and the 
hailing or interpellation of individuals as subjects are one and the same thing,’ Althusser 
remarks.66 Althusser’s famous example of interpellation is that of the policeman calling 
out to the individual in the street: ‘Hey, you there!’ The automatic recognition that we 
are the ones being hailed—as opposed to anyone else—is precisely what ensures that 
we become subjects. As soon as we hear the policeman’s call, we immediately assume 
(that is, even before we turn around) that it is addressed to us. For Althusser, this 
process of ideological identification conditions the shift from individual to subject 
                                                
63 Ibid., p. 17. 
64 Ibid., pp. 16-17 and 19. 
65 Ibid., p. 28. 
66 Ibid., p. 49. 
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within a given social order: interpellation connects individuals (subjects with a 
lowercase ‘s’) to the state (Subject with a capital ‘S’). In Henry V, the Chorus stands for 
the transhistorical voice of ideology that transforms individuals into interpellated 
subjects. From undifferentiated individuals, the Chorus’s audience is instantly turned 
into a socially-defined category (‘you’, ‘gentles’, etc.) through a cleverly orchestrated 
performance. The example of Henry V illustrates Althusser’s theory that the ‘mise en 
scène of interpellation’ participates in ‘the very structure of all ideology.’67 
 
 C. HENRY V, OR THE AESTHETICISATION OF DIFFÉRANCE 
Act V of the play opens with a warning: ‘Vouchsafe to those that have not read the story 
/ That I may prompt them’ (5.0.1-2). Here again, the Chorus interpellates its audience 
through a specific directive—Hey, you there! Read the story. As editors point out 
almost unanimously, ‘the story’ in question could be a reference to Raphael Holinshed’s 
chronicles (Shakespeare’s main historical source for Henry V).68 On the level of ‘what-
is-said-in-the-play’, the Chorus assumes that its audience knows about a certain story. 
However, the referential tie of that ‘story’ is as uncertain as the presence of an audience 
and the location that is assigned to it. Therefore, identifying ‘the story’ exclusively with 
Holinshed’s historical chronicles and ‘the playhouse’ exclusively with a specific theatre 
in Elizabethan London severely limits Henry V’s potential for meaning. Every 
interpretive act relies on a specific notion of presence in space and time—a different one 
every time (which emphasises the temporalisation that defines all critical processes). 
The structural différance that haunts both literature and literary criticism guarantees that 
there can be no such thing as a fixed entity called ‘the audience’. Instead, there can only 
                                                
67 Ibid., p. 51. 
68 Gurr’s footnote to the lines in the New Cambridge edition of the play reads: ‘Presumably in Holinshed, 
but possibly also in broadside ballads’ (p. 198n). 
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be a multitude of audiences: every time it is invoked, the concept of audience can only 
refer to a heterogeneous spatio-temporal phenomenon, characterised by an intrinsic self-
alienation. Following that logic, ‘audience’ (as a phenomenon that includes readers and 
playgoers alike) will always be at odds with the instance which the Chorus interpellates 
in the play (‘you’, ‘gentles’, etc.). Accordingly, the systematic historicisation of ‘the 
playhouse’, ‘the story’ or the ‘gentles’ in Henry V advocates a mode of criticism that 
silently bridges the gap between text and context (a gap that is fundamentally 
unbridgeable). Identifying the ontological point of origin of Henry V through the intra-
diegetic reference to ‘the story’ attaches the play to a set historical narrative; this is 
especially problematic in view of the historically saturated field of Shakespeare studies. 
But as its inner contradictions testify, Henry V remains fundamentally open to 
interpretation. Besides, and this is a central concern in the present thesis, the 
discrepancy between signifier and signified, cleverly staged in Henry V, participates in 
the aesthetics of the drama—rather than undermining it, as it has so often been 
claimed.69 If the play remains open to a multitude of contradictory and alternative 
discourses, as it certainly does, it is precisely because historical alienation constitutes 
one of its most powerful loci.70 Whatever historical perspective we choose to adopt 
(medieval, Elizabethan, twenty-first century or any other perspective) can never fully 
coincide with the play’s genuine ‘inner moment’, which is always alien by essence and 
can only be seen in negative—namely through what it is not. Henry V characteristically 
refuses to be elucidated through Shakespeare’s historical moment or even through that 
of the historical king Henry V; more importantly perhaps, it never fully subscribes to a 
                                                
69 For a detailed overview of the (overwhelmingly unfavourable) view of anachronism in Shakespeare 
criticism since the seventeenth century, see Chapter 1 of this thesis, ‘“Violator of Chronology”: 
Shakespeare’s Anachronisms in Con-texts’. 
70 This phenomenon is also a characteristic feature of Julius Caesar and Hamlet, as demonstrated in 
previous chapters. 
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set present, which necessarily includes ‘our’ own present (that of the critic speaking at a 
given time). Like many other plays by Shakespeare, Henry V resists ontological 
foreclosure; and this resistance is emphasised by the Chorus. The untimely aesthetics of 
Shakespeare’s drama can be explained in terms of the registration of this resistance 
within the play—and, in the case of Henry V, the Chorus embodies the main registering 
instance, through the ‘performative present’. Within the critical grid of this thesis, the 
main function of the Chorus is to question the metaphysics of presence perpetuated by 
much literary criticism. For its self-alienating rhetoric troubles the positive 
aestheticisation that underlies many critical modes, including historicist ones. 
 
 D. CHORUS AS INTERPELLATED SUBJECT—LOCATING LACAN’S BIG OTHER (OR NOT) 
Althusser’s theory of the state provides a useful framework to comprehend the Chorus’s 
superficial strategy of objectification of its audience. From an Althusserian perspective, 
the Chorus stands for the sense that 
ideology has always-already interpellated individuals as subjects, which 
amounts to making it clear that individuals are always-already interpellated by 
ideology as subjects, which necessarily leads us to one last proposition: 
individuals are always-already subjects.71 
It seems important to make it clear now that this theory is primarily relevant to an 
audience-based approach to Henry V. In the present analysis, however, the dynamics of 
subjectivity have been deliberately displaced: from the beginning, we have made the 
somewhat unusual decision to look at the world of Henry V (which crucially includes 
‘the world’ at large) from the perspective of the Chorus. Althusser’s theory of the 
ideologically-generated subject provides us with a key ‘transitional’ tool (but not an end 
in itself, as will become clear very soon) to understand the extent to which the 
displacement of presence constitutes an intrinsic effect of Shakespeare’s drama. 
                                                
71 Althusser, ‘Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses’, pp. 49-50. 
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Althusser’s proposition that ‘an individual is always-already a subject, even before he is 
born’ posits the becoming-subject of individuals as systematic and retroactive. As such, 
it sums up rather well the Chorus’s perspective towards the audience it envisions. By 
way of an example, Althusser mentions ‘the ideological ritual that surrounds the 
expectation of a “birth”, that “happy event”’—indeed, ‘everyone knows how much and 
in what way an unborn child is expected.’ The Chorus’s strategy of interpellation 
dramatises the ideological ritual underlying the expectation of an audience (child-like) 
in the play. But this expectation extends beyond the traditional boundaries of ‘the play’; 
it is perpetuated through the assumption (hardly ever questioned by critics) that there is 
indeed an audience that is present where and when the Chorus invokes it. In Henry V, 
the Chorus might be said to stand for what Althusser calls the ‘ideological constraint 
and pre-appointment’ of a ‘“pathological” […] structure’ with regards to its audience.72 
However, the reading of Althusser deployed in this chapter must necessarily take into 
account the elusive quality of the audience addressed by the Chorus. Throughout the 
play, the audience under address is indeed like a child to be born, a ‘happy event’ that is 
yet to come. But, and this is probably the most important factor to keep in mind, this 
happy event cannot ever be said to have arrived; in fact, it might never arrive. 
Althusser’s theory of ideology is only relevant here if we adapt it to the displaced 
subjectivity that has been developed so far—in other words, the fact that the subject is 
not on the side of ‘the audience’ but on the side of the Chorus needs to be integrated to 
the theoretical analysis of the play. If the real subject of Henry V is the Chorus, as it has 
been implied so far, this can only mean that it is the one being ideologically constrained 
through its idea of an audience. This fantasised audience constitutes the overarching 
ideological instance through which the Chorus is always already subjectified. 
                                                
72 Ibid., p. 50. 
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As noted earlier, the Chorus is a pervert—its creation of a false sense of 
possibility in an audience that does not even exist, in particular, testifies to its perversity. 
Thus, in Henry V, the idea of a phantom audience that allegedly knows about a 
mysterious story constitutes the hard kernel of the Chorus’s fantasy. Žižek notes that 
‘fantasy is the primordial form of narrative, which serves to occult some original 
deadlock’; in other words, ‘the narrative silently presupposes as already given what it 
purports to reproduce.’73 What is silently presupposed as already given in the Chorus’s 
narrative is History itself; thus, the pseudo-authentic historical account of Henry V’s life 
constitutes the original deadlock that accounts for the interpellation strategy that is 
developed throughout the play. But if there is no real audience, then who is being 
interpellated? The answer, of course, is: the Chorus itself. For the Chorus, the main 
function of audience delimitation is to ensure that enjoyment of the performance takes 
place. However, such a fantasy can only be fulfilled through the assurance that an 
audience is enjoying the play, which is an unmistakable sign that the Chorus is a pervert. 
As pointed out earlier, the core mechanism of perversity lies in the deferral of 
enjoyment onto another instance—and in the case of Henry V, this instance is located 
within the virtual space of a fantasised audience. Lacanian psychoanalysis offers some 
extremely relevant tools to theorise the intersubjective relation that binds the Chorus to 
its audience-construct. Lacan’s notion of the ‘big Other’, in particular, is very helpful to 
examine the subjective dynamics of the play. The concept appears very early on in 
Lacanian psychoanalysis, in a seminar called ‘Introduction of the Big Other’ (1955). 
During this particular seminar, Lacan suggested that ‘we [as subjects of language] in 
fact address A1, A2,’ namely ‘those we do not know, true Others, true subjects.’ And 
what distinguishes those ‘true Others’ or ‘true subjects’ is that 
                                                
73 Žižek, The Plague of Fantasies, pp. 11-12. 
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they are on the other side of the wall of language, there where in principle I 
never reach them. Fundamentally, it is them I’m aiming at every time I utter true 
speech, but always attain a’, a’’, through reflection. I always aim at true subjects, 
and I have to be content with shadows. The subject is separated from the Others, 
the true ones, by the wall of language.74 
A traditional, audience-based approach to Henry V might locate the big Other on the 
side of the Chorus—this would imply that ‘we’ identify with the audience which the 
Chorus has in mind, which, once again, is not the case in this chapter. On its own, this 
type of identification would merely scratch the surface of the big Other and only 
illustrate what Žižek calls ‘the common perception’ of Lacan’s concept—in this over-
simplified common perception, ‘it is as if we, subjects of language, talk and interact like 
puppets, our speech and gestures dictated by some nameless all-pervasive agency.’75 
However, there is more to the big Other (and Henry V) than a straightforward dystopian 
scheme: the perceiving subject, in particular, does not have to be on the side of an 
audience. On a theoretical level, it might be tempting indeed to view the Chorus as an 
all-pervasive agency, a big Other qua ‘Big Brother’; such an approach, however, would 
only illustrate a superficial aspect of Lacan’s complex notion.76 As Žižek points out, the 
big Other is an elusive instance that operates at the Symbolic level—in Lacanian 
terminology, the order of the ‘Symbolic’ designates the everyday reality of the subject, 
namely what is experienced as real in a given subjective field. 
The symbolic order, society’s unwritten constitution, is the second nature of 
every speaking being: it is here, directing and controlling my acts; it is the sea I 
                                                
74 Jacques Lacan, ‘Introduction of the Big Other’, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book II, The Ego in 
Freud’s Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis, 1954-1955 [1978], edited by Jacques-Alain 
Miller, translated from the French by Sylvana Tomaselli (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 
235-47, p. 244. 
75 Slavoj Žižek, How to Read Lacan (London: Granta Books, 2006), p. 8. 
76 This type of approach is precisely the one adopted in the next chapter in order to explore the notion of 
interpassivity in view of Shakespearean drama. From a Lacanian point of view, there is nothing wrong 
with considering ‘us’ as the subjects of language, as long as we acknowledge the fundamentally shifting 
nature of subjectivity—from a pseudo-objective perspective, the subject is everywhere and nowhere at the 
same time (i.e. there can be no objective/ultimate/impartial account of subjectivity). 
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swim in, yet it remains ultimately impenetrable—I can never put it in front of 
me and grasp it.77 
In the present analysis, the big Other is essentially on the side of that thing (cold and 
slimy—almost otherworldly) often referred to as ‘the audience’, which constitutes the 
impenetrable Symbolic reality that the Chorus strives to fix in time and space. From this 
perspective, Lacan’s suggestion (quoted above) that ‘I always aim at true subjects, and I 
have to be content with shadows’ fully applies to the Chorus. The intersubjective 
dynamics of the play, as explored in this chapter, illustrate the ever-shifting quality of 
the concept of the big Other. 
In spite of all its grounding power, the big Other is fragile, insubstantial, 
properly virtual, in the sense that its status is that of a subjective presupposition. 
It exists only in so far as subjects act as if it exists. Its status is similar to that of 
an ideological cause like Communism or Nation: it is the substance of the 
individuals who recognize themselves in it, the ground of their whole existence, 
the point of reference that provides the ultimate horizon of meaning, something 
for which these individuals are ready to give their lives, yet the only thing that 
really exists are these individuals and their activity, so this substance is actual 
only in so far as individuals believe in it and act accordingly.78 
The idea of the big Other as a ‘subjective presupposition’ maps out the function of the 
audience imagined by the Chorus in Henry V: it is essentially a ‘substance’ that only 
exists to the extent that the subject (the Chorus) acts as if it exists. Eventually, the 
presence of a virtual audience in the Chorus’s experiential field is precisely what allows 
the process of enjoyment to take place. 
 
CONCLUSION 
As demonstrated in this chapter, the Chorus relies on the construction of a virtual 
audience for the deployment of its dramatic strategy within the wider dramatic frame of 
the play Henry V. In psychoanalytical terms, the systematic deferral of enjoyment on to 
                                                
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid., p. 10. 
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another instance (the fantasised audience) makes the Chorus the archetypical pervert. In 
this sense, the intersubjective mechanism of Henry V provides a graphic illustration of 
the big Other qua negatively-invested, impenetrable Symbolic entity. Lacan’s 
concept—and especially Žižek’s interpretation of it—becomes central in the next 
chapter, which carries on exploring the displaced subjective dynamics of Shakespearean 
drama through the notion of interpassivity. In order to explore further the intrinsic 
untimeliness that underlies the experience of literature, the focus is shifted onto ‘us’ as 
perceiving subjects of representation. ‘We’, as the subjective instance defined by a 
specific interpretive present, can also be viewed as the subjects of literature—and the 
Chorus itself, as well as other metadramatic Shakespearean figures, can be said to 
occupy the Symbolic space of the big Other.79 Such radical reversibility suggests that 
the ‘meaning’ of literature has nothing to do with an immutable core of truth that needs 
to be retrieved; rather, meaning is plural as it is perpetually recreated through every act 
of interpretation.80 This perpetual, maddening and unstoppable phenomenon of semantic 
reactualisation is possibly the most crucial and defining feature of the untimely 
aesthetics of Shakespearean drama. 
                                                
79 It might be worth emphasising once again that the ‘we’ that is used in the next chapter differs from the 
all-encompassing ‘we’ that featured in the chapter on Julius Caesar. Unlike that of Chapter 2, the ‘we’ of 
Chapter 5 is self-consciously determined by a specific historical bias—that of early twenty-first century 
technologically advanced societies. 
80 The previous chapter on Hamlet provided an extensive reflection on the notion that literature and its 
‘fragmented’ meanings are a direct effect of critical operations in the present. 
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CHAPTER 5 – ‘I AM IN THE PICTURE’: THE DISPLACEMENT OF SUBJECTIVITY 
AND THE AESTHETICISATION OF THE BIG OTHER IN SHAKESPEAREAN DRAMA 
 
 
 
Here the example of Shakespeare is magnificent. Who demonstrates better that texts fully 
conditioned by their history, loaded with history, and on historical themes, offer themselves so 
well for reading in historical contexts very distant from their time and place of origin, not only in 
the European twentieth century, but also in lending themselves to Japanese or Chinese 
transpositions? 
– Jacques Derrida, ‘This Strange Institution Called Literature’1 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter identified the elusive audience of Henry V as the big Other of 
Lacanian psychoanalysis. However, it is essential to keep in mind that the one defining 
feature of the big Other is its fundamental unfixedness. In other words, the big Other is 
that which makes complete presence impossible—this is the main reason why this 
psychoanalytical concept is so crucial in the present thesis. In order to emphasise the 
volatile quality of the big Other, the present chapter deliberately shifts its perspective by 
referring to a mode of experience that clashes with that of the previous chapter (this is a 
deliberate and productive clash, though). While subjectivity was previously located on 
the side of the Chorus, potential viewers of the dramas are here considered as the 
subjects of representation. 
 Central to the chapter’s argument is the sense that our perspective as viewing 
subjects is inherently displaced by a ghostly gaze that lurks on the sidelines of 
representation. ‘The picture, certainly, is in my eye. But I am in the picture,’ Lacan 
                                                
1 Jacques Derrida, ‘“This Strange Institution Called Literature”: An Interview with Jacques Derrida’, 
translated from the French by Geoffrey Bennington and Rachel Bowlby, in Acts of Literature, edited by 
Derek Attridge (London: Routledge, 1992), 33-75, pp. 63-64. 
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remarked in his seminar, ‘Of the Gaze as Objet Petit a’ (1964).2 This aphorism posits a 
core of alienation within subjectivity: as such, it constitutes the main theoretical axiom 
of the chapter. In Shakespearean drama, both the ghost in Hamlet and the witches in 
Macbeth can be said to testify to the fundamental displacement that haunts subjectivity. 
From the viewpoint of potential audiences, the Chorus in Henry V occupies a similar 
function in that it circumscribes viewers within an enclosed representational space 
(while giving them an illusion of freedom). In this sense, the Chorus can be said to 
crystallise the deferral of presence that underlies representation. As the key mediating 
instance in the play, the Chorus stands for the Lacanian big Other—for Lacan, the main 
function of the theatrical chorus is to take over the process of enjoyment, to enjoy the 
play instead of us. 
 While Lacan’s own comments on the role of the theatrical chorus are discussed 
in the chapter, the reflection focuses on Slavoj Žižek’s interpretation of the concept of 
the big Other—defined by the latter as ‘the agency that decides instead of us, in our 
place.’3 Žižek reads the big Other in view of the notion of interpassivity, brought to the 
fore in the late 1990s.4 Interpassivity describes how, in a given representational context, 
                                                
2 My own translation. Sheridan’s English translation of the seminar contains a serious mistake; it reads: 
‘the picture, certainly, is in my eye. But I am not in the picture’ (Jacques Lacan, ‘Of the Gaze as Objet 
Petit a’, in The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-analysis [1973], edited by Jacques-Alain Miller 
and translated from the French by Alan Sheridan (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1977), p. 96). This is 
a problematic reversal of Lacan’s original aphorism: ‘le tableau, certes, est dans mon œil. Mais moi, je 
suis dans le tableau’ (Les quatre concepts fondamentaux de la psychanalyse, edited by Jacques-Alain 
Miller (éditions du Seuil, 1973), p. 111). Anne Marsh suggests that ‘this translation has influenced the 
way in which Lacan has been read in the English speaking world. To be “not in the picture” means that 
the subject has no agency. It is similar to the way in which Foucault has been read through secondary 
adaptations as a determinist. Neither Lacan nor Foucault are determinist theorists but their work in 
translation has often been read as such. For Lacan the gaze and desire are entwined and entangled so as to 
produce a complex web of looking and being looked at’ (‘Psychoanalysis: The Gaze and the Photo-graph’, 
The Darkroom: Photography and the Theatre of Desire (Victoria: Macmillan, 2003), p. 47). 
3 Slavoj Žižek, Looking Awry: An Introduction to Jacques Lacan through Popular Culture (Cambridge 
MA and London: MIT Press, 1991), p. 77. 
4 ‘Interpassivity’ as the act of projecting one’s own self or emotions onto exterior objects was first used 
by the Austrian philosopher Robert Pfaller. Žižek traces Pfaller’s first use of the term to a 1996 
symposium in Linz (Austria), Die Dinge lachen an unsere Stelle (The Plague of Fantasies [1997], second 
edition (London and New York: Verso, 2008), 144n). See also Robert Pfaller, Die Illusionen der anderen: 
Über das Lustprinzip in der Kultur (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2002). 
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the object deprives us (qua subjects) of our emotional content and takes over the 
process of enjoyment for us. Making extensive use of Žižek’s theory of interpassivity, 
the chapter explores the idea of the displacement of subjectivity in view of 
Shakespearean drama. The Chorus of Henry V, in particular, illustrates the principle of 
mediation that underlies our subjective experience of reality. In this sense, the plays can 
be seen as anticipating certain aspects of our own social formation. Viewed through the 
notion of untimely aesthetics (as developed in previous chapters), Hamlet, Macbeth and 
Henry V stage—as well as participate in the elaboration of—the core of mediation that 
underlies all forms of staged entertainment. Within the larger framework of the thesis, 
the chapter provides a practical demonstration of the notion that the untimely aesthetics 
of Shakespearean drama is always constructed in the present. In other words, this 
aesthetics is the direct effect of the intrusion of the viewer’s eye into the literary picture. 
 
I- UNCANNY PERSPECTIVES: SHAKESPEARE’S LACANIAN OPTICS 
 A. ‘LOOKING AWRY’: ŽIŽEK AND RICHARD II 
In the preface to Looking Awry (1991), Žižek announces that Shakespeare is to be ‘read 
strictly as [a] kitsch author.’5 This ‘kitsch Shakespeare’ turns out to be a key platform in 
his examination of Lacanian psychoanalysis. A few pages into the book, Žižek asserts 
that ‘Richard II proves beyond any doubt that Shakespeare had read Lacan.’6 He then 
goes on to look at his favourite passage in the play. After King Richard’s departure for 
Ireland, the distraught Queen shares her grief with one of Richard’s followers. 
                                                
5 Žižek, Looking Awry, p. vii. 
6 Ibid., 9. Žižek’s remark echoes Daniel Mesguich’s own assertion, in 1977, that ‘Shakespeare had 
obviously read Lacan’ (‘The Book to Come is a Theater’, SubStance 6/7(18/19) (1977), 113-19, p. 118). 
For an account of the pairing of Shakespearean drama and Lacanian psychoanalysis in recent criticism, 
see Jonathan Gil Harris, Shakespeare and Literary Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 
91-106. 
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Unexpectedly, Bushy’s attempt at comforting the Queen develops into an elaborate 
speech on perspective: 
Each substance of a grief hath twenty shadows, 
Which shows like grief itself but is not so. 
For sorrow’s eye, glazèd with blinding tears, 
Divides one thing entire to many objects— 
Like perspectives, which, rightly gazed upon, 
Show nothing but confusion; eyed awry, 
Distinguish form. So your sweet majesty, 
Looking awry upon your lord’s departure, 
Find shapes of grief more than himself to wail, 
Which, looked on as it is, is naught but shadows 
Of what it is not. 
       (2.2.14-24) 
This speech lays the very foundation for Žižek’s interpretive method, which relies on 
the sense that a shift in the viewer’s position can make a familiar concept radically 
unfamiliar. ‘Looking awry,’ to use Shakespeare’s original phrase, implies that we shift 
our perspective in order to ‘distinguish form’, that is to produce meaning.7 In Looking 
Awry (named after Richard II), Žižek deliberately skews his critical position in order to 
provide a fresh outlook on Lacanian theory: ‘this way of “looking awry” at Lacan 
makes it possible to discern features that usually escape a “straightforward” academic 
look,’ he suggests.8 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
7 For a detailed reading of this speech and how it can be said to inform Žižek’s ideology critique, see 
Étienne Poulard, ‘Shakespeare’s Politics of Invisibility: Power and Ideology in The Tempest’, 
International Journal of Žižek Studies [online] 4(1) (2010), available at 
http://zizekstudies.org/index.php/ijzs/article/view/225/327. 
8 Žižek, Looking Awry, pp. vii-viii. 
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B. THE ‘PRE-EXISTENCE OF A GAZE’ IN HAMLET: THE CORE OF ALIENATION 
UNDERLYING SUBJECTIVITY 
Repeatedly emphasised in recent scholarship, the uncanny affinity between Lacanian 
psychoanalysis and Shakespearean drama also stands the test of other works.9 Hamlet, 
for instance, toys insistently with the notion of a sideways gaze that decentres 
subjectivity. This idea climaxes in the elaborate optics of the play within the play in Act 
III. While King Claudius is watching ‘The Mousetrap,’ a bigger play is taking place: a 
play that is about Hamlet watching Claudius watch another play—‘I’ll observe his 
looks,’ the prince had announced previously (3.2.217; 2.2.573). But Hamlet himself is 
under the constant scrutiny of invisible eyes posted everywhere. Although his original 
plan is to observe the king’s looks, he is himself branded ‘Th’observed of all observers’ 
by Ophelia (3.1.153). And the prince is indeed being looked at from everywhere—by 
Claudius’ secret agents, by an inscrutable ghost, but also by audiences potentially 
watching or reading Hamlet. From a Lacanian perspective, the interest of the play 
within the play lies in its staging of an endlessly shifting gaze: the subject’s conviction 
of being in control of its field of vision is systematically undermined by the presence of 
a supplementary gaze lurking in the margins. While Claudius’ central position as an 
observer is decentred by Hamlet’s ‘special observance,’ the prince’s own vantage point 
in the theatre in Elsinore is destabilised by a multitude of invisible eyes coming from all 
sides (3.2.17). The notion that the gaze manifests itself from a point that is always 
already elsewhere is a typical Lacanian locus: ‘in the scopic field, the gaze is outside, I 
am looked at, that is to say, I am a picture,’ Lacan remarked in his famous seminar on 
                                                
9 On this topic, see notably Shakespeare in Psychoanalysis by Philip Armstrong (London: Routledge, 
2001) and After Oedipus: Shakespeare in Psychoanalysis by Julia Reinhard Lupton and Kenneth 
Reinhard (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993). 
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the gaze.10 Thus, Hamlet’s seemingly privileged position as a looking subject in the 
theatre renders him oblivious to the fact that he is also part of the picture. This 
primordial scopic estrangement also mirrors our own precarious position as viewers 
(readers and playgoers alike) of Hamlet. As the play illustrates, theatrical representation 
fundamentally destabilises how we see ourselves in relation to the world. Although we 
might like to think of ourselves as comfortably uninvolved observers, we (like Claudius) 
sooner or later realise that we too are in the spotlight: ‘we are beings who are looked at, 
in the spectacle of the world.’11 Lacan develops this locus in his seminar on Hamlet, ‘a 
tragedy of desire that establishes the subject in dependence on the signifier.’ Thus, 
‘Hamlet is constantly suspended in the time of the Other,’ and ‘whatever [he] may do, 
he will do it only at the hour of the Other.’12 
The play within the play in Hamlet can be read as a metadramatic comment on 
the precarious situation of the viewer, not only in the theatre, but in the world at large. 
The presence of an ever-shifting gaze circumscribing the subject makes vision a 
fundamentally alienating experience. What destabilises subjectivity, according to Lacan, 
is ‘the pre-existence of a gaze,’ which testifies to the sensation that ‘I see only from one 
point, but in my existence I am looked at from all sides.’13 In Hamlet, the pre-existence 
of a gaze is epitomised in the figure of the Ghost, which always already precedes the 
subject in the scopic field. The ghost’s decentring function is dramatised at the 
beginning of the play when one of the sentinels posted on the battlements inquires: 
‘What, has this thing appeared again?’ (1.1.19). As mentioned in the previous chapter, 
                                                
10 Jacques Lacan, ‘Of the Gaze as Objet Petit a’, p. 106. Martin Jay specifically locates Lacan’s optics 
within the larger context of an ‘antiocularcentric discourse’ in twentieth-century French philosophy and 
psychoanalysis (Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth-Century French Thought 
(Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1994), p. 16). 
11 Lacan, ‘Of the Gaze as Objet Petit a’, p. 75. 
12 Jacques Lacan, ‘Desire and the Interpretation of Desire in Hamlet’, edited by Jacques-Alain Miller, 
translated from the French by James Hulbert, Yale French Studies 55/56 (1977), 11-52, pp. 17 and 18. 
13 Lacan, ‘Of the Gaze as Objet Petit a’, p. 72. 
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what fascinated Derrida about this particular line in the play is that the thing in question 
has not ‘appeared’ yet—it is literally the first reference to the Ghost in the play. Thus, 
the first scene of Hamlet confronts us in effect with a thing that ‘comes back, so to 
speak, for the first time,’ Derrida points out in Specters of Marx.14 The fact that the 
Ghost’s first apparition is itself haunted establishes the pre-existence of a gaze in the 
play. The Ghost stands for the asymmetrical dialectic between the subject’s eye and the 
objectifying gaze to which it is subjected—after all, Lacan defined the experience of 
‘seeing’ as that to ‘which I am subjected in an original way.’15 In this sense, it can be 
said that Hamlet maps out a visual regime where seeing is intrinsically obscene because 
it involves a radical form of exhibitionism. The Ghost symbolises an omniscient gaze 
that comes from all sides; and although it ‘fixe[s] [its] eyes upon [us] […] Most 
constantly,’ such a gaze cannot be allocated a point of origin because, from the 
beginning (and before—especially before), it comes from elsewhere (1.3.232-3). 
Derrida’s thought-provoking analysis of the play suggests that the Ghost, qua pure gaze, 
is at once all-seeing and unseen (presence and absence): 
This Thing meanwhile looks at us and sees us not see it even when it is there. A 
spectral asymmetry interrupts here all specularity. It de-synchronizes, it recalls 
us to anachrony. We will call this the visor effect: we do not see who looks at 
us.16 
Powerfully dramatised in Hamlet, the de-synchronising function of the gaze is a 
recurring Shakespearean locus. The spooky sense that we do not see who looks at us, in 
spite of being looked at from all sides, runs like a guiding thread in Shakespeare’s 
                                                
14 Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New 
International [1993], translated from the French by Peggy Kamuf (New York and London: Routledge, 
1994), p. 4. 
15 Lacan, ‘Of the Gaze as Objet Petit a’, p. 72. 
16 Derrida, Specters of Marx, pp. 6-7. 
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Jacobean dramas—from the dark paranoia of Measure for Measure to the bleak 
panopticism of The Tempest.17 
 
 C. ‘ENTER THREE WITCHES’: A GAZE LURKING IN THE MARGINS OF THEATRICALITY 
In Macbeth, the witches occupy the same οὐτόπος (“non-space”) as the Ghost in Hamlet: 
they epitomise the pre-existence of a gaze that lurks in the margins of theatricality.18 
Their de-synchronising function transpires in the first scene of the play, as the French 
poet Stéphane Mallarmé pointed out in ‘La fausse entrée des sorcières dans Macbeth’ 
(1897). In the essay, Mallarmé suggests that the witches’ supposed entrance—‘Enter 
                                                
17 There is consistent debate around the issue of whether Lacan’s discourse on optics is compatible with 
other French theories of vision, and notably Michel Foucault’s reflections on panopticism. Thus, Anne 
Marsh notes that ‘critics have often […] tended to read Jacques Lacan through the existential philosophy 
of Jean-Paul Sartre and combined these two interpretations of the gaze to support a Foucauldian panoptic 
analysis. It is therefore necessary to re-examine Lacan’s thesis on the gaze in order to undermine this 
panoptic determinism and to recuperate a subject who is always part of the picture, especially as it is 
being made. In Lacan’s thesis, the subject becomes a kind of virus infecting the picture’ (The Darkroom, 
p. 42). Martin Jay traces this ongoing panopticisation of Lacan to an essay by Jacques-Alain Miller—
Lacan’s son-in-law and the editor of the French journal of psychoanalysis Ornicar? (Downcast Eyes, pp. 
381-84). First published in 1975 as ‘Le despotisme de l’utile: la machine panoptique de Jeremy Bentham’, 
the essay examines Bentham’s 1791 treatise on a model prison. Considering the concept of the 
panopticon, Miller suggests that ‘this configuration sets up a brutal dissymmetry of visibility. The 
enclosed space lacks depth; it is spread out and open to a single, solitary central eye. It is bathed in light. 
Nothing and no one can be hidden inside it—except the gaze itself, the invisible omnivoyeur. 
Surveillance confiscates the gaze for its own profit, appropriates it, and submits the inmate to it’ (‘Jeremy 
Bentham’s Panoptic Device’, October 41 (Summer, 1987), p. 4). But, as Jay notes, ‘Miller was not the 
first to criticize the coercive implications of Bentham’s panoptic dream. […] Nor was his critique the 
most influential, that honor going to Michel Foucault’s more extensive discussion in Discipline and 
Punish’—also published in 1975 (p. 383). While ‘Jacques-Alain Miller was the first psychoanalyst to see 
the panoptic model as the architectural embodiment of Lacan’s theory of the eye and the gaze,’ Marsh 
argues that ‘Miller really offers a psycho-social reading, much like Foucault’s. There is no direct 
reference to Lacan and the question of the subject’s desire, which is fundamental to psychoanalysis, is not 
addressed.’ By contrast, ‘the field of vision explored by Lacan is full of traps, it is a labyrinth rather than 
a panopticon’ (The Darkroom, pp. 42 and 46). However, Jay points out (in relation to both Miller and 
Louis Althusser) that ‘the psychological analysis of vision in Lacan could easily be absorbed into a social 
and political critique in which voir was linked with both savoir and pouvoir’ (p. 383). And indeed, 
‘Lacanian and Foucauldian positions have been confounded by an unstable theoretical marriage,’ Marsh 
observes. ‘The geometric scheme, embodied by the panopticon, is about space and does not adequately 
explain the function of the eye, let alone the gaze which is active within the relationship between the eye 
and light, enmeshed within a complex corporeal and psychological space.’ In contrast with Foucauldian 
optics, ‘Lacan’s concept of the subject as blind spot, a stain within representation, allows for a more 
complex and less homogenous interpretation and understanding of visual representation,’ Marsh claims 
(The Darkroom, pp. 42, 46 and 48). In his seminar on ‘The Line and the Light’ (1964), Lacan remarks: ‘if 
I am anything in the picture, it is always in the form of the screen, which I earlier called the stain, the spot’ 
(The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-analysis, p. 97). 
18 Terry Eagleton makes a similar point when he argues that ‘the witches figure as the “unconscious” of 
the drama’ (William Shakespeare, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 2). 
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three WITCHES’—is not really an entrance (1.1.0). Instead, they seem to be already 
present before the performance starts: it is ‘as if the curtain has simply risen a minute 
too soon, betraying fateful goings-on.’19 In this sense, the untimely rising of the curtain 
(lever de rideau) lets us peek at something that should have remained hidden: the extra-
dramatic presence of a gaze that stares back at us from the gaping darkness of the 
stage.20 Rehearsing Mallarmé’s insight, Jean-Michel Rabaté notes that ‘the curtain that 
separates us from the mystery has been raised too early, forcing us to peep through a 
darkness that was not meant for us.’21 In the theatre, the curtain embodies (although it is 
also supposed to hide it) the ‘darkness that was not meant for us’, which corresponds to 
the inscrutable moment that precedes representation. But in Macbeth, the curtain is by 
definition always lifted too early, letting us ‘peep through the blanket of the dark’ 
(1.5.51). Instead of entering the page/stage, the witches become visible, suddenly and 
intermittently, in the epileptic blink of lightning strokes—‘Thunder and lightning’ 
                                                
19 ‘Ouverture sur un chef-d’œuvre : comme, en le chef-d’œuvre, le rideau s’est simplement levé, une 
minute, trop tôt, trahissant des menées fatidiques’ (Stéphane Mallarmé, “La fausse entrée des sorcières 
dans Macbeth”, Oeuvres complètes (Paris: Pléiade, 1945), p. 348). Translated from the French by Barbara 
Johnson and cited in Marjorie Garber, Shakespeare’s Ghost Writers: Literature as Uncanny Causality 
[1987] (New York and London: Routledge, 2010), pp. 123-24. 
20 By staging a scene that lets us see what should not be seen, the witches reveal their close affinity with 
the category of the uncanny, as identified by Sigmund Freud. In his famous essay from 1919, Freud 
declared, rather surprisingly, that ‘the ghostly apparitions in Shakespeare’s Hamlet, Macbeth or Julius 
Caesar may be dark and terrifying, but at bottom they are no more uncanny than, say, the serene world of 
Homer’s gods.’ This is all the more puzzling when we know that, in the same essay, Freud considers the 
uncanny as that which ‘was meant to remain secret and hidden and has come into the open’ (The Uncanny, 
edited by Hugh Haughton and translated from the German by David McLintock (London: Penguin, 2003), 
pp. 156 and 132). It seems difficult to agree with Freud’s somewhat whimsical suggestion that the ghostly 
apparitions in Shakespeare have nothing to do with the uncanny—on the other hand, this remark can be 
viewed as a practical instance of the uncanny. It is worth noting that the witches are referred to as ‘weird 
sisters’ in Macbeth (it is their official name in the dramatis personæ list) and that the word ‘strange’ 
recurs sixteen times in the play. Thus, ‘“strange” would perhaps be Shakespeare’s word for “uncanny”, 
unheimlich,’ Nicholas Royle suggests (‘The Poet: Julius Caesar and the Democracy to Come’, In 
Memory of Jacques Derrida (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009), p. 4). See also Nicholas 
Royle’s monograph, The Uncanny: An Introduction (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003), 
which contains many interesting considerations on literature and the category of the uncanny. 
21 Jean-Michel Rabaté, Given: 1° Art, 2° Crime: Modernity, Murder and Mass Culture (Brighton: Sussex 
Academic Press, 2006), p. 73. 
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(1.1.0).22 Following Mallarmé, Marjorie Garber remarks that ‘the witches do not enter, 
are not described as entering the scene in the ordinary way of actors—instead they 
appear: extra-scéniquement, uncannily present.’23 What the witches stand for in the first 
scene of Macbeth is a presence that precedes all presence, an ‘extra-scénique’ gaze that 
transcends the spatio-temporal boundaries of the stage and decentres the subject’s 
fantasised ontological centre. This oblique gaze does not only address the characters in 
the play; it also circumscribes potential audiences: ‘the spectator of the play Macbeth, 
and Macbeth himself as spectator of the witches’ play, are both thereby subjected to a 
gaze, photographed as components within the spectacle,’ Philip Armstrong observes.24 
Thus, the peripheral gaze of the witches imparts the sense that we are not only 
spectators of the play: crucially, we are also part of the performance. From the 
beginning, even before the play starts, we are unwittingly ‘photographed as components 
within the spectacle’. When we go to the theatre, we obey a scopic drive that makes us 
want to ‘look at things’ compulsively: we watch the world as spectacle.25 However, the 
originary split between the subject’s eye and the object’s gaze posited by Lacan 
guarantees that we are fundamentally looked at in the spectacle of the world. 
Rephrasing this foundational axiom of Lacanian psychoanalysis, Žižek writes: ‘when I 
                                                
22 ‘A lightning flash is composed of a series of strokes with an average of about four. The length and 
duration of each lightning stroke vary, but typically average about 30 microseconds (the average peak 
power per stroke is about 1012 watts)’ (Hugh Christian and Melanie Cook, “A Lightning Primer: 
Characteristics of a Storm”, Lightning & Atmospheric Electricity Research at the GHCC (NASA), 
http://thunder.nsstc.nasa.gov/primer/primer2.html (accessed 31 August 2011)). 
23 Garber, Shakespeare’s Ghost Writers, p. 123. 
24  Philip Armstrong, “Guilty Creatures: The Visual Regime of Shakespeare’s Later Tragedies” 
(unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Wales, College of Cardiff, 1995), p. 245. See also 
Armstrong’s monograph, Shakespeare’s Visual Regime: Tragedy, Psychoanalysis and the Gaze (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000). 
25 Although Freud had suggested oral, anal and genital drives, Lacan added the scopic drive to the main 
categories of drive: ‘it is not, after all, for nothing that analysis is not carried out face to face. The split 
between eye and gaze will enable us, you will see, to add the scopic drive to the list of the drives’ (Lacan, 
‘Of the Gaze as Objet Petit a’, p. 78). 
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look at an object, the object is always already gazing at me, and from a point at which I 
cannot see it.’26 
The dramatic status of the witches in Macbeth is strikingly unclear: although 
they are characters in the play (they are listed in the dramatis personæ), they also 
function as a metadramatic commentary, in the manner of a chorus. Such hybridity is 
apparent in the first scene, where they figure not so much as characters but rather as 
narrators introducing the play in a few words. 
FIRST WITCH When shall we three meet again? 
   In thunder, lightning, or in rain? 
SECOND WITCH When the hurly-burly’s done, 
   When the battle’s lost and won. 
THIRD WITCH That will be ere the set of the sun. 
FIRST WITCH  Where the place? 
SECOND WITCH   Upon the heath. 
THIRD WITCH There to meet with Macbeth 
      (1.1.1-7) 
The whole plot of Macbeth is here summarised in the space of seven lines: recalling 
those two-minute comic adaptations by the Reduced Shakespeare Company, the first 
scene of the play is a bit of a narratorial joke, anticipating subsequent subversions of the 
play. 27  The reference to the main protagonist—‘There to meet with Macbeth’—
announces the fateful encounter that is to take place later in the same act. Like a chorus, 
the witches speak catachronically (their utterances appear in a different order from that 
of the narrative which unfolds for audiences): in this way, they give us glimpses of the 
action to come. But are they merely anticipating the action in a descriptive mode or are 
they actually instigating the play performatively? The strong performative dimension of 
the witches’ utterances suggests that they hold a form of authorial agency. Such 
performativity is encapsulated in the third witch’s impatient injunction, ‘Anon’ 
                                                
26 Žižek, Looking Awry, p. 109. 
27 The Reduced Shakespeare Company: The Complete Works of William Shakespeare (Abridged) (2000) 
is available on DVD. Their two-minute rendition of Macbeth can be viewed at 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pQk4Y6Q69u8 (accessed 3 November 2011). 
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(meaning ‘right now’ or ‘at once’ in Shakespeare’s English), the aim of which, it seems, 
is to conjure up immediate dramatic presence (8). So, does the witches’ famous 
aphorism, ‘Fair is foul, and foul is fair,’ crystallise the play’s reversal of established 
values or is it a generative statement (performative) that engenders the play de facto 
(10)? There is no readymade answer to this question: Macbeth famously keeps the 
mystery intact regarding the origin and agency of its witches, whose dramatic 
intervention is, in their own words, ‘a deed without a name’ (4.1.65). While the witches 
are part of Macbeth as we may read it or watch it, their position in the scopic field is 
constantly shifting, which conveys an uncanny effect of presence as absence (just like 
the Ghost in Hamlet). The primordial ontological shift that the witches embody is 
precisely what makes Macbeth so relevant to contemporary reflections on subjectivity. 
Their role as metadramatic commentary originates in the empty dramatic space 
(οὐτόπος) from which they speak. In a Žižekian sense, what the witches symbolise is the 
necessary perspective, the ‘awry’ view that allows the observer to ‘distinguish form’. 
Readers and viewers of Macbeth often wonder what the witches actually ‘do’ in the play. 
On the level of dramatic enjoyment, at least, it is clear: they tell us how to enjoy the play. 
Like the chorus of Greek tragedy, the witches are the managers of enjoyment. 
 
II- INTERPASSIVITY: ON THE DISPLACEMENT OF SUBJECTIVITY IN SHAKESPEARE AND 
IN THE ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY 
 A. THE INTERPASSIVE CHORUS OF HENRY V 
In The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, Lacan comments on the role of the classical chorus in 
the theatrical economy of enjoyment: 
When you go to the theatre in the evening, you are preoccupied by the affairs of 
the day, by the pen that you lost, by the check that you will have to sign the next 
day. You shouldn’t give yourselves too much credit. Your emotions are taken 
charge of by the healthy order displayed on the stage. The Chorus takes care of 
them. The emotional commentary is done for you. […] Therefore, you don’t 
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have to worry; even if you don’t feel anything, the Chorus will feel in your 
stead.28 
As Lacan points out, the theatrical chorus displaces subjectivity by taking charge of the 
audience’s emotions. Not only are we told what to feel but it feels for us; we are ‘felt 
for’, so to speak. Nowhere in Shakespeare’s plays is this idea better illustrated than in 
Henry V, whose coercive chorus epitomises the Lacanian big Other (as Žižek remarks, 
‘the “big Other” designates precisely the agency that decides instead of us, in our 
place’). One of the most fascinating aspects of Henry V—explored in the previous 
chapter—lies in the Chorus’s strategy of objectification of (what it sees as) its audience. 
Let us pretend for a while that we are in the position of the imaginary audience under 
address. At all times, the Chorus’s dizzying melodramatic logorrhoea ensures that the 
emotional commentary is done for us: all we are required to do, it seems, is to watch the 
Chorus enjoy the play in our own place. In Act IV, for instance, it insists on the need for 
us to ‘sit patiently and inly ruminate,’ to ‘sit and see’—meanwhile, the emotional 
content is taken charge of (4.0.24; 52). Each choric intervention is an occasion to 
bombard us with repetitive orders apparently aimed at depriving us of our free will. 
While the Chorus revels in the bombastic grandeur of its historical narrative, we are 
constantly asked to ‘suppose’ or ‘imagine’ that we actively participate in the dramatic 
deployment.29 The numerous appeals to the spectators create a powerful sense of 
interactivity; we are given a central role in the dramatic process. However, and as Žižek 
explains, the situation in which the object carries out the emotional commentary for ‘me’ 
is the exact opposite of interactivity: 
The other side of this interactivity is interpassivity. The obverse of interacting 
with the object (instead of just passively following the show) is the situation in 
                                                
28 Jacques Lacan, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis. The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: Book VII (London and 
New York: Routledge, 2008), p. 310. 
29  For specific examples, see previous chapter—‘“O My Democratic Friends”: Henry V and the 
Performance of Presence’. 
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which the object itself takes from me, deprives me of, my own passivity, so that 
it is the object itself that enjoys the show instead of me, relieving me of the duty 
to enjoy myself.30 
In Henry V, the deprivation of the viewer’s passivity is enacted by the Chorus taking 
over the process of enjoyment. In this sense, the Chorus appears as the ultimate symbol 
of interpassivity. Thus, when the Chorus enjoys for me, ‘I am passive through the 
Other.’31 
 
B. THREE INSTANCES OF INTERPASSIVITY IN CONTEMPORARY MASS ENTERTAINMENT 
The most disturbing aspect of interpassivity lies in the way the object can experience 
emotions in my place: ‘it is as if some figure of the other—in this case, the Chorus—can 
take over from us and experience for us our innermost and most spontaneous feelings 
and attitudes, inclusive of crying and laughing,’ Žižek writes.32 In Henry V, the Chorus 
exults, manifestly intoxicated by its own narrative: ‘now sits expectation in the air’ 
(2.0.8). As the feeling of anticipation is experienced for us by ‘some figure of the other’, 
we are deprived of our emotional content. The main effect of being ‘felt for’ in this way 
is that the status of the audience qua positively invested subject is cancelled. In 
Lacanian terminology, the matheme $ refers to the inherently barred or split status of 
the subject, which is constituted through a lack.33 Thus, 
the very fact that I can be deprived of even my innermost psychic (‘mental’) 
content, that the big Other (or fetish) can laugh for me, and so on, is what makes 
me $, the barred subject, the pure void with no positive substantial content.34 
                                                
30 Slavoj Žižek, How to Read Lacan (London: Granta Books, 2006), p. 24. 
31 Ibid., p. 26. 
32 Ibid., p. 22. 
33 See Jacques Lacan, Le séminaire, livre IV, La relation d’objet (Paris : Seuil, 1998). No English 
translation available at this point. 
34 Žižek, The Plague of Fantasies, p. 159. 
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A modern equivalent of the theatrical chorus would be canned laughter—artificial 
audience laughter inserted into TV programmes. Canned laughter was first devised by 
the American sound engineer Charles Rolland Douglass in the 1950s, when the need to 
simulate live audiences became pressing, due to the ever-increasing costs of live TV 
sitcoms.35 The ‘Laff Box’, as it was then dubbed, was a huge tape machine which stood 
‘more than two feet tall, operated like an organ, with a keyboard to select the style, sex 
and age of the laugh as well as a foot pedal to time the length of the reaction.’36 On a 
purely mechanical level, canned laughter emulates the ‘genuine’ (or rather expected) 
emotional response of an audience. However, its most far-reaching effect is that it 
ultimately supplants the so-called genuine emotion it purports to stage. In this sense, it 
is not sufficient to say that canned laughter imitates human feelings; rather, it literally 
takes the place of them. For Žižek, the process of emotional substitution that canned 
laughter activates epitomises the interpassive process. 
When I come home in the evening too exhausted to engage in meaningful 
activity, I just tune in to a TV sitcom; even if I do not laugh, but simply stare at 
the screen, tired after a hard day’s work, I nonetheless feel relieved after the 
show. It is as if the TV were literally laughing in my place, instead of me.37 
Canned laughter empties me of my emotional content: it enjoys for me when I am too 
tired to think or engage with whatever I am watching (which is no longer relevant). As 
such, it highlights a central function of mass entertainment, which is to relieve me of the 
duty to enjoy myself.38 
                                                
35 Miss Cellania, ‘Artificially Sweetened: The Story of Canned Laughter’ (22 August 2012), Neatorama, 
http://www.neatorama.com/2012/08/22/Artificially-Sweetened-The-Story-of-Canned-Laughter/ (accessed 
24 December 2012). 
36 Adam Bernstein, ‘Charles Douglass, 93; Gave TV Its Laugh Track’, The Washington Post (24 April 
2003), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename=article&contentId=A27715-
2003Apr23&notFound=true (accessed 06 September 2011). 
37  Slavoj Žižek, ‘Will You Laugh for Me, Please?’ (18 July 2003), In These Times, 
http://www.inthesetimes.com/article/88 (accessed 06 September 2011). 
38 In a paper called ‘The Enjoying Machine’, Mladen Dolar offers ‘a glance into the prehistory of 
interpassivity’ in the arts. The paper was given at a conference in Istanbul in 2010 (‘interpasif persona’: 
amber’08 arts and technology festival). For the official transcript, see 
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Another TV-related example of interpassivity is the practice that consists in 
recording films (or other programmes) and storing them for future viewing—‘for which, 
of course, there is almost never time,’ Žižek points out: 
Although I do not actually watch the films, the very awareness that the films I 
love are stored in my video library gives me a profound satisfaction, and 
occasionally enables me to simply relax and indulge in the exquisite art of far 
niente—as if the VCR is in a way watching them for me, in my place.39 
Video recording is a significant modern instance that illustrates the extent to which 
mass entertainment relies on a big Other figure enjoying in my place. Thus, when the 
video player is watching the films for me, I can afford to do nothing: I can truly relax. 
At last, I can watch TV in peace because I know that the ‘important stuff’ is taken care 
of by the Other—here again, I am being ‘felt for’. Far from being an empowering 
activity, watching TV fundamentally implies that I am being watched. The ultimate 
example for the idea that enjoyment relies, at heart, on the displacement of subjectivity 
is pornography, which functions more and more in an interpassive way, Žižek explains. 
Thus, 
X-rated films are no longer primarily the means to excite the user for his (or her) 
solitary masturbatory activity—just staring at the screen where ‘the action takes 
place’ is sufficient, it is enough for me to observe how others enjoy in the place 
of me.40 
In effect, pornography magnifies the core principle of alienation that underlies the 
whole experience of watching television. If pornography is so unnerving, it is precisely 
because it takes us too close to this principle by bringing to the surface the kernel of 
obscenity that sustains mass entertainment.41 
                                                                                                                                          
http://www.scribd.com/doc/59669927/amber-08-Art-and-Technology-Festiva (accessed 18 January 2012), 
pp. 136-47. 
39 Žižek, How to Read Lacan, 24. 
40 Ibid. 
41 This kind of close-up effect can be found elsewhere in popular culture—and most notably in David 
Lynch’s films, when the camera typically zooms in on an apparently insignificant detail and suddenly 
reveals the primordial substance of life, swarming with disgusting larvae. A famous example would be 
that of Blue Velvet (1986), which opens on an idyllic image of American suburbs: blue sky, red poppies, 
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C. ‘A PARALYSED OBJECT-GAZE’: THE OBJECTIFICATION OF THE VIEWER 
Ultimately, what pornography helps us realise is the extent to which mediated 
entertainment in all its forms is inherently pornographic. The intrinsic obscenity of the 
modern industry of large-scale entertainment can be read in the very geography of 
Elizabethan London. In Shakespeare’s time, playhouses were typically relegated to the 
outskirts of the city, along with brothels. This significant geographical determination 
asserts theatricality’s elective affinity with pornography—from the Greek pornē, 
literally meaning ‘prostitution’. The prostitutive nature of theatre is dramatised in Henry 
V, with a promiscuous Chorus that flirts with its audience relentlessly: 
the scene 
Is now transported, gentles, to Southampton. 
There is the playhouse now, there must you sit, 
And thence to France shall we convey you safe 
And bring you back, charming the narrow seas 
To give you gentle pass, for if we may 
We’ll not offend one stomach with our play. 
     (2.0.34-40) 
Throughout Henry V, the Chorus refers to its audience as ‘gentles’—which, in 
Shakespeare’s time, was synonymous with ‘well-born’, ‘honourable’ or ‘noble’. 
However, this systematic gentrification is only a preliminary stage in the lewd flirtatious 
strategy of the Chorus, which then offers to take its spectators to France, ‘charming the 
narrow seas’ to give them ‘gentle pass’. The proclaimed destination gives us a clue as to 
how the proposition should be read: the French word passe, a euphemism for sexual 
gratification, is generally used in the expression maison de passe (literally ‘brothel’)—
                                                                                                                                          
white fences, waving firemen and well-groomed kids crossing the street. The scene’s dream-like quality 
culminates in the figure of a middle-aged man watering his garden. However, the harmonious feeling 
soon disintegrates when the man suddenly suffers a stroke and collapses. The camera then zooms in on 
the grass, revealing a multitude of cockroaches crawling about. In the next scene, the main protagonist 
Jeffrey Beaumont (Kyle MacLachlan) finds a severed ear in a field; a close up reveals it to be infested 
with ants. For Žižek’s analysis of Blue Velvet, see ‘David Lynch, or, the Feminine Depression’, in The 
Metastases of Enjoyment: On Women and Causality (London and New York: Verso, 1994), pp. 113-29. 
For an extensive discussion of Blue Velvet in view of Žižek’s theories, see Todd McGowan, ‘Fantasizing 
the Father in Blue Velvet’, The Impossible David Lynch (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 
pp. 90-109. 
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this is where the English expression ‘to make a pass’ comes from. So the Chorus’s 
figurative pledge to ‘give […] gentle pass’ to its audience is also a straightforward 
proposition to pleasure them in a sexual way—as well as a very convincing 
demonstration that from being ‘felt for’ to being ‘felt up’ there is a very fine line. We 
are in the presence of a sexually aggressive Chorus that flirts with us, chats us up, 
comes on to us. Il nous drague! (as the French would say). The expression is very 
appropriate here as it nails down two essential features of the Chorus’s naughty 
flirtation with its fantasised audience: while coming on to us in an overtly sexual way, it 
also ‘drags’ us quite literally—a double function that recalls that of the prostitute, who 
has to be promiscuous and engaging in order to attract customers. Thus, in Henry V, the 
Chorus drags its audience to a performance by making explicit promises of sexual 
gratification. Such a perverted little dramatic strategy illustrates the extent to which 
theatre is the pornographic institution par excellence. 
Ultimately, pornography crystallises the extent to which staged entertainment 
relies on the viewer being assigned the status of an object. 
Contrary to the commonplace according to which, in pornography, the other (the 
person shown on the screen) is degraded to an object of our voyeuristic pleasure, 
we must stress that it is the spectator himself who effectively occupies the 
position of the object. The real subjects are the actors on the screen trying to 
rouse us sexually, while we, the spectators, are reduced to a paralyzed object-
gaze.42 
Žižek’s insight prompts the sense that pornography is nothing but a metonymy for mass 
entertainment at large. What pornography does, in effect, is magnify the obscene 
dynamics of enjoyment underlying theatre, television or cinema. In other words, it 
makes apparent something that is already there in the visual arts.43 Likewise, the anti-
ocularcentric play within the play of Hamlet and the Chorus dragueur of Henry V both 
                                                
42 Žižek, Looking Awry, p. 110. 
43 For a more thorough analysis of this phenomenon, see Étienne Poulard, ‘“After the Takeover”: 
Shakespeare, Lacan, Žižek and the Interpassive Subject’, English Studies 94(3) (2013), 291-312. 
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testify to theatre’s capacity to reflect on its own alienating function in relation to the 
viewer’s eye. The idea that vision is at heart an alienating experience for the subject is 
staged in one of the most memorable episodes of Stanley Kubrick’s film adaptation 
from Anthony Burgess’ novel, A Clockwork Orange (1971). Psychopathic delinquent 
Alex DeLarge is the leader of a small band of thugs whose main occupation is to 
indulge in ‘ultra-violence’. After murdering a woman in her house, Alex is captured by 
the police and sentenced to fourteen years in prison. Two years into his sentence, he is 
offered an alternative procedure: the Ludovico technique—an experimental aversion 
therapy which aims at rehabilitating criminals within two weeks. The ‘therapy’ consists 
in forcing the subject to watch violent images for protracted periods of time while under 
the effect of nausea-inducing drugs; the use of iron specula guarantees that the victim’s 
eyes remain open at all times. It is probably not a coincidence that the scene bears 
striking similarities with the play within the play in Hamlet. Does not Alex’s ‘paralysed 
object-gaze’ in the experimental scientific cinema exactly match Hamlet’s position as 
‘the observed of all observers’ in the theatre in Elsinore? In both situations, the subject 
is staged as deprived of its privileged viewing position. In A Clockwork Orange, the 
possibility of such a vantage-point is undermined by the doctors’ ubiquitous gaze, 
coming from all sides and circumscribing their patient. The dehumanising effect of this 
medical gaze, all-seeing but unseen, is implied by the spectral presence of the doctors at 
the back of the cinema: merged in the blinding halo of the projector’s light, they are 
hardly discernible, except for their ghost-like white coats. Ultimately, such an analogy 
demonstrates how Shakespearean drama and modern mass entertainment can be read in 
view of one another. While the plays can be used in order to look at certain aspects of 
our own social formation, contemporary artworks can also provide interesting entry 
points into Shakespeare—these are two key presentist modes of investigation. 
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Eventually, such methods can be said to illustrate as well as make use of what has been 
identified, throughout the thesis, as the untimely aesthetics of Shakespearean drama. 
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CONCLUSION – BEYOND RESISTANCE: POST-CRITICAL SURRENDER 
The final chapter of this thesis has aimed to demonstrate how some key metadramatic 
Shakespearean characters can be said to register as well as participate in a radical 
displacement of the viewer’s subjectivity (assuming there is indeed a viewer in the 
playhouse, this time). Thus, the ghost in Hamlet, the witches in Macbeth and the Chorus 
in Henry V can illustrate how—from the beginning, and even before—subjectivity is 
haunted by an elusive instance that objectifies the viewing subject. Henry V’s Chorus, in 
particular, constitutes a powerful instance of the politics of interpassivity that conditions 
our experience not only of theatre but of all forms of staged entertainment—as 
discussed in the chapter, the Chorus (through its very function in the mediation of 
subjectivity) anticipates some defining features of the modern entertainment industry 
such as canned laughter and pornography. Other significant examples of interpassivity, 
not examined in the chapter, include televised football matches and adverts—in those 
instances, the intervention of a pervasive commenting voice reminds us that the 
emotional commentary provided by the TV set is essentially an updated version of the 
classical chorus that not only urges us to enjoy but literally enjoys for us. For Žižek, 
though, the ‘exact counterpart of the Chorus in antique tragedy’ remains canned 
laughter: 
After some supposedly funny or witty remark, you can hear the laughter and the 
applause included in the soundtrack of the show itself. Here we have the exact 
counterpart of the Chorus in antique tragedy; it’s here that we have to look for 
‘living Antiquity’. That is to say, why this laughter? The first possible answer—
that it serves to remind us when to laugh—is interesting enough because it 
implies the paradox that laughter is a matter of duty and not of some 
spontaneous feeling. But this answer isn’t sufficient, because usually we don’t 
laugh. The only correct answer would then be that the other—embodied in the 
TV set—is relieving us even of our duty to laugh, i.e., is laughing instead of us. 
So, even if, tired from the hard day’s stupid work, we did nothing all evening 
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but gaze drowsily into the TV screen, we can say afterwards that objectively, 
through the medium of the other, we had a really good time.1 
As Žižek points out, canned laughter always seems to intervene at the wrong time. This 
implies that there is a strange untimeliness that guarantees that, whenever the TV set is 
laughing, we are not laughing. Along the same lines, it could be said that whenever the 
Chorus is commenting on (what is supposed to be the ‘real’) Henry V, we (as viewing 
subjects) are experiencing mediation to a very intense degree. This is a striking example 
of how Shakespearean drama can be experienced in view of an aesthetics of 
untimeliness. For, ultimately, the Chorus emphasises the deferral of presence that is 
embedded in all linguistic processes. 
 In Of Grammatology, Derrida notes that ‘language adds itself to presence and 
supplants it, defers it within the indestructible desire to rejoin it.’2 By providing a 
comment on a pseudo-authentic and supposedly unmediated historical scene, the Chorus 
of Henry V can be said to rely on, promote as well as participate in the elaboration of a 
metaphysics of presence. Its utterances add themselves to the imagined presence of that 
scene; and so, to use Derrida’s phrase, they defer presence within the indestructible 
desire to rejoin it. The notion that language defers presence by adding itself to it is 
epitomised in the practice of literary criticism—another key example of interpassivity. 
In The Subject of Tragedy (1985), Catherine Belsey suggests that ‘literary criticism is 
[…] a choric elegy for lost presence.’3 Belsey’s analogy is significant to our purposes 
here in that it reminds us that the Chorus of Henry V is essentially a proto-literary critic. 
In the manner of a theatrical chorus, literary criticism tells us how to enjoy by providing 
                                                
1  Slavoj Žižek, ‘The Lacanian Real: Television’, Symptom 9 (2008), lacan dot com, 
http://www.lacan.com/symptom/?p=38#_ftn1 (accessed 09 September 2011). 
2 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology [1967], translated from the French by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak 
(Baltimore MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), p. 280. 
3 Catherine Belsey, The Subject of Tragedy: Identity and Difference in Renaissance Drama (London: 
Routledge, 1985), p. 54. 
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a supplementary comment on literature. While all criticism inherently testifies to a loss 
of presence, what often distinguishes postmodern criticism is its self-reflexive 
acknowledgement, and in some cases, celebration of such loss. Francis Barker’s The 
Tremulous Private Body, already addressed in the introduction to this thesis, provides a 
good example of a Shakespeare criticism that self-consciously fashions itself as 
postmodern. The following passage, in particular, is worth quoting again. Writing about 
Shakespeare’s most famous play, Barker argues that ‘Hamlet is nothing but the prince’s 
evasion of a series of positions offered him’: 
The point is not to supply this absence, but to aggravate its historical 
significance. […] Rather than a gap to be filled, Hamlet’s mystery is a void to be 
celebrated, therefore, against the individualist illusion of man as free and full of 
meaning; a fable which it is still ours to undo today.4 
As pointed out earlier, Barker’s rejection of the ‘individualist illusion of man as free and 
full of meaning’ illustrates the politics of resistance through which a number of cultural 
materialists have sought to distinguish themselves from new historicism. What is 
purposefully resisted here is presence itself—a ‘fable which it is still ours to undo 
today’, in Barker’s own words. As a specific example, this occurrence should not 
obfuscate the fact that all literary criticism, whether postmodernist or not, eschews 
presence, precisely because of the ‘fables’ it seeks to ‘undo’. Barker’s assertion that 
‘Hamlet’s mystery is a void to be celebrated’ calls for a recognition of non-presence as 
a valid critical category; such thematisation of the impossibility of presence, it is 
suggested, can constitute a literary politics of its own. 
But, ultimately, resistance to presence reaches beyond the superficial realm of 
the thematic: as the thesis has demonstrated in various ways, différance is inscribed 
within the linguistic processes through which the criticism is formed. And whether this 
                                                
4  Francis Barker, The Tremulous Private Body: Essays on Subjection, quoted in Richard Wilson, 
‘Historicising New Historicism’, New Historicism and Renaissance Drama, edited by Richard Dutton and 
Richard Wilson (London and New York: Longman, 1992), p. 14. 
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objective process is acknowledged (or even celebrated) is ultimately irrelevant. For 
criticism intrinsically resists—and, in that respect, what it actually resists does not 
particularly matter. The main concern throughout this thesis has been to emphasise how 
Shakespearean drama can be said to aestheticise the intrinsically differential quality of 
literature. With this aim in mind, the chapter on Julius Caesar has suggested that the 
untimeliness that haunts literary works can be experienced within the diegetic 
framework of a play. Following this reflection, the chapter on Hamlet has demonstrated 
that différance is in fact always already at work in all the subjective responses (not only 
critical, strictly speaking) to a work of art. This ultimately implies that literature has no 
‘in-itself’, no inalienable core of presence. With a large focus on Henry V, the last two 
chapters of the thesis have demonstrated how such différance is the effect of a 
maddening mediation of presence at work not only ‘in’ literature (and ‘its’ alleged 
historical moment) but essentially everywhere else (and from a multitude of historical 
moments). Eventually, the notion of interpassivity has allowed us to examine the 
implications of this mediation for the viewing subject in the present. Read in the light of 
interpassivity, Shakespeare’s plays can help us comprehend how meaning and 
subjectivity are systematically displaced in all forms of staged entertainment—on the 
other hand, we should remember that the plays themselves crucially participate in this 
generalised deferral of presence. 
If our modern lives are regimented by mediative processes, as they are, 
interpassivity does not necessarily have to be a disempowering mechanism. In The 
Plague of Fantasies, Žižek insists on the coexistence of two seemingly contradictory 
aspects of the interpassive subject: while the big Other deprives us of our individual 
capacity to enjoy, it also takes over the mechanical, repetitive and alienating functions 
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inherent to the process of enjoyment.5 Far from being antagonistic, these two aspects of 
interpassivity in fact complement each other. In many ways, this uncanny reversibility 
challenges the typical postmodern impasse of the disarticulated subject. Žižek 
repeatedly insists on the liberating potential contained within the interpassive process: 
By surrendering my innermost content, including my dreams and anxieties, to 
the Other, a space opens up in which I am free to breathe: when the Other laughs 
for me, I am free to take a rest; when the Other is sacrificed instead of me, I am 
free to go on living with the awareness that I did atone for my guilt; and so on.6 
Thus, for Žižek, staged entertainment can be used as a medium to experience the 
relieving potential of the big Other. Thus, when the TV set is laughing for me I am 
relieved of the burden to enjoy. Likewise, when the literary critic (or the Chorus) is 
telling me what a work is actually about or how I am supposed to enjoy it, I am relieved 
of the burden to enjoy. However, this recognition only provides a very superficial (and 
rather dubious) type of relief, as it essentially implies our complicity in being 
brainwashed. The only way of experiencing interpassivity as a genuinely liberating 
experience is to deliberately shut off those voices. This can be done, for instance, by 
turning the TV off. In place of the ubiquitous injunction telling me what and how to 
enjoy, there is suddenly silence and the possibility for healthy introspection. 
It would be hard to deny that we live in a world of extreme mediation. 
Accordingly, it might appear important, to some of us at least, to find effective ways of 
bypassing the complex interpretive layering that conditions our experience of reality—
this is all the more relevant to academic practices within the humanities, where the 
degree of mental layering often takes alarming proportions. Towards the end of his life, 
the German philosopher Martin Heidegger discussed the concept of Gelassenheit—
                                                
5 Žižek, The Plague of Fantasies, p. 147. 
6 Ibid., p. 141. 
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often translated as ‘releasement’. While Žižek dismisses Heidegger’s use of the concept 
as a mere politics of resignation or withdrawal, David Couzens Hoy suggests that 
Gelassenheit should not be interpreted as ‘withdrawal’ so much as ‘letting be’. 
‘Withdrawal’ is still too voluntaristic, as if we could really escape our social and 
historical situation. ‘Letting be’ means not trying to control everything, but it is 
not simply an inner attitude. ‘Letting be’ is something that has to be practiced 
over and over, and is thus still in active relation to the affairs of the world.7 
In the context of criticism, letting be may imply relinquishing our identification with 
specific intellectual positions. In a society that values action, control and resistance, it is 
easy to overlook the intrinsic value of surrender. Perhaps an adequate response to the 
fashionable politics of resistance would be a non-strategic and total surrender of our 
mental content. But if all criticism generates resistance, as suggested earlier, where can 
we find a space for genuine surrender within the realm of academia? Maybe the answer 
lies beyond the ‘choric elegy’ of criticism (and so beyond the academic institution 
itself). For, as the Daoist sage Zhuangzi pointed out, 
The purpose of words is to convey ideas. 
When the ideas are grasped, the words are forgotten. 
Where can I find a man who has forgotten words? 
He is the one I would like to talk to.8 
 
                                                
7 David Couzens Hoy, The Time of Our Lives: A Critical History of Temporality (Cambridge, MA and 
London: The MIT Press, 2009), p. 176. Gelassenheit, Žižek argues, is an attitude of ‘withdrawing from 
engagement, from “public” circulation, silently laying the ground for the possible arrival of gods’ (Slavoj 
Žižek, The Parallax View (Cambridge, MA and London: The MIT Press, 2006), p. 284). Žižek is here 
referring to Heidegger’s infamous statement that ‘only a god can save us’ (Martin Heidegger, ‘Nur noch 
ein Gott kann uns retten’, Der Spiegel 30 (1976), 193-219). For a first-hand account of Gelassenheit, see 
Martin Heidegger, ‘Conversation on a Country Path about Thinking’, in Discourse on Thinking, 
translated from the German by John Anderson and Hans Freund (New York: Harper and Row, 1996). 
8 Thomas Merton, ‘Means and Ends’, The Way of Chuang Tzu (Boston and London: Shambhala, 2004), 
p. 179. 
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But nature does not change. Only we change. All 
our theories are just words and our words are not 
so different from the songs of the birds and the 
cries of the animals—except we make the mistake 
of thinking that our words contain the truth. But 
look! The first stars are out. Come. You must be 
hungry. This philosophizing is very tiring. I think 
we should stick to farming! Let us go and eat!1 
 
                                                
1 Jonathan Reggio, One Day the Shadow Passed (London: Hay House, 2012), p. 186. 
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